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This dissertation explores the impact of legitimacy concerns on the strategic decision 
making of separatist rebel groups. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of new states in 
the international system has increased consistently. Many of these have risen from the ashes of 
states that have collapsed under the weight of their own domestic political and economic 
institutions as well as widespread popular support for separation, as happened in the former 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Others feature populations and area too small to be deemed 
consequential in the international system, and have been peacefully granted independence 
through international agreements, as happened in places like Micronesia. A few, however, 
earned statehood on the back of blood and hard-fought self-determination, at times aided by 
important members of the international system. These conflicts are among the few examples of 
separatist conflicts that met with success in establishing a new state. Despite the fact that 
separatist conflicts make up roughly a third of all ongoing armed conflicts, only four – Namibia, 
Eritrea, East Timor, and South Sudan – have resulted in statehood in the post-Cold War era. This 
statistic reflects the difficulty in establishing new states in an international system that 
prioritizes the norm of territorial integrity over that of the right to self-determination. In this 
dissertation, I argue that the difficulty of establishing new states is not lost in separatist actors, 
and that they conduct their struggles in ways strategically designed to endear themselves to 
important gatekeepers of statehood – namely, their domestic population and important 
members of the international community. They do this by trying to manufacture legitimacy – 
that is, their right and ability to govern a people and rule over a piece of territory. I argue that, 
owing to concerns of legitimacy, we can observe systematic differences in the way separatist 
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actors conduct warfare compared to other rebel groups, and these differences usually manifest 
in ways that avoid legitimacy costs and procure legitimacy gains. Indeed, based on a 
quantitative analysis of separatist and non-separatist conflicts in the post-Cold War era, it 
appears that separatist rebel groups engage in lower levels of violence and employ fewer 
economic forms of civilian targeting, such as civilian killing, use of child soldiers, sexual violence, 
kidnapping, theft, and seizure of humanitarian aid. I also find that separatists are more likely to 
engage in practices that are intended to demonstrate the efficacy of their political institutions, 
such as extortion – or, in other words, taxation without legality. It also appears, however, that 
legitimacy concerns are only one piece of a complicated puzzle. In a micro-level analysis making 
use of novel month-level data, I find that developments within conflicts, such as significant 
battlefield losses, can cause groups to re-think their strategies, and may lead them to target 
more civilians in order to take advantage of short-term benefits when negative strategic shocks 
leave their potential for long-term success in doubt. Taken together, these findings contribute 
novel insights to the scholarly discussions surrounding civilian targeting in armed conflicts in 
general, separatism in particular, as well as statebuilding, legitimacy, and the micro-dynamics of 
civil war. They also provide useful insights for conflict-management practitioners seeking viable 




To my parents for their unwavering support  
 v 
Acknowledgements 
There are few more mentally demanding undertakings than a doctoral degree. This 
dissertation is the culmination and product of a six-year journey during which I have been 
surrounded by incredibly inspiring, supportive, and generous people. Each of them, in their own 
way, contributed to my ability to overcome the rigors of graduate school so that I am able write 
these acknowledgements today. The members of the faculty and staff in the Political Science 
Department at the University of Illinois are dedicated teachers and mentors who have helped 
me grow and mature not only as a scholar but also as a person. John Vasquez has been a 
tireless advocate and mentor since before I even arrived in Champaign, and has been with me 
at every step of this process. Alyssa Prorok has generously contributed hours of her valuable 
time and dispensed her impeccable expertise on civil war in ways that have fundamentally 
influenced the transformation of this dissertation from its inception roughly three years ago. I 
frequently stopped to chat with Carol Leff about academics as well as topics beyond the 
purview of academia, and her seminar on Ethnic Conflict is where my earliest ideas to explore 
separatism and legitimacy began to germinate. Lastly, but not least, I am grateful for the 
tireless help of Brian Gaines in reading several drafts of dissertation chapters that are far 
outside his field of study in order to ensure the methodological accuracy and rigor of the 
analyses that appear in this dissertation. I am nearly as grateful for his interest in talking hockey 
when the stress and rigors of grad school were especially palpable. For helping with everything 
practical related to this journey, Brenda Stamm and the rest of the administration have my 
sincere thanks. 
 vi 
I would not have been able to pursue a graduate degree at the University of Illinois 
without the help of the faculty members in the Department of Political Science at The 
Pennsylvania State University. I am particularly indebted to Douglas Lemke, who taught me in 
two undergraduate classes, employed me as a research assistant, and ignited in me an 
insatiable intrigue in exploring trends in international relations in general, and in civil conflict in 
particular. He also served as a steadfast mentor and devoted far more time than he should have 
to advising me at every step of the grad school application and selection process. 
I would also be remiss not to thank the graduate students at the University of Illinois, as 
well as the other dear friendships I developed while living in Champaign-Urbana, for 
brightening my day, every day, for six years. Although I am grateful for the support and 
friendship of many, there are a few who I wish to particularly highlight: Luke Plutowski 
tolerated me as a roommate for three years and, somehow, still wanted to be one of my closest 
friends even afterward. Nuole Chen, Ekrem Baser, Alice Ionnontuoni, Wei Zhong and Jessica 
Morelock, and, unofficially, Patrick Hebert, Caglayan Baser, and Chris Grady round out what I 
affectionately refer to as The Greatest Cohort of All Time. From cohort retreats to our annual 
holiday gift exchanges to the countless happy hours and dinner parties, their friendship and 
support are perhaps the biggest reasons I lasted this long in grad school. Thomas Lassi became 
the closest of friends, and our hours-long conversations centering on sports and movies and 
politics remain the highlights of my graduate experience. Ryan Loh and Lydia Nguyen helped 
me to realize a world outside of academia that helped make Champaign feel more like my 
home than merely a grad school program. Ryan particularly is the best rec-league hockey 
captain I could have asked for, even if we always managed to choke when it counted and never 
 vii 
won the big one. Alex Avrin, despite entering my life fairly late in my grad school experience, 
has become the partner in crime I have always been waiting for. Her love and support over the 
better past year have lifted me to levels I had never imagined, and is in large part responsible 
for my ability to finish this thing out strong. I look forward to wherever – and to whatever – our 
journey takes us next. To all of you, thank you for tolerating my bad jokes and for sharing in my 
laughs. I am extremely lucky to have you in my life. 
Above all, I need to recognize the love and support that have come from my family at 
every step of this journey. My parents, Tom and Joyce, never forced me to follow a particular 
path, but enthusiastically supported me in everything I set myself to. The world of academia in 
general and of international relations in particular are a mystery to them, yet they still anxiously 
ask me to tell them about my research and those of my friends and colleagues. My brother, 
Jesse, remains my favorite movie-watching partner and pilot-in-training. I love all of you and am 
fairly certain I would have left graduate school long ago if not for your support. 




Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..1 
Chapter 2: Civilian Targeting in Armed Conflict………………………………………………………………………..16 
Chapter 3: Separatism, Legitimacy, and Civilian Targeting in Civil War…………………………………….39 
Chapter 4: Separatism and Civilian Targeting in Civil War: An Empirical Analysis……………………..67 
Chapter 5: Separatism and the Economic Victimization of Civilians in Civil War…………………….107 
Chapter 6: Separatism and the Micro-Level Dynamics of Civilian Targeting in Civil War…………131 
Chapter 7: Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..162 
References…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….183 
Appendix: Data and List of Cases……………………………………………………………………………………………197 
 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
“We prefer world law in the age of self-determination to world war in the age of mass 
extermination.” – John F. Kennedy, Former United States President. 
 
“There are both things in international law: the principle of territorial integrity and right to self-
determination.” – Vladimir Putin, President of Russia 
 
1.1 The Motivation 
 The quotations above point to two central paradoxes of armed conflict and political 
violence. Rebellion against a sovereign state is inherently illegal, even as it unfolds in response 
to political grievances and within an international system that values the right of self-
determination. The sentiment communicated by President Kennedy above has, in a few 
instances, been embodied in the peaceful establishment of a new state based on the wishes of 
a popular majority – or at least the holding of a referendum for one. Usually these occur in 
countries with established democratic institutions, as was the case with the referenda on 
Scottish, Catalan, and Qebecois independence in 2014, 2017, and 1995, respectively, as well as 
on the British decision to leave the European Union in 2016. More often than not, however, 
self-determination movements occur in less free societies where accommodative institutions 
do not exist and where meeting dissent with force is the norm. In such cases, international legal 
standards that protect the right to self-determination can do little to peacefully resolve self-
determination disputes, and political violence that often escalates to civil war and in extreme 
cases “mass extermination,” as President Kennedy put it, results.1 
 
1 In some cases, such “mass extermination” results in “remidial secession”, where the international community 
comes to believe that a people is so badly treated by the regime that the only remedy is separation. This was the 
case in the internationally sanctioned separation of South Sudan from Sudan in 2012. 
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 Often, the failure of self-determination movements to peacefully meet success results 
from the paradox evident in the second quote. Given Mr. Putin’s penchant for at different times 
supporting either the right to self-determination or the principle of territorial integrity, perhaps 
there is no better bearer of the message that these two principles of international law are 
diametrically opposed and inherently contradictory, and that this contradiction has never been 
resolved. Indeed, it appears that the rarity with which self-determination movements translate 
into statehood is a direct consequence of the fact that the international community values the 
principle of territorial integrity – and, hence, stability – more than it values the principle of self-
determination. There is evidence that states crack down harder against separatist movements 
than other rebellions (Walter 2009), as well as that non-violent movements are more successful 
than violent ones in meeting their goals except when they are separatist (Chenoweth and 
Stephan 2011). There seems to be a general aversion among states to sacrificing the integrity of 
their territory in favor of a subset of their population’s right to determine their own political 
fate. This paradox is further underscored by the fact that the successful establishment of a new 
state is especially hard because it usually requires the support of powerful members of the 
international system (Coggins 2015), many of whom – including three fifths of the permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council2 – deal with self-determination movements on 
their own soil. As with all legal doctrine, precedent reigns supreme insofar as priorities are 
determined in international law. 
 Self-determination movements, particularly those with separatist aspirations, therefore 
face an uphill battle from the outset. They must engage in an inherently illegal action – 
 
2 Russia, China, and the United Kingdom. 
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rebellion – in spite of the de jure legality of the use of force in the quest for self-determination 
but de facto lack of it – while simultaneously winning the support of important members of the 
international system that are likely to oppose in principle the premise of their existence as an 
independent entity. As is a pre-requisite of maintaining the society of a new state, they must 
also establish a social contract with some subset of a domestic population that has consented 
to be governed by them.3 
 What is more, it appears that separatist groups know this and make strategic decisions 
accordingly. The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), for example, 
expended considerable energy and political capital ingratiating themselves to domestic civilians 
and engaging in extensive diplomatic dialogues with the international community in their 
struggle for independence from, initially, colonial Portugal, and subsequently Indonesian 
occupation in 1975. Their nearly three-decade separatist civil war culminated in the induction, 
on September 27th, 2002, of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste as the 191st member state 
of the United Nations, with Fretilin winning a majority of the votes in the country’s inaugural 
democratic elections. Similarly, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), during its multi-
decade civil war against the government of Ethiopia, earned considerable credibility for its 
establishment of a network of schools and hospitals in territory under its control, as well as for 
its treatment of prisoners of war, earning widespread domestic and international support for 
political efficacy and observation of international humanitarian law. EPLF translated these 
 
3 The Social Contract, of course, owes its philosophical origins to John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who 
conceptualized of the relationship between the government and the governed as an implicit agreement wherein 
leaders exchanged protection of the natural rights of life, liberty, and property for the conferment of legitimacy. 
Further, according to Locke, a government’s failure to provide these is not simply grounds for rebellion, but rather 
the obligation toward it. 
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legitimacy gains into incumbency and statehood in the newly independent state of Eritrea in 
1993. These anecdotes are born out in the data. Separatist conflicts, on average, tend to kill 
fewer civilians than non-separatist conflicts, despite also lasting longer on average and not 
killing fewer combatants, on average. In addition, several statistical analyses show that, in 
effect, this reflects deliberate and systematic differences in the way separatist groups behave 
compared to other rebel groups, specifically in ways that show they value playing by the rules 
of the international system and upholding their end of a domestic social contract.4 
 Conceptually, what constitutes a separatist is fairly straightforward. Separatist rebel 
groups are one subset of self-determination movement. As Kathleen Cunningham (2013) puts 
it, a self-determination movement is simply an organized attempt to achieve greater self-rule. 
Separatism is the attempt to translate that self-determination into formal separation from a 
parent state. A separatist rebel group, therefore is the subset of separatist self-determination 
movements that has engaged in armed, violent rebellion against the parent state with the goal 
of liberating some territory from that state’s control. Thus, they differ from non-violent 
separatist self-determination movements like that in Catalonia and Scotland in that its means of 
achieving separation involve violent rebellion – hence, rebel. Usually, separatist groups aim to 
establish a newly independent state, but sometimes a separatist group has irredentist 
aspirations that involve joining another state already in existence, as is the case with Armenian 
rebels in Nagorno-Karabakh, whose goal after separation from Azerbaijan is to become 
annexed into Armenia. 
 
4 See for instance Jo (2015), but I discuss these in much more depth in Chapter 2. 
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 It is important to emphasize, of course, that a rebel group may fit the description of a 
self-determination movement without being separatist. Some rebellions aim merely to carve 
out some additional degree of autonomy within the political apparatus of an existing state. The 
Zapista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in Mexico is an example of such a group, as they 
appear to pursue an outcome that includes significantly enhanced autonomy in southern 
Mexico and guarantee of greater indigenous rights, but not outright independence. Separatism 
therefore requires the goal of full separation from a parent state, which is usually explicitly 
stated by the groups themselves or is clearly inferable based on contextual factors. 
 This dissertation therefore considers a very specific subset of rebel groups and 
compares their strategic decisions to the broader sample of rebels. It takes as its starting point 
violent, separatist self-determination rebel groups such as FRETLIN, EPLF, and Karabakhi rebels 
referenced in the preceding paragraphs – groups that seek to separate from an existing state 
and do so violently. It then compares these strategic decisions to those of center-seeking 
groups – those whose goals are geared toward some internal outcome such as a regime or 
policy change – in other words, all rebels that are not separatists.5 
 At its core, then, this dissertation contributes to the academic dialogue aimed at 
demonstrating the manner in which separatist conflicts are, owing to unique domestic and 
international pressures, systematically different than other types of armed conflicts, and to 
establish some of the limits of these differences. In addition, however, it speaks to the broader 
 
5 Examples of such center-seeking groups include Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, the Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia, and a litany of others (See Appendix at the end of this dissertation for a comprehensive list). I discuss 
what constitutes separatist and non-separatist groups from an operational, empirical standpoint when I get to the 
empirical analyses in Chapter 4. 
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civil war literature by focusing on outcomes that have been at the center of civil war debates 
since the research program’s infancy: civilian targeting and state-building. Civilians are all too 
often caught in the crosshairs of combatants in armed conflicts. Yet the international norms 
and laws protecting civilians in wartime combined with the propensity of separatist groups to 
place special emphasis on playing by the rules of the international system allows us to 
systematically explain civilian targeting patterns, in different forms, in at least a subset of 
armed conflicts. This project attempts to paint a fuller, more complex, more dynamic, and more 
nuanced picture of the forces at play as it relates to separatism, legitimacy, micro-level conflict 
dynamics, and civilian targeting in civil war. 
 
1.2 The State of the Literature 
 Existing literature on civilian targeting in civil conflicts, at the group-level specifically, 
tends to fall into two theoretical veins. On the one hand, championed by Stathis Kalyvas (2006), 
some scholars tend to view the targeting of civilians as strategic, deliberate, and discriminate – 
the product of calculations intended to achieve some specific purpose and dispelled against 
targets selected for specific reasons. On the other hand, Jeremy Weinstein (2007) and others 
explain violence against civilians as the result of poor discipline and a breakdown in the 
principle-agent relationship between rebel commanders and foot soldiers, resulting in the 
indiscriminate targeting of civilians en masse. The reality likely falls somewhere in between 
these two extremes, or at the least can be either in different circumstances, but separately they 
serve as a sort of dialogue between competing paradigms of thought on civilian targeting in civil 
war that has, over time, produced a progressive research program that has gradually increased 
our understanding of the forces that make civil war so terrible for civilians. 
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 The literatures exploring separatism and legitimacy are far less developed. It is clear, 
from the few existing studies, that separatists behave systematically differently from other 
rebel groups, and do so for reasons having to do with the unique domestic and international 
pressures such movements are subject to. A few notable studies in this vein include Jo (2015), 
Fazal (2018), Stewart (2016), and Huang (2018). Beyond that, however, very little exists to 
connect the dots between separatist legitimacy concerns and civilian targeting. In Chapter 2, I 
explore the philosophical and academic discussions regarding these topics in further depth, and 
identify several important gaps in these literatures to which this dissertation seeks to 
contribute. 
 
1.3 The Argument 
 The theoretical argument I introduce in Chapter 3 attempts to establish a 
comprehensive theoretical framework to explain the behavior of separatist groups as a function 
of concerns of legitimacy. This argument builds upon the work of several scholars, as well as 
notable real-world examples, that demonstrate that separatist rebel groups routinely make 
strategic decisions that are attenuated by concerns of legitimacy. It situates existing research 
into an overarching framework that is useful for making sense of the strategic options available 
to separatist groups as well as outcomes resulting from those decisions. To summarize, I argue 
that separatists have two broad strategic options in regard to legitimacy: they can make 
decisions that procure legitimacy gains and others that avoid legitimacy costs.6 
 
6 Of course, separatist groups could alternatively choose not to seek legitimacy at all, but that would go against 
their strategic interests in their endeavor to achieve independence, as they need legitimacy as a precondition for 
success in establishing a new state. 
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 I then derive a few testable predictions that fall within the legitimacy cost avoidance 
dimension of this framework, which relate specifically to the targeting of civilians – a practice 
that is both outlawed in international law and abhorred by domestic civilians. My theoretical 
expectations here rest squarely in the rational-strategic vein of civilian targeting logic 
championed by Kalyvas and others, which argues that combatants target civilians for specific 
reasons that have strategic benefit. My theory here uses this logic in the inverse. While 
targeting civilians can have important strategic benefits for rebel groups, the avoidance of 
targeting civilians can actually be more beneficial for separatist groups in particular – mainly 
because it does not alienate important domestic and international supporters and may actually 
demonstrate to both something about their political efficacy and willingness to play by the rules 
of the international system and uphold their end of the social contract. 
Rebels may target civilians either violently or economically, and I argue that separatist 
groups, owing to how the legitimacy of their movements are perceived, engage in both forms 
of targeting less often or at lower levels than other rebel groups. With respect to the former, I 
argue that separatists kill fewer civilians, use lower levels of sexual violence, use fewer child 
soldiers, and kidnap civilians less often than other rebel groups. In terms of economic targeting, 
I also argue that separatists engage in theft from civilians and intercept humanitarian aid less 
often than other rebel groups. Counterintuitively, however, I argue that separatists are actually 
more likely to extort from civilians, owing to the similarity extortion bears to taxation and the 
legitimacy gains that can be procured from the establishment of an institutionalized tax regime 
that resembles the kind that nearly all states use regularly. These arguments represent novel 
contributions to the literature because they consider new outcomes that have not been 
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explored in the context of civilian targeting in general (theft, seizure of humanitarian aid, 
extortion) or with respect to separatism in particular (sexual violence), or with respect to new 
data sources and contexts (civilian killing, child soldier use). In addition, no studies that I am 
aware of have treated extortion as a method of state-building, and as such my exploration of 
this idea here – which I expound upon theoretically in Chapter 3 and test in Chapter 5 – is 
especially notable. 
 I also argue that longer-term concerns such as that of political legitimacy may be a 
luxury that not all separatist groups can afford, and some contextual factors may lead some 
separatists to place legitimacy in the back seat in favor of shorter-term tactical considerations. 
As Kalyvas and others establish, targeting civilians can be strategically beneficial. Developments 
within conflicts that put a separatist group’s prospects for success in doubt could create such a 
circumstance where separatists become untethered from the legitimacy-seeking framework. 
Such a development that is easily observable might come in the form of a costly battle. Thus, I 
argue that separatists become more likely to target civilians in the aftermath of suffering 
significant battlefield fatalities as a way of “stemming the bleeding”, so to speak, and to level 
the strategic playing field in the short term regardless of longer-term consequences. 
 I explore only one outcome that dives deeper in to the micro-level forces at work in the 
overarching strategic playing field that separatists contend with. This serves to not only probe 
the surface of other outcomes that might be explored with the same or similar logic but also to 
demonstrate the limits of legitimacy-seeking theory. Taken together, then, I argue that 
separatist groups systematically behave according to legitimacy concerns owing to unique 
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domestic and international pressures, but that these expectations are limited and attenuated 
by other contextual factors. 
 
1.4 The Evidence 
 Chapter 4 explores the subset of these claims that focus on violent forms of civilian 
targeting. I utilize several data sources from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) to 
identify a universe 1,099 dyadic conflict-years that includes information on the number of 
civilians killed, the levels of child soldiers and sexual violence used, and the incidence of 
kidnapping at the hands of both separatist and non-separatist groups in the years between 
1989 and 2009. The analyses in Chapter 4 show that separatist groups do tend to kill fewer 
civilians and use lower levels of sexual violence against civilians than other groups, and these 
findings are robust to several model specifications. I also find contextual support for the 
analysis of rebel kidnapping propensity – it appears that separatists are not less likely to engage 
in kidnapping in general, but they are less likely to kidnap international civilians specifically. By 
contrast, the analyses in chapter 4 find no support for the notion that separatist groups use 
fewer child soldiers than other rebels. 
 In Chapter 5, I explore economic forms of civilian targeting such as theft, extortion, and 
seizure of humanitarian aid. I construct these measures using the novel Rebel Contraband 
Dataset (RCD) (Walsh et al. 2018), and use data identical to those used for the tests explored in 
Chapter 4. I find, as predicted, that separatists engage in theft and the seizure of humanitarian 
aid significantly less often than other rebels, and that they engage in extortion significantly 
more often. These findings further support the idea that separatist groups place specific 
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emphasis on making strategic decisions that enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of domestic 
and international audiences. 
 Having established this baseline expectation, I turn in Chapter 6 to an analysis of the 
broader strategic landscape that separatists must grapple with and some of the limits of the 
legitimacy-seeking framework. I construct monthly data derived from the UCDP Georeferenced 
Events Data (GED) (Sundberg and Melander 2013) for all separatist conflicts ongoing during the 
years 1989-2018, producing a universe of 10,544 dyad-months. According to these data, it 
appears that, consistent with the theoretical predictions I outline in Chapter 3, separatist 
groups do indeed kill more civilians after suffering higher levels of battlefield fatalities, lending 
support to the notion that micro-level conditional factors may help explain when separatists do 
kill more civilians in spite of the incentives to practice restraint. 
 
1.5 The Contribution 
 The theoretical argument, accompanied by the legitimacy-seeking framework, 
hypotheses, and empirical analyses found in the later chapters, suggests that separatist rebel 
groups, owing to concerns of legitimacy and the perceptions of important potential domestic 
and international supporters, tend to behave differently compared to their non-separatist 
counterparts. They do so systematically and the results are robust across multiple different 
model specifications. They also suggest that legitimacy concerns are only one piece of the 
puzzle, and that contextual factors also matter for explaining separatist civilian targeting 
patterns. This study and its findings have a few important implications for academic discussions 
surrounding civil war and other forms of political violence. 
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 First, I shed light important aspects of a specific subset of civil conflicts – separatist 
conflicts. These conflicts clearly unfold systematically differently from other types of conflicts, 
and this is in part due to the unique incentives of the actors involved. Separatists care about 
how their movements are perceived. A key component of this is demonstrating both the 
willingness and the ability to play by the rules of the international system, as well as to uphold 
their end of a social contract with a domestic citizenry. Demonstrating this willingness implies 
something about separatist values, more specifically that they value the same things that their 
potential-future counterparts in the international system value as well as what their potential-
future domestic constituency values. Demonstrating the ability to do these things says 
something about the entity’s political efficacy. Doing so requires considerable effort and 
political capital to be spent on various state-making measures intended to build state capacity 
and develop political and social institutions capable of upholding the international and 
domestic values that the gatekeepers of legitimacy so value and that should be expected of a 
fully functioning state. 
 Second, my theory and findings have important implications for the literature on civilian 
targeting at large. The killing of civilians is interesting and important, but it has been studied at 
length.7 Other forms of civilian victimization have received considerably less attention, if any. 
By examining the factors that contribute to the prevalence of sexual violence or of child soldier 
use,8 or the incidence of theft, humanitarian aid seizure, and extortion, I contribute novel 
 
7 Albeit it is done in a very limited capacity in regard to separatism in particular. 
8 I do not mean that these outcomes have not been examined at length – indeed they have, especially sexual 
violence. Rather, my point here is that they have not been examined systematically as it relates to separatism and 
legitimacy. Only Jo (2015) examines child soldiering as an outcome attenuated by legitimacy concerns, albeit using 
different data and model specifications than I use in Chapter 4, and sexual violence has not yet been explored in a 
legitimacy-seeking context. This dissertation fills these gaps in the literature. 
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insights into the various ways in which civilians can become victims in civil wars and the forces 
driving them. In addition, I explore these outcomes while simultaneously injecting separatism 
into the discussion, which is usually only considered as a driving force behind civilian targeting 
in a small subset of studies and usually only used as a control variable to help explain the 
incidence of civilian killing as a function of some other primary independent variable. The 
theory and analyses in this dissertation expand the scope of research on civilian targeting in 
general. Further, for many of the covariates I include in these analyses, I use new and 
innovative data that allow me to shed light on the broader forces, independent of separatism, 
influencing rebel civilian targeting propensities in new and fascinating ways. Thus, the findings 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5 represent original contributions to knowledge on civilian 
targeting patterns in general, as well as within a specific subset of conflicts, upon which future 
scholarship can build and from which policy-makers and conflict management practitioners 
might derive actionable insights. 
 Finally, I contribute to conflict research in general by exploring the dynamic nature of 
armed conflicts. That is, rather than focusing on group- or conflict-level factors to help explain 
conflict outcomes, I also take into account contextual, within-conflict factors that influence 
combatant decisions as a response to strategic stimuli. I am certainly not the first scholar to 
explore dynamic conflict developments within time and space,9 but it is certainly an 
underdeveloped strain of the conflict literature in comparison with studies conducted at the 
group-, conflict-, or conflict-year level. In addition, few studies explore within-conflict 
developments in the context of strategic shocks. Indeed, it is clear from the analyses in Chapter 
 
9 See for example Hultman (2007) and Reed Wood (2014) 
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6 that separatist rebel groups respond to such developments. Due to empirical challenges and 
data availability, I focus only one specific shock in relation to one subset of conflicts, but leave 
the door open for future scholarship to expand the scope of the insights produced herein. 
Scholarship may, for example, explore how separatists respond to other negative or positive 
shocks, or expand the discussion to explore how all rebels or, more generally, all combatants in 
armed conflicts respond to similar strategic developments. I discuss some potential future 
directions for such research in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 This project also has implications for policymakers. By identifying certain conditions – 
and establishing the scope of those conditions – that contribute to higher or lower levels of 
civilian victimization, policymakers and conflict-management practitioners can develop a profile 
of conflicts that require greater or lesser urgency in addressing. They can also work to develop 
solutions based on certain conflict-specific contextual factors that might allow them to make 
war less terrible for the civilians trapped in the middle. In particular, it is clear based on the 
findings I outline in Chapters 4-6 that members of the international system can have 
considerable influence over the behavior of at least separatist rebel groups. As it stands, 
however, it appears that they rarely act in ways that reward separatists for their efforts to play 
by the international community’s rules. The reason for this probably lies with the contradiction 
I discussed earlier in this chapter – the discord between the principles of self-determination and 
territorial integrity. Yet the consequences of continuing to ignore separatist efforts are clear 
and unforgiving: separatists can be expected to learn that their efforts at legitimacy-building go 
mostly unrecognized and are likely, eventually, to choose to do away with strategies that 
prioritize restraint vis-à-vis civilians. If that happens, the international community will have lost 
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an opportunity at productive engagement with belligerents in at least a subset of armed 
conflicts. 
 In general, I hope that future scholarship and practitionership views the contributions of 
this dissertation as positive and progressive for enhancing our understanding of armed conflict 
processes, as well as allowing us to better address the scourge of armed conflict for civilians 





Chapter 2: Civilian Targeting in Armed Conflict 
“International Law says people fighting for self-determination can use force in order to achieve 
their independence.” – Norman Finkelstein, Political Scientist 
 
2.1 Introduction: The Historical Context and Framing the Academic Dialogue 
 The scourge of war has, throughout history, brought civilians into the crosshairs of 
combatants. To an extent, that is why war is regarded as so terrible by nearly any sensible 
person – it is one thing to knowingly be put in harm’s way in a conflict zone as a soldier, part of 
a force designed for that purpose; it is another to live within one by unfortunate circumstance. 
Yet history is not full of statesmen and combat commanders who have valued the welfare of 
non-combatants in armed conflicts. On the contrary, in ancient and medieval warfare, the 
targeting of civilians was seen as an inseparable part of war, as victors killed, plundered, and 
raped as tacitly (or explicitly) endorsed payment for their service and incentive to fight well and 
win battles – it was simply part of the spoils of war to which soldiers were entitled.10 Despite 
changing norms of conduct in war that have at least given civilians a status of protection, the 
tradition of targeting them remains alive and well today. Whether for reasons of strategy, 
incentive, or poor discipline, civilians remain a focal point of combatant violence. 
 Yet, resistance to this norm extends far into the past as well. For example, and quite 
ironically, the enslavement of captured soldiers and civilians in ancient warfare was seen as a 
humane alternative to killing them. Similarly, culturally dependent notions of “honor” have long 
 
10 Accounts of widespread looting, rape, murder, and plunder are recounted by many of the classical sources, such 
as Herodotus, Livy, Homer, Hebrew Prophets, and others. Loot and plunder were the primary form of payment for 
Roman soldiers (see for example Vickman 2005, Cochran 2012). 
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served to dissuade certain practices in war.11 Intellectually, the origins of thought establishing 
the ethical boundaries of warfare concerning non-combatants can be traced back to ancient 
Egyptian, Hebrew, Chinese, Hindu, Classical Greek, and Christian philosophers.12 Early attempts 
to establish laws of war can be found in the Mahabharata, the Old Testament, the Quran, and, 
perhaps most systematically, were outlined by St. Thomas Aquinas as the Just War Theory or 
Doctrine in his 13th Century Summa Theologica. 
 These philosophers and the tradition carried on by others have been the basis for a 
continually expanding set of international legal standards for treatment of civilians in wartime 
as well as a rich collection of academic research aimed at understanding various dimensions of 
civilian targeting in armed conflicts. The establishment of legal principles and proliferation of 
research directed at the topic are evidence of changing international norms regarding the value 
of human life and how it can and should be preserved in times of war. These developments are 
also perhaps the product of latent attitudes that existed all along but were not prioritized by 
soldiers and tacticians. 
They are also very recent. The first treaties establishing guidelines for conduct in war 
and prohibitions of certain tactics or weaponry did not come into effect until the mid-19th 
century. The earliest attempt to regulate warfare through international law was the 1864 
Geneva Convention, but this was limited only to protections for soldiers wounded in combat. 
The first widespread attempts to establish a broad war-crimes regime were the Hague 
 
11 Though Robinson (2006) notes that not only do conventions of what is deemed honorable differ in time and 
place, they are also fluid in context and tend to yield to pragmatic or strategic military interest depending upon 
circumstances. 
12 See Robinson (2003), Friday (2004), Deslauriers and Destree (2013), Cox (2017). Among the Classical Greek and 
Christian philosophers, these would most notably be Aristotle, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas. 
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Conventions of 1899 and 1907, yet widespread global acceptance of acceptable standards of 
behavior in wartime was not achieved until the establishment of the United Nations in 1948 
and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, with the atrocities of the Second World War fresh in the 
world’s collective memory.13 The application of these international legal standards to intrastate 
conflicts did not take place until even more recently. The Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions, established in 1977, were the first international treaties to apply specifically to 
internal conflicts. The shift away from a bipolar global distribution of power after the end of the 
Cold War facilitated the emergence of even stronger humanitarian and human rights norms. 
Several high-profile conflicts and resulting genocides in the 1990s prompted the international 
community to take international legal action against the perpetrators of human rights abuses. 
The United Nations levied sanctions against Milosevic’s abusive government in Yugoslavia. War 
crimes tribunals were established to investigate and try suspected war criminals for their roles 
in carrying out acts of violence in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia. These 
Tribunals established the precedent that individuals and non-state actors could be held 
accountable for war crimes and contributed to the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). 
While it is clear that international norms regarding the treatment of civilians in wartime 
have evolved over time, it is equally clear that the legal doctrines encoding these norms into 
law are nascent and evolving. It is also true, obviously, that the deliberate targeting of civilians 
in armed conflicts continues to plague conflict zones, regardless of the legal institutions in place 
 
13 Indeed, while today a salient focal point of prevention in conflict zones, the concept of “genocide” was neither 
defined nor conceived of until after the Holocaust. 
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intended to curb it – though there is evidence that these institutions have been at least 
somewhat successful.14 In addition, it is also clear that much variation exists regarding the 
extent to which civilians are the focal point of violence, depending on various factors specific to 
conflicts or combatants.15 Given these facts, modern scholars have attempted to identify the 
factors that contribute to higher or lower levels of civilian targeting in armed conflicts in light of 
legal and normative regimes in place that are meant to discourage it. 
This body of research builds upon the philosophical tradition discussed above to 
quantitatively and qualitatively examine various aspects of civilian targeting, such as its overall 
presence, the conditions conducive to higher or lower levels of it, and the motivations behind 
the perpetrators’ actions, among others. It is vast and illuminating. And yet, we still do not have 
a full picture of all of the forces at play. Even the most fundamental questions – why do 
combatants target civilians? Is it strategic? Is it a breakdown in the principle-agent relationship 
between leaders and soldiers (i.e., a discipline problem)? Is it something else? – do not have 
definitive answers. 
That is not to say, of course, that great progress has not been made toward answering 
these questions. Numerous scholars have advanced influential arguments that inform, 
contradict, and build upon one another. Very few things that are studied in the social sciences 
enjoy definitive answers, but the dialogue created by conflicting yet progressive research 
findings, aided by theoretical and empirical innovations, can bring us ever closer. In this 
dissertation, I aim to contribute to this healthy dialogue by establishing some modicum of 
 
14 See for example Wemmers (2009) 
15 See Kalyvas (2012) for an overview 
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insight into the civilian targeting patterns of at least a subset of conflicts – specifically conflicts 
of self-determination, otherwise known as separatist or secessionist conflicts. Before I do that, 
though, I must outline the state of existing research on the topic. In the pages that follow, I 
engage in a discussion of some of the most prominent arguments in the international relations 
literature on civilian targeting in armed conflicts. I then discuss a few areas where previous 
research and empirical innovations have opened new areas and methods of inquiry. By the end 
of this chapter, I will have established the specific contributions that this dissertation makes 
within the broader academic discussion on the topic. This will serve to set the stage for a more 
specific discussion of my theory and expectations, which I discuss in the following chapter. 
 
2.2 Civilian Targeting in Armed Conflict 
 Civilian targeting in interstate conflicts has generally been studied separately from that 
in civil conflicts – though to be fair this is not unlike most research areas in conflict studies. 
Nonetheless, it is instructive to consider the findings of research on international conflict as it 
relates to trends of interest in internal conflicts, specifically with respect to studies taking place 
at the group-level, the level at which my dissertation makes one of its contributions. The 
literature on civilian targeting in interstate war tends to focus on two primary variables: the 
military strategies of the combatants and the war aims of the challenging state. In general, it 
appears that combatants employing guerrilla, attrition, or counterinsurgency strategies are 
much more likely to target civilians than are combatants using conventional strategies.16 The 
logic underpinning these findings is strategic and rational. Combatants employing guerrilla 
 
16 See for example Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004); Valentino, Huth, and Croco (2006). 
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tactics or engaging in wars of attrition, as well as those engaging in counterinsurgency, target 
civilians as a way of eroding support for their adversaries via intimidation, eradication, or simply 
– especially in the case of counterinsurgency – because they are unable to distinguish between 
combatants and civilians. Other scholars argue that the war aims of the combatants matter. 
Downes (2008) for example finds that states engaged in wars of annexation tend to view some 
members of the population of the territory they hope to annex as a threat, and accordingly 
engage in campaigns of ethnic cleansing.17 
Although these findings deal specifically with interstate wars, the logic underpinning 
them is prevalent throughout the literature on civilian targeting in internal conflict as well. In 
fact, this area of research – civilian targeting – is one of the few where scholarship has achieved 
more progress in the realm of civil war than that of interstate war. One reason for this 
difference is simply that, as is widely noted, internal conflicts are often plagued by much higher 
levels of brutality than interstate conflicts.18 Some scholars attribute this difference in violent 
behavior to the intimacy of civil wars – that is, conflict takes place in areas “where there is a 
record of closeness and peaceful interaction between victims and victimizers” (Kalyvas 2006: 
11).19 Similarly, civilians are often intimately involved in civil wars – as sources of recruitment, 
supply, shelter, finance, and intelligence for the combatants. Furthermore, they are “political 
 
17 Fazal (2018) notes that an important exception to this finding occurs when the annexing state is does so for 
reasons of reuniting with co-ethnics, such as the Armenian annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh or the Russian 
annexation of Crimea. In addition, it is worth noting that Downes finds in addition that desperation can also matter 
– combatants engaged in potentially existential wars are more likely to commit atrocities against civilians in order 
to inflict domestic costs upon their adversaries and bring the war to a swifter conclusion. He supports this claim 
using evidence from the allied strategic bombing campaigns of World War II. 
18 See Kalyvas (2006: 3) for a brief discussion. 
19 And therefore also the expectation of similar non-conflict interactions in the future, a notion that is specifically 
relevant to the legitimacy-based argument I outline in the next chapter. 
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constituents, on whose behalf belligerents fight” (Stanton 2016: 6). This is all in addition to the 
fact that the vast majority of conflict deaths – civilian and combatant alike – since the end of 
the Second World War can be attributed to civil wars (Strand, et al. 2019). For these reasons, 
academic research on civilian targeting during armed conflicts tends to focus specifically on 
internal conflicts.  
Like research focusing on interstate conflicts, research on internal conflicts has tended 
to fall into a few broad categories. Some scholars have tended to focus on state-level factors 
that lead to higher levels of violence against civilians, such as regime type, state strength, 
demographic breakdown or resource endowments.20 Others have explored conflict-specific 
factors, such as the number of combatants, widespread grievances, ethnic divisions, or the 
involvement of external states in the conflict.21 Finally, and of specific relevance to the theory I 
outline in Chapter 3, some scholars have focused on group-level factors; that is, elements 
specific to the combatants engaged in the conflict that make them more or less likely to target 
civilians. Research at the group-level tends to broadly fall into two veins. One vein, in keeping 
with much of the research focusing on violence trends in interstate conflict that I discussed 
above, frames violence as a rational outcome within a strategic environment. The other posits 
violence as the outcome of a breakdown in the principal-agent relationship between combat 






20 Eg., Lacina (2006), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Hegre et al. (2001). 
21 Eg, Regan (2000), Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), Ellingsen (2000). 
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2.2.1 Civilian Targeting as Principle-Agent Failure 
As I just alluded to, one major research area views violence against civilians as a 
breakdown in the principle-agent relationship between commanders and combatants. This line 
of reasoning, most notably explored by Jeremy Weinstein (2007), argues that violence is the 
result of poor discipline and an inability or unwillingness of commanders to hold soldiers 
accountable. In Weinstein’s analysis, the initial conditions that rebel leaders confront accounts 
for variation in rebel use of violence toward civilians. Groups that have access to sources of 
finance that can be gained without civilian consent tend to attract a different type of recruit 
than groups where civilian support is required. “Resource rich” rebel groups – those that enjoy 
access to natural resources – tend to attract more soldiers motivated by greed and who may 
view local civilian populations as a source of wealth.22 In such cases, rebel commanders are able 
to solve collective action problems by offering selective incentives that attract recruits more 
motivated by plunder and material gain than the achievement of political goals. These groups 
tend to suffer from an inability or unwillingness to hold soldiers accountable for violent 
transgressions against civilians, since they do not necessarily rely on civilians for financial or 
political support and may actually have an incentive to permit indiscipline in order to maintain 
morale and numbers within their fighting ranks. 
Weinstein also argues that, in rebellions where civilian support is not important, rebels 
dolling out reprisals against civilian defectors have less information about individual civilians 
 
22 Kalyvas (2012) refers to this approach as “Hobbesian”, since, in his view, it presupposes that most humans are 
naturally violent and that violence against civilians in civil wars is the unintended consequence of organizational 
strategies that incentivizes the participation of opportunistic recruits – similar to the conditions inherent to 
Thomas Hobbes’ “State of Nature”. 
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and are more prone to make mistakes, resulting in a higher likelihood of inadvertent 
indiscriminate violence and potentially perpetuating a cycle of civilian resistance and 
subsequent reprisals. By contrast, “resource poor” rebel groups not only rely more heavily on 
civilian support, but also tend to attract a higher proportion of recruits who are more 
committed to the ideological cause and less driven by profit, thereby simultaneously 
incentivizing commanders to enforce discipline and attracting inherently more disciplined 
recruits. 
Similarly, Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) find in a study of rebel groups in Sierra 
Leone that higher levels of civilian abuse are associated with rebel structures that are more 
ethnically fragmented, rely on material incentives to recruit soldiers, and lack mechanisms to 
enforce discipline. Salehyan et al. (2014) supplement this notion by finding that external state 
sponsors help rebel groups feel less reliant on civilian support and therefore also less restrained 
from acting on abusive impulses.23 Reed Wood (2014) finds support for this idea. Although he 
acknowledges that the strength of the group matters, he also finds that groups that do not rely 
on local support also tend to use more violence directed toward civilians, especially at higher 
levels of relative strength. According to Elizabeth Wood (2009), similar motives explain patterns 
in the incidence of sexual violence in armed conflicts. 
Other scholars argue that the relationship between civilians and soldiers matters for 
explaining the potential agency failure leading to violence against civilians, but that economic 
 
23 However, it is worth noting that Reed Wood et al. (2012) find the opposite – that combatants in armed conflicts 
tend to target civilians in order to tip the strategic plane in their favor more often when their adversaries have 
external state supporters that tip the balance of power in their direction. In either case, the participation of 
external actors leads to the same outcome: higher levels of civilian targeting. 
 25 
factors are not the driving force. For example, Goodwin (2006) argues that an absence of social 
and political connections – in essence, a lack of commonality – leads rebel soldiers to more 
often use violence against civilian populations. Several other scholars (e.g., Balcells 2010 and 
Weidmann 2011) argue that violence against civilians of the indiscriminate variety results from 
pre-war ethnic and ideological cleavages, and how they are strategically mobilized by elites 
during the war. Hoover (2011) argues, in a study of the Salvadoran Civil War, that organizational 
characteristics matter, but that it is ideology and the accompanying education, indoctrination, 
and training, rather than resource wealth, that lead rank-and-file soldiers to commit acts of 
brutality against civilians without orders from command. 
 
2.2.2 Violence as Strategic and Rational 
By contrast, other scholars of armed conflict have long viewed violence in war as “by 
nature instrumental” (Arendt 1970: 51), intended primarily to achieve specific objectives.  As 
Reid Wood (2010: 602) notes, this logic, applied to insurgencies “suggests that armed political 
actors employ violence against vulnerable populations with the expectation that it improves 
their position within a strategic setting.” In the context of research on civil wars, this line of 
reasoning, which has arguably gained more popularity than Weinstein’s agency-failure 
perspective, has been most popularized by Stathis Kalyvas (2006). He posits in his seminal book 
The Logic of Violence in Civil War that violence against civilians is a strategic tool that may 
either be wielded or sheathed depending upon circumstances inherent to the conflict 
environment – in his argument, these circumstances manifest primarily as zones of control. 
According to Kalyvas, most rebel groups rationally recognize that indiscriminate violence 
can be counterproductive, and thus instead engage in selective violence. Kalyvas’ theory rests 
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primarily on the level of control enjoyed by combatants in a given area, as well as the costliness 
of gathering information on civilians in order to identify defectors. He also places agency on 
civilians as similarly rational actors. He argues that areas where rebels enjoy full control over an 
area do not need to engage in much indiscriminate or selective violence, since civilians 
rationally support armed actors that give them the best chance of survival regardless of their 
true preferences. In areas where control is highly contested between rebels and the 
government, violence is viewed as counterproductive, since gathering information on civilians is 
costly and the carrying-out of reprisals can deter more support than it coerces.24 Instead, 
armed actors compete with one another for civilian support by offering incentives to cooperate 
or, at least, remain neutral, rather than by deterring defection through force. According to 
Kalyvas, areas that are subject to the highest likelihood of violence are those where combatants 
enjoy a near-hegemonic (but not totally hegemonic nor legitimately contested) presence, since 
defectors may still pose a threat but the risk of losing local support is fairly low. In these cases, 
violence is still highly selective and must be directed at individuals on the basis of their actions 
in order to be effective, much like law enforcement. 
Other scholars have borrowed elements of Kalyvas’ influential argument to contribute 
new insights to our understanding of the strategic logic behind violence. For example, Vargas 
(2009) finds that combatants may tend to use strategies of selective violence more widely over 
time, and that non-lethal forms of violence (such as kidnapping, torture, and extortion) can 
 
24 Kalyvas (2006) emphasizes that revenge and personal scores account for much of this. In addition, Kalyvas and 
Kocher (2007) find that indiscriminate violence against civilians helps solve collective action problems for 
adversarial groups because it helps raise the costs of non-participation (possible death) and comparatively reduces 
the costs of participation (protection). See also Kocher et al. (2011). 
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elicit similar selectiveness patterns. According to other scholars, the change of territorial 
control (rather than territorial control per se) also matters. Metelits (2010) finds that an abrupt 
and significant loss of territorial control may lead to higher levels of violence against civilians by 
rebel groups, arguing that rebels face more pressure to retain control over crucial resources 
when faced with competition from rival actors. Similarly, Ziemke (2008) argues using evidence 
from Angola that rebels respond to a loss of territorial control with violence in order to instill 
fear and prevent large-scale civilian defection.25 
Still others frame strategic (un)selective violence within a bargaining perspective. Eck 
and Hultman (2007),26 for example, argue that indiscriminate violence can be used strategically 
by rebel groups to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the government. According to this 
logic, rebels attack civilians in order to induce civilians to blame the government for a failure to 
adequately protect them, thereby forcing the government to consider solutions more amenable 
to rebel demands.27 Similarly, Hultman (2012) argues that rebels target civilians to put pressure 
on the government in order to extract concessions. 
Violence has also been shown to be strategically employed as a tool to help enhance 
rebel recruitment and cohesion. Byman (1998), for example, argues that acts of violence in 
identity-based conflicts can reinforce in-group cohesion and out-group animosity. In this logic, 
then, rebel groups use violence to engineer identity divisions that help develop a pipeline of 
 
25 See also Hultman (2007) and Wood (2014) for more on violence as a counter to strategic setbacks. 
26 See also Lake (2002) 
27 This is similar to a prevalent argument in the terrorism literature that posits that democracies are more prone to 
terrorist attacks because they are more responsive to the costs associated with civilian fears and complaints 
regarding the ability to protect citizens (see Pape 2005). Theoretical discussions of terrorism are inherently related 
to those of civilian targeting in civil wars, since there is little to conceptually distinguish terrorist attacks against 
soft targets and rebel attacks against civilians (see Valentino 2014 for a discussion). 
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recruits from among the in-group. Cohen (2010) finds that violence against civilians can be 
similarly used to engineer a rebel group “brotherhood”, so to speak. She shows, using evidence 
from Sierra Leone, that rape was often deliberately used as a tool by rebel commanders to help 
strengthen bonds among soldiers in the rank-and-file. 
Other strategic perspectives consider that not all rebel groups are created equal. Reid 
Wood (2010), for instance, argues that rebel groups would ideally like to incentivize civilian 
support through the provision of benefits, but that some rebel groups lack the capacity to do 
so, and instead resort to violence to coerce support. While weak rebel groups are more likely to 
kill civilians indiscriminately, strong rebel groups more often offer a mix of selective incentives 
and selective repression. Similarly, some scholars posit that weak rebel groups strategically 
target civilians as a way of inflicting costs on the government when they are too weak to 
challenge the government directly (Valentino 2004, Pape 2005). The notion that rebels may use 
violence against civilians as a tool for weakening the government is supported by Fjelde and 
Hultman (2015), who find using innovative data that rebels appear to actively target civilians 
who are co-ethnic constituents of their adversary in order to weaken support. From another 
perspective, civil wars with multiple non-state combatants also seem to illicit strategic targeting 
of civilians. Kathleen Cunningham (2014) notes, for example, that groups that are more 
factionalized tend to be more likely to target civilians via the logic of outbidding – groups 
compete with each other to intimidate civilians into support. Together, these studies 
demonstrate the notion that rebel groups use civilian targeting as a strategic tool in order to 




2.2.3 Audience Costs, Legitimacy, and Violence and Restraint as Strategic Choices 
More recently, group-level studies of rebel violence against civilians have begun to rely 
upon the logic of audience cost theory (see Fearon 1994) to help explain why, given all the 
incentives to target civilians, some groups disproportionately practice restraint. According to 
audience cost theory, political actors make decisions that are most likely to keep happy the 
“audiences” – or observers – upon whom their support and ability to exercise influence rely. 
With respect to wartime belligerents, Stanton (2016) applies this logic to show that rebels (and 
governments) are more likely to exercise restraint vis-à-vis civilians when they are responsive to 
a domestic public or are in need of international support. Implicit in these findings are the 
support of domestic and international audiences.  
One element of Stanton’s theory posits that combatants (governments and rebels) that 
are particularly responsive to domestic pressure tend to more readily practice restraint. With 
respect to international audiences, she argues that the increasing acceptance of international 
human rights and humanitarian norms over the last several decades that were discussed earlier 
in this chapter have lead warring actors to restrain from engaging in indiscriminate targeting 
against civilians in an effort to “present themselves as legitimate international actors eligible for 
political or economic assistance” (Owens 2017: 1). The source of variation here is the degree to 
which rebels or governments need international support. With regard to rebels specifically, she 
argues that the rebels that possess developed and inclusive political institutions are more 
responsive to domestic civilian pressures, and that rebels that are fighting autocratic 
governments are more in need of international support because they are less able to leverage 
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domestic civilian pressures against the government. These rebels are the least likely to use 
violence against civilians, and the most likely to practice restraint. 
Stanton’s theory and findings are insightful. Accordingly, they have been refined in a 
series of recent studies aiming to identify alternative group-level factors that influence rebel 
group violence and restraint patterns as a function of audience costs. Hyeran Jo (2015) presents 
the most comprehensive of these. In a study of all conflict dyad-years since the end of the Cold 
War, she finds that rebels that care about legitimacy tend to more readily adhere to 
international law, operationalized empirically as the number of civilians killed, whether or not 
they use child soldiers, and whether or not they grant international observers access to their 
detention centers. Her study builds upon Stanton’s by arguing that it is audience concerns as 
they relate to legitimacy specifically, rather than audience costs generally, that predict rebel 
decisions to use violence against civilians. The use of legitimacy is notable because it implies 
that the rebels in question have longer-term considerations in mind than simply appealing to 
important potential supporters in the short-term. 
Jo classifies rebel groups as either legitimacy seeking or legitimacy indifferent. 
Legitimacy seeking rebel groups behave in ways that are intended to impress potential 
domestic and international supporters, who act as the arbiters of legitimacy. Of course, 
however, legitimacy can be a notoriously elusive and subjective concept. A definition of 
legitimacy inherently relies on several unobservable characteristics. Jo discusses this idea at 
length. She narrowly defines legitimacy as “the perception that an entity is a viable political 
entity,” and more broadly borrows Lipset’s (1983) definition that “’legitimacy involves the 
capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political 
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institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society.’” Thus, legitimacy is 
derived from the “perception” or “belief” of certain relevant observers (or audiences) that a 
political entity is a) up to the task of governing and b) doing so responsibly. Since rebel groups 
do not yet enjoy legitimacy and often do not have existing political institutions for observers to 
“believe in,” they “therefore have to create the belief that their new political institutions are 
the proper ones for their society” if they want to be viewed as legitimate (Jo 2015: 27-28; 
emphasis in original). 
In her discussion of how rebels might hope to gain legitimacy, Jo references Max 
Weber’s observation that the sources of legitimacy stem from tradition, charisma, and legality. 
Rebels inherently lack tradition and legality, at least at first and prior to gaining statehood. They 
must therefore rely on “charisma”, engineered through strategic choices, in order to begin to 
establish the other two. Jo operationalizes rebel groups that are legitimacy seeking according to 
three non-mutually exclusive characteristics: if they enjoy the support of human rights-
respecting state sponsors, if they are separatist as opposed to center-seeking, and if they 
possess a legally recognized political wing. Each of these can be viewed as an attempt to 
establish tradition and legality. By gaining support from human-rights respecting states, they 
attempt to signal to domestic and international audiences that they too respect human rights 
and will attempt to adhere to international legal standards regarding treatment of civilians. By 
establishing a legally recognized political wing, they are able to claim tradition via their 
existence as a political party with democratic experience prior to rebellion, and to claim legal 
action within an established political system as their first unsuccessful attempt to ameliorate 
grievances with the government, thereby framing violence as a last resort.  
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Separatist groups have an even more complicated relationship with Weber’s three 
sources of legitimacy. Non-separatist groups (i.e., “center-seeking” groups), should they 
successfully assume control of an existing state government, can inherit tradition and legality, 
at which point charisma is no longer as significant of a point of emphasis. Separatist rebel 
groups, on the other hand, have no expectation of such an inheritance; they must build 
tradition and earn legality, largely on the back of their charisma. Luckily, the nature of 
separatism helps in this respect. Although rebellion in the first place is inherently illegal, there is 
generally some international sentiment that is sympathetic toward the right of self-
determination, even if the international system at large does tend to prioritize the 
contradictory principle of territorial integrity.28 Similarly, many rebel groups that hope to 
establish their own state take seriously the notion that they will need to be able to govern post-
independence, and therefore focus on developing institutions that are up to the task – and in so 
doing establish some governing tradition. 
As I mentioned above, groups who must build their own tradition and legality must 
often rely on charisma and strategic choices to do so. Like the broader concept of legitimacy of 
which charisma is a part, charisma is dependent upon the perception of others. But whose 
perception matters? In keeping with Stanton, Jo implies that certain domestic and international 
audiences are important for building and maintaining the levels of charisma that help enhance 
the entity’s chances of gaining and keeping legitimacy. Jo argues that legitimacy seeking rebel 
groups do this by demonstrating their political efficacy and willingness to play by the rules of 
the international system by adhering to international law. 
 
28 See discussion of this in Chapter 1. 
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Tanisha Fazal (2018) further examines the role of audience costs and war-aims in civilian 
targeting patterns in civil conflict. She finds that separatist groups in particular are especially 
likely to practice restraint vis-à-vis civilians than are other rebel groups. She argues this for 
three reasons. First, separatists have a specific incentive to protect civilian populations that are 
meant to comprise the population of their future new state, as well as to avoid reprisals from 
the government for targeting of other civilians. Second, they have an interest in protecting their 
reputation in the eyes of the international community, who makes the ultimate decision 
regarding their fate as a potential state. Third, restraint demonstrates capability, which, as Jo 
also argued, signals to all relevant observers that they are up to the task of governing should 
they ever actually gain independence.29 
 
2.3 Gaps in the Literature and Contributions 
These findings supplement those in several other studies that suggest that legitimacy-
seeking behavior extends well beyond decisions about the targeting of civilians.30 The central 
theme, of course, is that separatist rebel groups face unique pressures derived from their need 
to earn political legitimacy and make strategic decisions based on the incentives derived from 
 
29 In addition to the work of Jo and Fazal, Fortna (2015) also presents some evidence that separatist groups may 
also be less likely to use terrorism. This notion contradicts other scholars, namely Pape (2005) and Stanton (2009), 
who view secessionist groups as more extreme and thus more likely to use strategies of terrorism. It is worth 
noting, however, that Fortna’s findings are not significant and appear only as part of a supplemental discussion to 
her main findings. 
30 Megan Stewart (2016) for example finds that separatist groups more often than other rebel groups provide 
education and healthcare services to the civilians living under their control, which serves an important state-
making and legitimacy-building function. Florea (Forthcoming) notes that separatists engage in an even wider 
range of governance practices, including establishing police forces, separate branches of government, hospitals, 
schools, banks, and social security networks, which help signal a commitment to local rule. Huang (2016) and 
Coggins (2015) both find that separatist groups more often use diplomacy as a strategic tool, and Huang argues 
that investing in offices and embassies and engaging with state officials, NGOs, and foreign media outlets are 
valuable strategic tools often used by separatists for securing international legitimacy. 
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those pressures. One thing that is missing in this nascent research area is a broad, parsimonious 
theory of separatist rebel behavior that positions existing research and their logical extensions 
regarding legitimacy-oriented rebel strategic choices according to simply and clearly defined 
dimensions. Within such a theoretical framework, a multitude of testable predictions may be 
derived according to clearly specified theoretical conditions. I devise such a framework in 
Chapter 3, which posits separatist strategic choices as a function of legitimacy concerns and 
according to two broad dimensions according to which different choices may be categorized: 
legitimacy gains and legitimacy costs. 
The legitimacy-oriented studies discussed above fit neatly into one or the other 
dimension of this framework, or both in some cases. But they only explore a few potential 
outcomes. My second contribution, then, is to populate the framework with a multitude of 
new, testable predictions regarding outcomes related to civilian targeting and state-building, 
and then to test them. As I discussed at length in the first part of this chapter, the academic 
literature on civilian targeting is well developed and enjoys a healthy dialogue between 
competing and progressive research programs. Yet, only a handful of outcomes are explored in 
depth – civilian killing and, to a lesser extent, sexual violence, receive the bulk of this attention. 
Comparatively fewer studies have explored child soldiering and kidnapping as forms of civilian 
targeting, and even fewer have examined economic forms of civilian targeting such as theft, 
seizure of humanitarian aid, and extortion. The strand of literature exploring civilian targeting 
and separatism is even more narrow. I expand upon this by introducing several outcome 
variables that have received relatively little attention in the literature, and improve upon the 
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outcomes that have received a greater share of attention by subjecting them to further scrutiny 
using new data and alternative models. 
By demonstrating the aggregate efficacy of a legitimacy-seeking theoretical framework, I 
will have brought us greater understanding of at least a subset of armed conflicts, as well as 
helped to bridge the gap between legitimacy theory and rational-strategic theories of civilian 
targeting in civil wars. A final contribution I make, then, is to establish the scope conditions – or 
limits – of the legitimacy-seeking theory. I do this by bringing the opposite end of the rational-
strategic civilian targeting theory back into the equation by acknowledging that such strategic 
concerns really do influence rebel decisions to target civilians, and that separatists are not 
immune from some of the same incentives as other rebel groups and may choose to act on 
them depending upon contextual factors. To summarize, then, my contributions first embed 
the legitimacy-seeking behavior within a broad theoretical framework, then expand the 
framework by testing novel hypotheses while simultaneously contributing new insight to the 
literature on civilian targeting in general, then establish the limitations of the framework by 
considering a few contextual factors. 
 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
 The preceding discussion was intended to achieve three main purposes as it relates to 
the argument I lay out in Chapter 3. First, it outlined the literature focusing on civilian targeting 
in civil conflicts, framing it as an interplay between those scholars who view it is a rational, 
strategic outcome, and those who argue that it is an unfortunate byproduct of rebel group 
structures and poor discipline. Second, it discussed a subset of the literature that demonstrates 
something systematically different about separatist civil wars, specifically because separatist 
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rebel groups have unique incentives to present themselves to international and domestic 
observers as a responsible and capable political entity. One way in which they do this is by 
strategically practicing restraint vis-à-vis civilian populations. Third, this discussion has implicitly 
brought to light some of the limitations of existing research that I account for in the rest of this 
dissertation. 
 These limitations do not represent any significant oversight, and existing research has 
done a fine job of illuminating the forces underpinning the victimization of civilians in armed 
conflicts. Still, there is room for improvement, both theoretically and empirically, to which I 
contribute in the chapters that follow. Most fundamentally, the recent studies discussed above 
that explore the unique incentives that separatist (and, more generally, legitimacy-seeking) 
groups experience have opened fascinating new territory in the analysis of context-dependent 
conflict dynamics, but the findings in this area are also limited. As the discussion above should 
illustrate, enough research exists for us to determine that separatist groups do in fact behave 
according to incentives that seemingly take into account the perceptions of important domestic 
and international audiences, in a way that differs systematically from other actors. Yet only a 
handful of studies examine this notion as it relates to civilian targeting specifically. In addition, 
studies exploring separatism (or legitimacy more generally) have predominantly focused on one 
dependent variable to measure civilian targeting – civilian killing.31 It is worth noting, of course, 
 
31 It is worth noting that Jo does explore the propensity of legitimacy-seeking groups to use child soldiers. 
However, her analysis returns an unexpected positive relationship between separatism and child soldier use, and 
as I discuss in Chapter 4, does not hold up to alternative model specifications.  
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that the vast majority of research examining civilian targeting in general – not just those taking 
legitimacy concerns into account – also suffer from this limitation.32 
 This brings me to the third limitation of existing research: data limitations. The major 
reason that so much research focuses primarily on civilian killing is not because other possible 
forms of civilian targeting have been neglected. On the contrary, case studies have tackled 
other forms of civilian targeting extensively.33 This trend in the realm of large-N statistical 
studies stems from the reality that data on civilian fatality figures as a result of one-sided 
violence have been more reliable than data on other forms of violence against civilians. That 
does not mean that empirical innovations have not taken place to address this short-fall in the 
literature. One of the contributions that I make in this project is to utilize recent data 
innovations that consider other forms of civilian victimization. 
 In addition to the breadth of analysis, empirical realities have also limited the depth of 
what can be studied. Several small-N studies have done an excellent job examining the micro-
dynamics of violence against civilians in civil war.34 Yet, until recently large-N statistical analyses 
have been limited to the conflict- or conflict-year level. This is especially the case within the 
subset of the literature examining rebel war aims. In Chapter 6 of this dissertation, I break this 
limitation by utilizing data containing information on civilian fatalities as a result of individual 
conflict events to explore context-dependent within-conflict variation in rebel group civilian 
targeting patterns. 
 
32 Some notable exceptions discussed earlier in this chapter include Elizabeth Wood (2009), Vargas (2009), and 
Cohen (2010). 
33 See Elizabeth Wood (2009) and Cohen (2010) for notable examples. 
34 See again Kalyvas (2012) for an overview 
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 In effect, I answer in this dissertation not just questions relating to the war-aims of the 
belligerents in civil war, but also the how and when. That is, I consider how civilians become 
victims in more ways than simply murder. I examine when separatist groups practice violence 
or restraint based on contexts within individual conflicts. I also imply a broader theoretical 
framework for predicting separatist rebel group conduct in civil war as a product of legitimacy 
concerns that is not restricted solely to the targeting of civilians. I discuss all of these in more 
depth in the next chapter, wherein I carefully outline the theoretical framework underpinning 
the analyses I present later in the dissertation. 
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Chapter 3: Separatism, Legitimacy, and Civilian 
Targeting in Civil War 
“...legitimacy is based on three things. First of all, the people who are asked to obey authority 
have to feel like they have a voice--that if they speak up, they will be heard. Second, the law has 
to be predictable. There has to be a reasonable expectation that the rules tomorrow are going 
to be roughly the same as the rules today. And third, the authority has to be fair. It can't treat 
one group differently from another.” – Malcolm Gladwell, Canadian Journalist 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter develops a theory of rebel-civilian relations as a function of separatism, 
long-term legitimacy concerns, and short-term strategic concerns. Previous scholarship 
demonstrates that separatist rebel groups tend to behave systematically differently compared 
to other types of rebel groups. These differences tend to manifest along the lines of strategic 
choices that either generate good public relations or avoid bad ones. Existing research focuses 
on the killing of civilians (Fazal 2018), adherence to international law (Jo 2015), the provision of 
civil services (Stewart 2016), and the use of diplomacy in order to build international support 
(Huang 2018), but beyond that is quite limited. 
 The theory I outline in this chapter, and the subsequent chapters that test it, contribute 
to this body of work in a few key ways. First, it builds a framework for conceiving of rebel-
civilian relations as a function of legitimacy concerns. I neatly place existing findings, my own 
theoretical expectations, and a few additional implications within this framework. Second, I 
expand upon existing research by applying legitimacy-seeking logic to a new set of violent 
outcomes – namely the use of child soldiers, sexual violence, and kidnapping – as well as to 
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several types of economic victimization of civilians – extortion, theft, and seizure of 
humanitarian aid. I also then apply the framework to the killing of civilians under new model 
specifications. To summarize, I expect to find that separatist rebel groups tend to kill fewer 
civilians, use fewer child soldiers, use lower levels of sexual violence than other rebel groups, 
and to less often kidnap, steal from, and intercept aid intended for civilians, all else being equal. 
I also expect contextual factors to matter, including the brutality of the government they are 
facing as well as the legitimacy gains that might be procured through certain economically 
extractive practices such as extortion. 
 This brings me to the final theoretical contributions this dissertation makes. Clearly, 
across conflicts all else is not equal. Further, conditions within conflicts are not equal across 
time. I explore the potential sources of variation in separatist targeting patterns on the micro-
level by examining certain context-dependent factors that may influence separatist strategic 
decision making. More specifically, I posit that developments in the within-conflict space can 
induce rebels to make strategic adjustments that result in higher levels of civilian targeting. 
Such developments might include negative shocks to their relative fighting capabilities, such as 
a major loss on the battlefield. 
 In the next section, I begin the process of developing the theoretical framework that 
frames the rest of this dissertation. After that, I carefully outline my expectations in hypothesis 
form and elaborate upon my rationale. By the end of this chapter, the reader should have a 
strong sense of the arguments, assumptions, and overall theoretical and empirical 
contributions this dissertation seeks to make. 
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3.2 The Legitimacy-Seeking Framework 
 Separatist rebel groups tend to behave systematically differently compared to other 
rebel groups. These behavior differences are most often traced back to separatists’ desire – or 
perhaps necessity – to market their struggle as legitimate. Indeed, as the barriers to entry into 
the international system as a legally recognized state are extremely high, separatist rebel 
groups must gain the support of important gatekeeping actors – or audiences – in order to have 
any hope of success in establishing a new state. They do this by making decisions that either 
seek to enhance domestic and international support or avoid alienating it. This support comes 
in the form of legitimacy, which I define here as the right and ability of a political entity to 
govern a population and piece of territory, as conferred by important domestic and 
international audiences. Domestic audiences are important because an entity cannot govern 
without the existence of a social contract that is accepted by at least some subset of the 
population over which the entity hopes to govern. Separatists need to engineer a domestic 
constituency that is likely to accept this contract, and who also will provide support for the 
cause prior to statehood in the form of manpower or material/financial/moral support. 
International audiences matter because an aspiring state can only fully achieve its goal if 
important members of the international system support it. Prior to independence, a group’s 
chances of success are maximized when they can rely on the resources of a state for support. 
For separatist groups, though, success does not result merely from military victory; the group 
requires recognition. And indeed, the club of statehood is prestigious, and the barriers to entry 
are high. And yet, the number of states in the world has steadily increased over time. Gaining 
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entry to the club requires the support of important actors in the international system, 
specifically major powers.35 
In the eyes of these audiences, a polity’s legitimacy is derived from tradition, legality, 
and charisma.36 Separatist groups must build tradition and earn legality on the back of their 
charisma – operationalized for the purpose of this discussion as the extent to which they are 
able to convince domestic and international audiences of their political efficacy and willingness 
and ability to govern responsibly. By contrast, center-seeking groups can expect to inherit 
tradition and legality if their fight against the government is successful. Maintaining effective 
“charisma”, then, is not as centrally important for them as it is for separatist groups. This is not 
to say that center-seeking groups do not enjoy the support of important domestic and 
international actors, but they certainly do not require it in the same way that separatists do.37 
Indeed, all rebel groups care about their legitimacy, since the willing acceptance of their 
authority by domestic populations and members of the international community means that 
fewer resources are required to enforce it than illegitimacy. Owing to separatists’ lack of pre-
existing tradition and legality, however, legitimacy is harder for them to establish at the same 
time that the nature of their goals means that it is more important for them to cultivate. They 
 
35 See Coggins (2011). See also Griffiths and Fazal (2014) on the value of statehood. 
36 As I discuss in more depth below, these audiences confer legitimacy based on the extent to which they view a 
political entity as viable. Domestic audiences do so based on their willingness to agree to a social contract with the 
entity, while international audiences base this decision on the entity’s willingness and ability to play by their rules. 
In both instances, the entity’s treatment of civilians is paramount, and therefore I focus on rebel-civilian 
interactions in this dissertation. 
37 And indeed, all rebel groups care about their legitimacy, since the willing acceptance of their authority means 
that fewer resources are required to enforce it than illegitimacy. The important point this dissertation makes is 
that it is simultaneously more important and harder to establish for separatist groups, requiring them to more 
actively incorporate concerns of legitimacy into their strategic calculations. 
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can cultivate it by demonstrating their ability and willingness to govern responsibly and play by 
the rules of the international system – in part by avoiding the mistreatment of civilians.  
Conversely, it is harder for center-seeking groups to lose legitimacy, particularly if they 
achieve military victory and assume control of an existing state apparatus. They can therefore 
more often get away with widespread humanitarian transgressions and still be seen as 
legitimate. Notable examples of cases where rebel groups that perpetrated major atrocities 
against civilians and went on to comprise the leadership of an existing state include the Alliance 
of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in Liberia, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) in Rwanda. The leaders of each of these groups, partly through political maneuvering but 
largely on the back of the de facto legitimacy of the existing state, were able to present 
themselves as legitimate heads of state in the eyes of the international community.38 
Although separatist groups cannot inherit the same level of tradition and legality simply 
through achieving military victory, adhering to strategies that prioritize legitimacy can help 
enhance these attributes, even in the absence of victory. In many cases, for example, lack of 
victory does not necessarily mean defeat. The landscape of global politics today is dotted with 
political entities that exist and operate as a state in every sense but the legal one. De facto 
states such as Somaliland and Abkhazia govern their own territory despite the international 
community’s unwillingness to recognize them as entities independent of their “parent” states. 
 
38 To be fair, only Paul Kagame, head of the RPF and current president of Rwanda has successfully managed to stay 
in power long-term. Although Laurent Kabila did manage to install a legitimate government which is today 
presided over by his son, Joseph, the elder Kabila himself only helmed the DRC for less than four years before his 
assassination. Charles Taylor fared the least well as the leader of a legitimate government. After six years as 
president of Liberia he was forced to resign amid domestic and international pressure, and was later charged, 
convicted, and sentenced to 50 years in prison on 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
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In other cases, secessionist rebellions have led to peace settlements where state governments 
have ceded non-independent autonomous status to separatist regions as part of peace 
settlements, as was the case with the Aceh region of Indonesia and Northern Ireland’s status 
within the United Kingdom, or have made concerted efforts to incorporate rebel groups into 
the peacetime political framework in an attempt to ameliorate secessionist grievances, as 
happened following Myanmar’s 2012 ceasefire deal with the Karen National Union (KNU).39 By 
contrast, non-separatist groups who place less of a priority on legitimacy in their interactions 
with civilians have less to gain in the absence of victory – Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) stand as prominent examples of non-
secessionist rebel groups with egregious human rights records that crumbled, were forced to 
remain on the run, or simply failed to maintain any significant political influence in the 
aftermath of military defeat.40 
 These examples are illustrative of the variation in strategic choices available to rebel 
groups, and how war aims and post-war expectations can shape rebel group decisions. 
Separatist rebels have clear incentives to impress these domestic and international audiences, 
while center-seeking groups feel these to a lesser degree, since, if they achieve victory, other 
states will deal with them diplomatically even if they are explicitly “disapproving”. Breakaway 
 
39 Though it should be noted that KNU’s military arm, the KLNA, has engaged in sporadic clashes with the Myanmar 
government later than 2012. 
40 It is worth noting further that in addition to the variation in strategies employed in these conflicts, the nature of 
separatist and center-seeking conflicts also contributes to the variation in post-war outcomes. Grievances that 
underlie territorial conflicts are inherently more divisible than those underlying center-seeking conflicts. In general, 
a government can grant territorial concessions short of independence, which is not true for a conflict where rebels 
seek regime change. A government may be more willing to grant concessions to separatist rebels who have 
demonstrated local legitimacy, and less willing when dealing with groups that have engaged in higher levels of 
violence against non-combatants. The LTTE in Sri Lanka and ETA in Spain are examples of separatist groups who 
engaged in extensive non-legitimacy seeking strategies. In turn, the governments expended significant resources 
to eradicate them rather than offering any concessions or substantive role in a post-conflict settlement. 
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regions, on the other hand, must win the legitimacy and recognition of an entirely new political 
entity as far as the international community is concerned. These incentives often translate to 
strategic decisions. These decisions can be theoretically organized according to a framework of 
legitimacy-seeking behavior. Most fundamentally, rebel groups can be categorized as either 
legitimacy seeking or legitimacy indifferent.41 Separatist rebel groups are the groups most 
systematically likely to be legitimacy seeking groups, though it should be noted that other 
scholars use a more inclusive definition of “legitimacy seeking”.42 
 Groups that are legitimacy seeking have strategic options available to them that further 
fall into two broad dimensions. The first dimension has to do with the procurement of 
legitimacy gains. Actions designed to enhance legitimacy gains are meant to enhance or 
strengthen the support of domestic and international audiences, usually by demonstrating 
something about their capability to govern effectively and responsibly or the extent to which 
they value international norms, such as respect for human rights and international law, 
administration of justice, provision of public goods, or use of diplomacy abroad. In the opposite 
dimension, separatist groups may engage in strategies designed to avoid legitimacy costs. 
Strategies in this dimension are designed to avoid taking actions that may reduce support from 
or alienate important audiences. In this vein, separatists might adopt strategies that involve 
 
41 Hyeran Jo (2015) coins these terms in her book, though she stops short of engaging in a lengthy theoretical 
discussion of the concepts or of the variety of potential outcomes associated with them. 
42 Particularly Jo, who also considers groups that have an independent political wing and groups that enjoy support 
from human rights-respecting state sponsors as also “legitimacy seeking”. While these additional characteristics 
are certainly relevant, I argue they are somewhat tautological in this context because they are themselves 
outcomes that can be predicted by a group’s legitimacy-seeking nature, as opposed to separatism, which as a 
movement inherently requires legitimacy to be successful. 
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practicing restraint where other groups might not – most prominently, this restraint should 
manifest in the nature of their interactions with civilians. 
 In this dissertation, I primarily explore one specific outcome of this framework – civilian 
targeting as a function of legitimacy cost avoidance. It is instructive to apply this framework to 
existing research as a way of organizing the important theoretical concepts and framing the 
discussion as it relates to separatist rebel groups and the importance they place on concerns of 
legitimacy. I do not intend here to launch an entire research program based on a fully 
elaborated theoretical framework, but I establish the foundation of one by testing an easily 
observable portion of the framework in order to demonstrate its efficacy for future scholarship. 
Research in this area is fertile yet still fairly limited. Only a few outcomes that are 
consistent with the framework have been rigorously studied, and several notable real-world 
counterexamples demonstrate that it is not simply enough to say separatist groups behave 
well, while non-separatist groups do not. In the next section, I theoretically establish the face-
validity of the legitimacy seeking framework by considering the effect of a few violent 
outcomes that have not yet been considered systematically. After that, I turn the civilian 
victimization coin over in order to examine economic forms of civilian targeting. Finally, I then 
insert more nuance into the equation by considering some circumstances that might lead 
separatist groups to deviate from the outcomes predicted by the framework depending on 
certain contextual and micro-level factors. 
 
3.3 Separatism, Legitimacy, and Civilian Targeting 
 Civilian targeting has strategic utility. Most often in the literature, this line of reasoning 
has been applied specifically to the killing of civilians. Broadly speaking, and to summarize, 
 47 
killing civilians can be strategically useful for coercing support, subduing dissent, deterring 
support for rivals, or outright eliminating said rival support.43 To a lesser extent, research has 
also demonstrated strategic benefits as it relates to other forms of civilian targeting, such as the 
use of child soldiers, the widespread use of sexual violence, the use of kidnapping, and 
economic forms of targeting such as theft and seizure of aid intended for civilians. Children are 
often conscripted by rebel groups as a way of intimidating populations and coercing support, 
since the fate of the children conscripted to fight is directly tied to the success of the group on 
the battlefield. In addition, children may actually make more attractive recruits than adults 
because they are easier to intimidate, indoctrinate, and misinform, thus making up for their 
lack of comparative physical capabilities with ideological zeal, ferocity on the battlefield, and 
respect for the chain of command (Beber and Blattman 2013). These benefits are only 
supplementary to the simple math of contributing more fighters to a fighting force. With 
respect to sexual violence, scholars find here too that such tools can be employed to subdue 
and intimidate populations (e.g., Koos 2017), and that rape has even been used as a method to 
enhance bonds among soldiers in the rank-and-file (Cohen 2010). Kidnapping, extortion, theft, 
and the seizure of humanitarian aid too appear to be useful tools for combatants to selectively 
intimidate local populations (e.g., Vargas 2009), as well as potentially lucrative sources of 
funding, which may be invaluable to combatant groups that lack the resources of a state. 
 The puzzle I first tackle in this dissertation centers on these benefits. We can view them, 
in the grand strategic landscape, as methods that may help turn the tide of war or enhance a 
group’s chances of gaining the upper hand on the battlefield. We can therefore view them as 
 
43 See again Kalyvas (2012) and relevant sections in the previous chapter for a more detailed discussion. 
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relatively short-term tactical considerations. Not all rebel groups have long time horizons, and 
we should expect groups with shorter time horizons to more often act on these incentives. I 
argue that separatist groups have the longest time horizon of all rebel groups. Some rebel 
groups know their chances of success are low, so their time horizons are correspondingly short. 
Others intend only to gain policy concessions and then a peace settlement. These groups also 
do not have long time horizons. Center-seeking groups, even the ones that have a decent 
chance of winning, endeavor to transfer their status from rebel group to incumbent of an 
existing state, so their time horizons end at the point of victory. On the other hand, separatist 
groups, especially those fully committed to the cause of statehood, have time horizons that 
could potentially extend indefinitely, since their existence as a political entity does not end with 
military victory – in fact, it only becomes more prominent as they gain more prestigious status. 
Thus, separatist rebel groups are the groups with the least incentive to prioritize short-term 
tactical advantages, and the most incentive to emphasize longer-term considerations. 
 This is especially the case when their long-term goal also happens to be extraordinarily 
hard to achieve. The club of statehood is extremely exclusive. Only 193 states enjoy widespread 
recognition today,44 out of the multitudes of de facto states and other political entities that 
exist or have existed outside the control of existing states worldwide but lack(ed) international 
legal recognition. The rate of expansion of the international system has slowed considerably 
since the end of the de-colonization period and the fall of communism in Europe, and only a 
handful of new states have emerged per decade since the end of the Cold War, excluding a slew 
 
44 “Recognition” here is defined as full member status in the United Nations. A handful of other entities enjoy 
limited recognition by other states, but are not subject to the significant benefits of full membership in the 
international community. 
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of new states in the early 1990s carved out of the former Eastern Bloc.45 Most of these have 
been microstates such as Andorra, San Marino, Micronesia, and Palau. Among the non-post-
communist states to gain independence since 1989 with a population over 150,000, a list that 
includes exactly four,46 none were able to do so peacefully.47 
This underscores the difficulty and central contradiction inherent in creating a new 
state. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show that non-violent dissident strategies are generally 
more successful than violent ones, but that this is not the case for secessionists. Secessionists 
would surely prefer to establish a new state without bloodshed, yet apparently this rarely ever 
happens. It seems reasonable to attribute this difficulty to the mixed forces of a “parent” state 
uninterested in losing territory/resources and an international community that prioritizes the 
principle of territorial integrity over the right to self-determination.48 Legality is a central 
component of establishing legitimacy, yet violent rebellion is inherently illegal and clearly 
opposed in principle by important members of the international community. Separatist groups 
therefore immediately encounter an up-hill battle as it relates to their legitimacy, and must go 
to pain-staking lengths to establish the legal basis for rebellion. 
 
45 Correlates of War Project, 2017, State System Membership List, v2016 
46 These four include Namibia (1990), Eritrea (1993), East Timor (2002), and South Sudan (2011). 
47 The main point here is further underscored by the several devastating conflicts of the post-communist wars in 
Yugoslavia and several former Soviet states. I relegate them to a mere footnote here only to emphasize the rarity 
of successful separatism under normal circumstances, which decidedly do not include a period involving the fall of 
a global superpower (The USSR). Still, their incidence underscores the main point of the following paragraph, 
which is that peaceful separatism is even rarer. 
48 Both of these phenomena can additionally in part be attributed to the unwillingness of states to set a precedent 
for future secessionists to expect successful promotion to statehood. Many states wrestle with multiple separatist 
movements and respond to them with a heavy hand in order to deter other likeminded groups (Walter 2009), and 
several major states wrestle with domestic secessionist movements of their own and oppose setting a precedent 
of granting independence to such movements. Three such major players include Russia, China and the United 
Kingdom, who together comprise three fifths of the United Nations Security Council. As Coggins (2011) points out, 
secessionism is most successful when supported by major powers, implying that the opposite is that it is quite 
unsuccessful when opposed by important actors. 
 50 
But how can such a basis be established? Outright military victory is one method. 
Eritrean rebels were able to secure independence after they defeated and overthrew the 
Ethiopian regime as part of a rebel coalition in the early 1990s, and were able to negotiate for 
independence with the new government in Addis Ababa, which was made up of yesterday’s 
rebels, for a peaceful separation.49 The other three post-Cold war, non-Eastern Bloc, non-
microstate successful separatists of Namibia, East Timor, and South Sudan gained 
independence on the back of international support that was born largely out of global 
sympathy resulting from the human rights abuses of their parent states – South Africa, 
Indonesia, and Sudan, respectively,50 though as I will discuss later, some of these groups did go 
to great lengths to enhance their legitimacy.51 
Obviously, however, these success stories are anomalies. Separatist groups clearly 
cannot expect to achieve outright military victory or to find a coalition of rebel groups that 
gives them a better expectation of that, nor can they rely on their parent states to respond to 
their grievances with such a heavy hand that they provoke an international response. In fact, 
they cannot even rely on the international community to respond to all similar cases in the 
same way.52 What they can influence, however, is how their own cause is perceived. This is 
where their own conduct in the course of conflict is concerned. They can do this primarily by 
 
49 To be fair, this peace did not last long, as Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a deadly interstate war in 1998-2000 over a 
border dispute. But the initial separation came “peacefully” as the rebel coalition defeated the existing Ethiopian 
regime and then disbanded without violent incident. 
50 This again refers to the concept of recognition of secessionist units as remediation for mistreatment, which I 
referenced above. 
51 Then again, others – specifically the SPLM/A in the case of South Sudan – decidedly did not. 
52 The inconsistency in the international response to the humanitarian crises in Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 
1990s stands as a stark reminder of this. More recently, UN action in Libya versus that in Syria and Yemen 
demonstrates this just as well. 
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adhering to international law of conduct in conflict – and they indeed tend to according to Jo 
and Fazal. In addition, they can advertise this willingness and ability by formally signing human 
rights treaties, appealing to or seeking membership in IGOs or NGOs, or working directly with 
media outlets and foreign governments.53 This is not simply a marketing ploy to win popular 
global support, though that can certainly be part of the equation. It is also a way for separatist 
groups to demonstrate their willingness and ability to play by the rules of the international 
system. Domestic populations are not being targeted, and may actually be protected instead. 
The international community sees the group as a responsible and capable political entity. The 
rebel group has done its best to appeal to the important audiences who serve as gatekeepers to 
statehood. 
Indeed, considerable progress has been made in international human rights law over 
the past several centuries. Legal precedent exists to punish perpetrators for the killing of 
civilians, the use of child soldiers, the use of sexual violence, kidnapping, economic crimes, and 
various other war crimes and crimes against humanity.54 Civilians are legally protected in 
wartime today by Protocol I, Article 52 of the Geneva Conventions adopted in 1949, which 
restricted the object of wartime violence to military targets only. Although the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply formally to Civil Wars until the adoption of Protocol II in 1977, the 
international legal basis for states, which separatist groups aspire to become, had existed for 
 
53 For example, according to Geneva Call, several Kurdish groups including KDPI, PAK, and YPG have committed to 
numerous human rights treaties, including Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, as well as more specific commitments regarding the use of anti-personnel mines, sexual violence, 
and protection of children in war-zones. KDPI in particular also maintains a significant diplomatic presence in 
Europe and North America, and regularly contributes reports to human rights organizations. 
54 Data challenges restrict me from discussing other forms of war crimes – or legitimacy-oriented behavior in 
general – so my discussion throughout this dissertation focuses only on the outcomes posited in this chapter. I 
leave it to future scholarship to apply the legitimacy-seeking logic to other outcomes. 
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nearly three decades. The use of child soldiers is prohibited under international law, despite a 
long history of children fighting as celebrated combatants in armed conflict, even relatively 
recently.55 These same 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions outlawed the 
military recruitment and use of children under 15 years old, which was subsequently officially 
recognized as a war crime under the 2002 Rome Statute.56 Sexual violence, for its part, enjoys 
somewhat less but still established precedent in international law. It was not adopted by the 
United Nations as an official war crime until a 2008 resolution, though it was mentioned in the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions and became prosecutable case law under the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Kidnapping is outlawed under the 1979 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, as well as several less notable 
agreements such as the Hague Abduction Convention. 
Economic forms of civilian victimization enjoy less explicit coverage under international 
humanitarian law but are often covered under international organized crime law. Extortion and 
theft specifically are covered under several regional international crime treaties and are 
routinely investigated by INTERPOL. The seizure of humanitarian aid, on the other hand, is not 
explicitly outlawed under any international law regimes, but aid-granting agencies such as the 
United Nations routinely threaten to or actively suspend aid to countries or regions where aid 
 
55 In the final days of World War II, the fall of the Third Reich was famously foreshadowed by its use of old men and 
boys to make its last stand as the allies pushed toward Berlin. Earlier, in the First World War, the youngest person 
to serve in a military capacity was Milos Misovic, who at the age of eight joined a Serbian artillery division after 
most of his family (including his parents) were killed in a raid by Austro-Hungarian forces. In American history, 
despite minimum age requirements to fight in both the Civil War and the Revolution, many minors lied about their 
age to serve and play major roles in fighting, and have been romanticized by subsequent generations for doing so. 
Despite the relative recency of these examples, they represent a notable contrast to today where child soldier use 
is outlawed and nearly all state militaries rely solely on adult combatants. 
56 The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) prohibited in 2000 the military 
conscription of children under the age of 18. Although this protocol is optional, 168 states are party to it. 
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intended to help civilians is intercepted by combatant groups,57 and rebel rent-seeking as it 
relates to foreign aid allocation is indeed a challenge discussed at great length in the academic 
literature on foreign aid.58 
The discussion in the previous paragraphs serve primarily to emphasize the importance 
the international community places on “good behavior”, so to speak, as it relates to human 
rights. While it is true that many states themselves behave poorly as it relates to the targeting 
of civilians, the international community at large certainly places a premium on protecting 
civilians to the extent possible, both normatively and legally in the form of various international 
human rights treaties. And, as I have already discussed, it is also true that successfully gaining 
statehood is extraordinarily difficult. Groups seeking legitimacy, then, and especially separatist 
groups that aim to join the exclusive club of statehood, give themselves the best chance of 
succeeding by playing by the rules of the international system. Doing so wins friends in high 
places (foreign states) and avoids alienating friends in low places (domestic populations), and it 
appears that many separatists go to great lengths to practice restraint in the real world. 
In one of the few successful secessionist bids in recent memory, for example, the 
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) marketed their struggle against 
first Portuguese imperialism and later Indonesian authorities as a fight for survival, where 
Fretilin stood as the protectors of the Timorese people and their Portuguese and Indonesian 
overlords as forces of violence and evil. In fact, Fretilin expended significant effort first 
negotiating with Portuguese authorities for a peaceful transition to independence in 1975, and 
 
57 This recently and notably happened in Yemen, where Houthi rebels have engaged in widespread theft of 
humanitarian aid which forced the UN to reduce its volume of aid sent to Yemen (Associated Press 2018). 
58 See, for example, Savun and Tirone (2011) 
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only resorted to armed conflict when neighboring Indonesia made it clear that an independent 
East Timor following the Portuguese withdrawal would not be tolerated. Throughout this 
period, Fretilin emphasized maintaining strong relations with the Timorese civilian population 
as well as appeals to the international community for moral and material support in forums 
such as the United Nations. These appeals as well as Fretilin’s strong human rights record59 won 
the group strong domestic and international support, and the fully independent state of East 
Timor joined the United Nations in 2002 after a prolonged grassroots rebellion aided by 
powerful members of the international system – most notably Australia and Portugal – forced 
the Indonesian government to concede defeat.60 
The case of Fretilin stands as a demonstrative case for the efficacy of the legitimacy-
seeking framework. Not only did Fretilin market its struggle as one of political legitimacy and 
moral superiority, it enjoyed deep domestic support and broad enough international support to 
translate these efforts into success. Other groups have followed a similar model. The Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) placed considerable emphasis on observing human rights and 
preserving strong relationships with local civilians. During its multidecade struggle against the 
Ethiopian government, the EPLF built schools and hospitals for the civilians living under their 
control, and dealt with prisoners of war by attempting to indoctrinate them into joining the 
EPLF rather than engaging in abuses against them like many of their contemporaries. In 1993, 
the EPLF transferred their non-state institutions and political structures into a formal governing 
 
59 Especially compared to that of the Indonesian government. 
60 See Clark (1980) for a thorough overview of the early years of the conflict over East Timor and a discussion of 
Indonesian human rights abuses. 
 55 
apparatus when they became the new incumbent party of the government of the independent 
state of Eritrea. 
Some less successful movements have practiced similar strategies. The Kurdistan 
Democratic Party in Iran (KDPI) has committed to refraining from various forms of civilian 
targeting, and has legally committed to these practices by signing a variety of international 
treaties, including Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and other more specific commitments regarding the use of anti-personnel mines, sexual 
violence, and protection of children in war zones.61 In Western Sahara, the Polisario Front has 
committed to the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocol I, and is seen by the United 
Nations as the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people rather than the government of 
Morocco.62 Elsewhere, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, the Kuki 
National Organization in India and Myanmar, and the government of the de facto state of 
Somaliland have all made similar commitments to practice restraint as it relates to the civilians 
living under their control. 
Although these examples do not represent systematic evidence, they are illustrative of 
the broader theoretical point here that separatist groups clearly do care about how their 
struggles are perceived by domestic and international populations and actively appeal to both 
for support. If it is true that separatists do indeed care more about their perceived legitimacy 
than other rebel groups, then they should engage in behaviors designed to procure legitimacy 
gains and minimize legitimacy costs systematically more often than other groups. The extent to 
 
61 It appears that other Kurdish armed groups, such as the Parti Azadi Kurdistan (PAK) and the People’s Protection 
Units (YPG) have followed their lead and signed several of these same agreements. 
62 Geneva Call (2015) 
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which rebels kill civilians, employ child soldiers, use sexual violence, and engage in kidnapping 
of civilians are easily observable violent outcomes that are consistent with this logic. In terms of 
economic outcomes, we should also be able to observe separatist groups targeting civilians for 
theft and intercepting aid intended for civilians, less often than other rebels groups. Given the 
international humanitarian laws and norms associated with each of these, engaging in them 
should entail considerable legitimacy costs, which separatists strategically endeavor to avoid. 
Thus, I argue that: 
 
H1a: Separatist rebel groups kill fewer civilians on average than other rebel groups. 
H1b: Separatist rebel groups use fewer child soldiers than other rebel groups. 
H1c: Separatist rebel groups use lower levels of sexual violence against civilians on 
average than other types of rebel groups. 
H1d: Separatist rebel groups engage in kidnapping less often than other rebel groups. 
 
H2a: Separatist rebel groups engage in theft from civilians less often than other rebel 
groups. 
H2b: Separatist rebel groups intercept humanitarian aid less often than other rebel 
groups. 
 
 My contribution here is somewhat modest, but still important. Fazal and Jo both study 
separatist group propensities to kill civilians, albeit using different data, and find support for 
that notion. I reexamine it here because, as I argue in the next chapter, both scholars make 
questionable model decisions that I attempt to account for. In addition, Jo also examines child 
soldiering as an outcome but, counter to her theory, she finds that secessionism may actually 
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fuel child soldiering rather than reduce it, a phenomenon she attributes to strong support 
among domestic supporters that translates to higher rates of volunteerism, including among 
children (Jo 2015: 164). In order to subject this claim to further analysis, I examine child 
soldiering using alternative data. H1c, H1d, H2a and H2b, contribute new dependent variables 
to the discussion. Civilian killing and, to a lesser extent, use of child soldiers, have been 
discussed as strategic manifestations of long-term legitimacy concerns of separatist groups who 
hope to avoid alienating key domestic and international audiences. Given the international 
legal precedent surrounding the use of sexual violence and kidnapping, I argue that restraint 
from such practices should be logically consistent with the other outcomes that have already 
received attention in the literature. 
The analyses that explore the economic side of the coin are especially interesting, since 
the vast majority of studies of civilian targeting explore it in terms of the violence associated 
with rebel-civilian interactions. Economic victimization can, however, be nearly as disruptive to 
civilian security, especially where economic or other forms of security are already on precarious 
footing. Since such forms of civilian victimization do not leave behind a body count or physical 
trauma, though, they may more easily pass undetected by important international audiences 
upon whose support separatists rely, and therefore separatists may be less deterred from 
engaging in such behaviors. They also come with more obvious incentives for rebel groups to 
deviate from practicing restraint, as they can be valuable sources of funding in a conflict space 
that is potentially very resource-scarce.  On the other hand, however, domestic audiences, as 
the presumptive victims of economic targeting, should be expected to be less likely to confer 
internal legitimacy upon an actor that engages in such actions, and therefore separatist groups 
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should still be deterred from partaking in such extractive strategies.63 Thus, my major 
contribution in these hypotheses is to subject the legitimacy-seeking theoretical framework 
that I have developed and applied to research on rebel strategic behavior to further scrutiny 
under new empirical conditions, within new contexts, and with respect to new outcomes. 
  I end this section by offering two caveats to this by way of corollary hypotheses. As I 
mentioned above, three of the four major successful post-Cold War separatist movements that 
did not emerge directly from the cold war were able to gain their independence in part because 
the international community, either as a whole or from important members of it, lent support 
either to their cause of secession or behind the idea of partition more generally as a response 
to human rights abuses by the government in conflict. In these cases, then, the groups gaining 
independence did not necessarily need to appear legitimate, only more legitimate than the 
government they are fighting,64 whom appear to be held to a higher standard than non-state 
combatants. The lesson that separatist groups may take from this is that they do not necessarily 
need to be on their best behavior, but instead merely need to engage in practices that remain 
below the level of brutality practiced by the government. In such cases, separatist groups may 
indulge in the targeting of civilians in order to take advantage of the short-term tactical benefits 
that can be won by doing so. In extreme cases, they may even attempt to provoke heavy 
 
63 With the possible exception of extortion, which, as I discuss below, may be viewed as a legitimate form of 
economic extraction if it is framed as the establishment of a tax-collecting institution. 
64 It should be noted, however, that of these, only the SPLM/A engaged in high levels of civilian targeting. As I have 
discussed, Fretilin in East Timor actively practiced restraint vis-à-vis civilians, and it appears that SWAMPO also did 
not engage in any widespread targeting in Namibia. To be clear, my argument here is not that separatist groups do 
not behave well when their adversaries behave poorly, only that they may be given a longer leash if they choose to 
capitalize on the short term benefits of targeting civilians more than they might otherwise, and that they likely 
recognize that. 
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responses from the government, a notion consistent with Kuperman’s (2008) argument 
regarding moral hazard and intervention. Thus, I offer the following hypothesis: 
  
H3: Separatist groups are not systematically less likely than other rebel groups to target 
civilians when the government engages in higher levels of civilian targeting. 
 
 This brings us now to the curious case of rebel extortion of civilians. I mentioned above 
that extortion is outlawed under international organized crime law, and included it in some of 
the same discussions as other outcomes that separatist groups should refrain from in order to 
avoid legitimacy costs. However, I argue that separatist groups can actually procure legitimacy 
gains from engaging in the extortion of civilians. Extortion involves the compulsory payment of 
money or other property in exchange for protection and other services. In practice, very little 
distinguishes extortion from the practice of legitimate taxation except legality, which, as I have 
already established, is a quality of legitimacy that separatist groups inherently lack. One way in 
which legality can be established is to attempt to manufacture another of the qualities of 
legitimacy that separatists inherently lack: tradition. If a separatist group can establish a 
tradition of regular economically extractive interactions with civilians living under their control, 
then they can not only more smoothly transition these extractive interactions into the legal 
sphere should they successfully gain statehood, but also establish a domestic civic tradition 
whereby citizens pay taxes to a local government with which they are engaged in a social 
contract. In addition, they also are then able to demonstrate to international audiences that 
they are able to procure the funds necessary to support civic and political institutions and to 
engage in legitimate tax collection. 
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The use of the term extortion here might be misleading, but it is accurate given the 
illegal nature of rebellion in the first place. And indeed, Walsh et al. (2018) whose data I use to 
test this notion operationalize extortion as “taxation” on economic activity that occurs in a 
given area. Such practices may be directed towards the extraction of resources, whereby rebels 
allow procurement of resources to continue uninterrupted in exchange for payment,65 or aimed 
at local businesses or individuals in the form of offering protective services, compelling a 
percentage of transactions, and so forth.66 Insofar as the practice of extortion connotes 
organized crime, numerous scholars have conceptualized of the state as merely the most 
successful forms of organized criminal enterprises. Charles Tilly, one of the field’s foremost 
authorities on government and society, began his seminal Warmaking and Statemaking as 
Organized Crime by noting that “If protection rackets represent organised crime at its 
smoothest, then war risking and state making – quintessential protection rackets with the 
advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of organised crime”, and later 
acknowledges that “predation, coercion, piracy, banditry, and racketeering share a home with 
their upright cousins in responsible government” (1985: 169-171).67 Several scholars have 
 
65 The Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) in Colombia earned millions of dollars annually by extorting oil 
companies. Hizb-i-Islami regularly extorted mining companies in Afghanistan and taxed actors engaged in the illicit 
opium trade. The Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal funded their 
operations in part through the extortion of timber, agricultural products, and cannabis trafficking. 
66 The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) set up extensive protection rackets and offered other security 
services in exchange for payment. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Phillippines taxed civilians and local 
businesses continuously between 1993-2007. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil-Eelam (LTTE) engaged in extensive 
taxation of local businesses and individuals, even going so far as to tax members of the Tamil diaspora. According 
to Walsh et al.’s (2018) case notes, the LTTE earned over $5 million annually from extortion, millions of which were 
taxed from the Canadian Tamil diaspora alone – despite evidence that many of these funds were involuntary, no 
explanation is offered for how these taxes were credibly encorced abroad. 
67 The whole of Tilly’s work here contributes other valuable insights regarding the notion of “organized crime” as 
an invaluable state-making tool. I strongly urge the reader to consult his work for a more comprehensive idea of 
just how fundamentally my theory (and those of other scholars) build(s) upon his ideas.  
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echoed this notion – that practices that are often seen as inviable in the absence of legality are 
crucial for the establishment of efficacious state institutions – in relation to the economic 
viability of aspiring states such as Transnistria (Blakkisrud and Kolsto 2011), Catalonia (Boylan 
2015) and Katanga (Larmer and Kennes 2019).  
Thus, I argue that separatists may actually be more likely to engage in extortion in the 
extractive interactions with civilians as a way of demonstrating to international audiences their 
efficacy as a political entity, developing among their domestic audiences (i.e., citizens) a sense 
of civic patronage to the local authority, and contributing in the process to statebuilding efforts 
that can help procure additional legitimacy-gains. Thus, I argue that: 
 
H4: Separatist rebel groups are more likely to engage in extortion of civilians than other 
rebel groups. 
 
 Ostensibly, all forms of civilian targeting can be viewed through the theoretical lens 
outlined to this point in this chapter – that separatist groups, due to concerns of legitimacy, 
should more often act with restraint toward civilians. The forms of civilian targeting I discuss 
above are merely the best captured in the data as they currently exist. I therefore restrict my 
theory to what I can test, but hope future scholars take on the challenge of building upon these 
notions pending innovations in reliable data. In order to maintain thematic consistency relating 
to hypotheses that examine violent vs. economic targeting of civilians, I explore the preceding 
hypotheses out of order. I examine H1a, H1b, and H1c as well as H3 in Chapter 4, while I double 
back to consider H2a, H2b, and H4 in Chapter 5. In the next sections, I outline my theoretical 
expectations regarding a few circumstances that might account for the deviations in the 
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outcomes predicted above. These circumstances take into account more micro-level factors, 
such as changes in the within-conflict strategic space, and represent novel contributions to the 
literature on civilian targeting and the role of legitimacy concerns within the broader strategic 
environment. 
 
3.4 The Micro-Dynamics of War: Shifts in the Strategic Plane 
 I turn now to a discussion of how factors other than long-term concerns of legitimacy 
can influence the strategic calculus of rebel groups, even separatists. Rebel groups often target 
civilians for strategic reasons. Usually these strategic calculations revolve around coercing 
support or deterring defection, or around procuring the resources needed to sustain a 
movement. Separatist groups, in spite of the long-term expected benefits of restraint, are not 
immune to the short-term advantages afforded by the lack thereof. I argue above that, in 
general, separatist groups do tend to prioritize the long-term. 
However, conflicts are not static; they are fluid and circumstances change constantly. 
Rebel groups may conceive of a strategy that fits their circumstances at one point in a conflict, 
but these circumstances can change rapidly and quickly render those plans obsolete. A negative 
shock to a group’s relative fighting capabilities or chances of success may quickly force a 
combatant to reevaluate their chances of victory and devise an alternative strategy that fits the 
reality of their new situation. Under circumstances where a group’s chances of success are 
rapidly diminishing, long term strategic concerns may no longer be a luxury they enjoy, and 
they may instead be forced to use new strategies to help reverse the tide of the conflict in the 
short-term. 
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Civilians fit into this equation because weak groups often rely on local populations for 
support, and separatists specifically more so since their struggle is inherently tied to a 
constituency and a piece of territory. A group that suffers a negative shock to their chances of 
success and is suddenly weaker than they had previously expected to be must ensure that they 
have the support of local civilians. The challenge for groups in such a position, however, is that 
a moment of weakness for a rebel may be precisely the moment that civilian supporters might 
choose to defect. Civilians may rationally “back the horse” that has the best chance of winning, 
desire to avoid being implicated as a sympathizer with the losing side if they view the rebel’s 
defeat as highly likely, or simply believe future interactions with another side are more likely 
than with the group they had previously supported and want to get off on the right foot when 
the “new sheriff in town” arrives.68 The group that has recently suffered the negative shock 
may ideally like to secure a cooperative civilian relationship without force, but may feel 
compelled to coerce it. In such cases, rebels may feel forced to respond with violence in order 
to instill fear and prevent large-scale civilian defection. 
I argue that separatist rebel groups are not immune to the strategic necessities that 
battlefield developments create. The dream of statehood can only stay alive so long as the 
group believes they can survive to continue fighting for it. In order to salvage that dream they 
may be forced to “fight dirty” simply because they feel there is no other viable recourse. Such a 
response can come about as a result of several potential stimuli that would count as a negative 
shock to a group’s relative strength or chances of success.69 One such negative shock that could 
 
68 See Kalyvas (2006) for more on civilian incentives and allegiance selection. 
69 It is instructive to compare this notion to that in the terrorism literature that terrorism, which civilian targeting is 
related to, is a weapon of the weak. That is, it is a tactic weak groups must resort to because they have few other 
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have immediate existential implications for a rebel group is a major battlefield defeat. Such a 
defeat carries with it not only strategic costs, but also the loss of manpower and materiel that 
may not be easily replaced, especially since most rebel groups are on precarious footing with 
respect to relative strength to begin with. We should therefore expect the rank-and-file and 
commanders of a group alike to deeply feel the effects of significant battlefield losses. Civilians 
should be able to sense the group’s weakening position, too, and may hasten the defection of 
civilian supporters, or at least the perception of rebel leaders that this might happen. The 
combination of these realities creates a situation where rebel groups are likely to be losing 
support, or perceive its likelihood, at the precise moment when they need it most as well as 
when they are most willing to coerce it violently.70 Thus, I hypothesize that: 
 
H5: Separatist rebel groups kill more civilians after suffering higher numbers of combat 




viable options. When things start “going south” for a group and they become weaker than they had been, they 
may be forced to move to this strategy. 
70 An alternative mechanism may also be at play here. Soldiers in the fighting ranks may suffer considerable 
psychological effects from particularly nasty or costly battles. In many cases, it is likely they even lost close friends 
or relatives. We might expect that low-level soldiers may react violently, and to potentially place blame on and 
lash out against civilian populations whose allegiance they view as dubious, potentially acting upon their own 
initiative. It is even possible that commanders could fall into this same psychological funk, or even panic, and 
actually order reprisals against civilians, though not for rational strategic reasons but rather for reactionary 
emotional reasons. Such a theory, though, would fall more closely under Weinstein’s (2007) agency failure model, 
so I do not consider it further here. Empirically, it may well be difficult to distinguish between these two 
mechanisms. It is a significant challenge to determine motive quantitatively; such a study would likely need to take 
up this challenge qualitatively, which I do not have the space or resources to tackle in this dissertation. I therefore 
do not attempt to distinguish between these mechanisms here, but instead leave it to future scholarship to 
elucidate. 
71 I operationalize “major defeats” in terms of battlefield fatalities suffered by the group. I discuss my 
measurement and reasoning for this in more depth in Chapter 6, but in general I argue that fatality figures are a 
good direct indicator of manpower costs (obviously), and a good indirect indicator of materiel and strategic costs. 
Especially costly battles generally come with high casualty numbers and costly materiel and strategic losses. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter has attempted to achieve three broad goals. First, it has rooted 
observations in the real world as well as scholarly findings regarding the conduct of separatist 
groups within a theoretical framework that posits separatist strategic decisions as a function of 
long-term concerns of legitimacy – defined as the right and ability of a political entity to govern 
a people and rule over a piece of territory. The framework predicts decisions along two 
dimensions – the avoidance of legitimacy costs and the procurement of legitimacy gains – and 
with respect to the perceptions of two important audiences – the domestic and the 
international. I stop short of fully fleshing out this framework, however, because the primary 
focal point of this dissertation relates specifically to civilian targeting. The broader framework 
to which such patterns theoretically correspond is important for the purpose of grounding this 
discussion within a broader set of existing findings and other expectations that can be further 
explored, but ultimately beyond the purview of the analyses that follow in the next few 
chapters. 
This brings me to the second major goal of this chapter. I have outlined a series of 
expected outcomes relating to the separatist propensity to target civilians compared to other 
combatants in armed conflict. The theory rests primarily upon the legitimacy cost avoidance 
dimension of the framework described above, and builds upon existing studies to argue that 
separatist groups should, on average, kill fewer civilians; be less likely to use child soldiers; 
engage in lower levels of sexual violence; and kidnap, extort, steal from, and seize humanitarian 
aid intended for, civilians. The theory expands upon existing research by considering a broader 
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set of dependent variables and exploring them with more appropriate models, which I discuss 
in the next two chapters. 
The third major goal of this chapter has been to explore the potential sources of 
variation in separatist civilian targeting patterns. The underlying assumption of a theory of 
legitimacy-seeking behavior is that the decision of whether or not to target civilians is strategic, 
in the vein of Kalyvas (2006). Restraint is strategic, but legitimacy concerns are not the only 
factor operating in the entire strategic plane. Some conflict contexts can create short-term 
incentives to target civilians even in spite of longer-term considerations that should incentivize 
restraint. Developments within conflicts can certainly cause groups to recalculate their strategy 
on the fly. Suffering a negative shock to their fighting capabilities, such as that following a major 
defeat on the battlefield, can certainly provoke a change to more heavy-handed strategies. In 
the next chapter, I begin the task of empirically examining Hypotheses 1 and 3 outlined above. 
Chapter 5 is then devoted to exploring the claims outlined in Hypotheses 2 and 4. Chapter 6 
then takes up the task of testing Hypothesis 5. 
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Chapter 4: Separatism and Civilian Targeting in Civil 
War: An Empirical Analysis 
“The Kurdish people have the right of self-determination like every other nation in the world.” – 
Jalal Talabani, Former president of Iraq 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter begins the process of empirically evaluating the claims that I have 
advanced in the preceding chapters. Do separatist rebel groups operate as freedom fighters, 
concerned about the well-being of their “constituents” and the perception of audiences at 
home and abroad upon whom their movement relies? Or are they no different in practice from 
other groups, making (sometimes abhorrent) strategic choices based on battlefield realities that 
give them the best chance of living to fight again tomorrow? The overriding theme that I 
advance in this dissertation is that domestic and international legitimacy do factor into 
separatist rebel group decision making, but that such concerns constitute only one – albeit 
major – factor within a broad, multifaceted, and nuanced strategic plane. Indeed, as I find 
below, legitimacy concerns only restrain separatist actors sometimes, but as I show in 
subsequent chapters, the times when these concerns take a back seat to other strategic 
considerations can be predicted systematically by forces specific to the conflict.  
 In the previous chapters, I outlined a theoretical framework, based on existing research 
and recent historical record, wherein separatist groups have incentives to behave 
systematically differently from other rebel groups, due to concerns over how their actions are 
perceived by domestic and international audiences. These perceptions manifest as legitimacy – 
the right and ability of a political entity to govern a people and rule over a piece of territory. 
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Separatist groups attempt to build and safeguard legitimacy by making strategic calculations 
intended to minimize legitimacy costs and maximize legitimacy gains.72 
 This first empirical dissertation chapter serves as an initial step in the process of further 
exploring the legitimacy-seeking framework. More specifically, I focus primarily on the 
legitimacy cost avoidance dimension of the framework described in the previous chapter. This 
dimension predicts that separatist rebel groups should try to enhance their domestic and 
international legitimacy, in part, by trying to avoid actions that might alienate important 
domestic and international audiences. Not only are such outcomes more easily observable in 
the real world, they also carry with them more pressing implications for efforts related to 
conflict management and human rights preservation. In the next two chapters, I do consider 
elements of the legitimacy gains procurement dimension of the framework – which predicts 
that separatists also make decisions intended to gain support from important domestic and 
international legitimacy arbiters – but only with respect to certain nuances related to civilian 
targeting, which is the primary literature that I seek to inform in this dissertation. I leave it to 
future scholarship to explore other outcomes consistent with the framework, but I hope to 
ground the framework on a more theoretically and empirically comprehensive footing that 
easily lends itself to further examination. 
The first step in this process, which I undertake in this chapter, is to expand upon 
existing research to examine the face-validity of the legitimacy-seeking framework. I do so by 
expanding upon existing research by scholars like Jo (2015) and Fazal (2018) by considering a 
 
72 See Chapter 2 for discussion of existing research that falls into this framework. 
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broader set of dependent variables and with alternative model specifications. I discuss these 
model alterations later in this chapter, but to reiterate from the previous chapter, I predict that: 
 
H1a: Separatist rebel groups kill fewer civilians on average than other rebel groups. 
H1b: Separatist rebel groups use child soldiers to a lesser extent than other rebel 
groups. 
H1c: Separatist rebel groups use lower levels of sexual violence against civilians on 
average than other rebel groups. 
H1d: Separatist rebel groups engage in kidnapping less often than other rebel groups. 
  
However, I offer one nuance here that is based upon the recent historical record of 
secessionist conflicts. In the previous chapter, I discussed that of the four notable successful 
separatist movements in the post-cold war era,73 three of them occurred in large part because 
the international community responded in favor of separatism because of the “parent” state’s 
poor human rights conduct.74 Assuming separatist movements learn from history, and that the 
lesson they take from this is that states are held to a higher standard than non-state actors, one 
can expect them to view the perceived legitimacy of their own movement as less important 
when the state they are seeking to separate from behaves “poorly”. That is not to say that 
 
73 As I discussed in Chapter 3, this is omitting the new states that directly emerged from the fall of Communism in 
Europe. 
74 For example, FRETILIN was able to gain independence for East Timor in large part because important actors in 
the international community, specifically Australia and post-colonial Portugual, were compelled to intervene in 
opposition to the Indonesian government rather than in support of FRETILIN. Indeed, Australian government and 
intelligence personnel anticipated and supported a swift Indonesian annexation of the region following the 
Portuguese withdrawal in the 1970s (Capizzi et al. 1976) – they were the only country to officially recognize 
annexation. However, Indonesian transgressions and domestic pressure from pro-FRETILIN activists gradually 
forced the Australian government to change course. The Howard Government officially endorsed Timorese self-
determination in 1998 (see Capizzi et al. 1976, Salla 1995, Jardin 2010 for a more detailed overview of Australia’s 
role in Timorese independence). 
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separatist groups, in such cases, do not care about their legitimacy; rather, they may come to 
believe that they only need to be better behaved than the government they are fighting. In 
such cases, I argue that: 
 
H3: Separatist groups are not systematically less likely than other rebel groups to target 
civilians when the government engages in higher levels of civilian targeting.75  
  
In the rest of this chapter, I use data on each of these outcome variables, together with 
data and variables discussed further below, to evaluate the merits of these hypotheses. The 
results of this analysis suggest that the legitimacy-seeking framework performs well for some 
outcomes, but things are a bit more nuanced for others. Specifically, it does appear that 
separatist groups kill fewer civilians and engage in sexual violence to a lesser extent than other 
rebel groups, yet may actually be more likely to use child soldiers. They also appear to kidnap 
foreign nationals less often than other rebel groups, but they do not appear to systematically 
engage in kidnapping in general less often than other rebels. They also appear to be less 
restrained when the government targets civilians, but only marginally so. Each of these findings 
are discussed in turn and in much more depth below, but the major takeaway appears to be 
that separatist groups behave as if legitimacy concerns do matter, but they are only one piece 
of a complicated puzzle. Taken together, the findings below provide a useful point of departure 
for our journey in the subsequent chapters to identify which group-level factors do help 
contribute to civilian targeting patterns in spite of the incentives to practice restraint. 
 
 
75 I operationalize this as the number of civilians killed in the previous year. I discuss this in more detail below. 
 71 
4.2 Overview of the Data 
 I identify a universe of cases of civilian targeting conceptualized in four different ways: 
1) civilian killing, 2) use of child soldiers, 3) sexual violence, and 4) kidnapping. I construct the 
final datasets using a variety of data sources that produce two separate datasets.76 To test 
civilian killing, sexual violence, and kidnapping, I utilize dyad-year data on all armed dyad years 
between 1989 and 2009.77 Each observation in those data consists of an individual year of an 
ongoing conflict dyad and contains information for that dyad between that rebel-state dyad in 
that year. This produces a dataset that consists of 1,099 conflict dyad-years making up 249 civil 
conflict dyads during the years 1989-2009. This setup allows me to account for year-to-year 
within-conflict variation in the data. To test child soldier use, I use dyad-level data on 243 
armed conflicts during the same period.78 The difference in data structure merely reflects the 
differences in structure of available data on the dependent variables, which I discuss further 
below. 
Conflicts in this analysis take on the UCDP definition of any armed conflict that reaches 
25 battle deaths. This allows me to examine episodes of low-intensity conflict that still result in 
fatalities as well as major clashes that are short-lived and consequently fall short of the 
traditional 1,000 battle death threshold used by most civil war scholars. This allows for a 
broader sample of conflicts than would otherwise be the case. Furthermore, the temporal 
period covered here is quite limited, lasting only 20 years, yet I argue that it is adequate for 
 
76 I discuss these data sources further below. 
77 The combined temporal range of the data discussed below limits me to this 20-year period. 
78 Missing observations in the child soldier data (Haer and Böhmelt 2016) account for the disparity between the 
number of dyads here and in the dyad-year sample used to test the other outcome variables. 
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exploring the relationships under consideration in this dissertation. Many scholars use 
alternative data to account for the post-Cold War bias often evident in studies of civil war and 
civilian targeting.79 I argue, however, that the post-Cold War period is exactly the period in 
which we are most likely to see strategic choices attenuated specifically by legitimacy-concerns, 
in addition to being the period in which any policy-relevance of this dissertation is most 
applicable. Different eras elicit different international forces. During the Cold War, for example, 
rebels merely needed to espouse a certain ideology in order to gain widespread support, 
especially from major powers. By contrast, modern rebels operating under a modern human 
rights regime should be expected to behave with more restraint if they seek widespread 
international support. This is to say nothing of the higher quality of data on civilian targeting in 
modern conflicts.80 Empirical choices almost always come with tradeoffs, and in this case I 
choose to prioritize data granularity with an emphasis on modern trends over temporal 
comprehensiveness that might allow me to extrapolate trends across time but which may 
produce insight that is less useful for explaining modern conflict trends in particular. 
 
4.3 Independent Variable 
The primary independent variable, separatism, is borrowed from the Nonstate Actor 
(NSA) Dataset compiled by Cunningham et al. (2013) and indicates whether or not a non-state 
actor in an armed conflict has explicitly secessionist goals. This variable is dichotomous, coded 
 
79 See Fazal 2018 for an example 
80 Advances in mass media technology upon which these data are based largely account for this. Fazal’s data, while 
extending back to 1816, merely indicate whether rebel groups targeted civilians and say nothing about the severity 
or extent of the targeting. By contrast, the OSV data on civilian killing contains actual fatality figures for conflicts 
ongoing in 1989 and later. I prioritize the higher granularity of data on modern conflicts. 
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with a value of 1 when a conflict is separatist and 0 when it is not.81 In the dyad-year data, this 
produces a sample that includes 377 secessionist dyad-years – about 34.4% of the total sample 
– and 682 non-secessionist dyad-years – roughly 62.1% of the sample.82 In the conflict-level 
data, the sample includes 56 separatist conflicts (~23%) and 186 (~77%) non-separatist 
conflicts. 
 
4.4 Dependent Variables 
 Four of the hypotheses examined in this chapter consider different outcomes. 
Accordingly, the models use four distinct variables: civilian killing, child soldier use, sexual 
violence, and kidnapping. Data measuring civilian killing is borrowed from the UCDP data on 
One-Sided Violence (OSV) in armed conflicts (Eck and Hultman 2007, Pettersson et al. 2019), 
which contains fatality figures for all actor-years between 1989 and 2018. These data consult 
global news sources and NGO/IGO reports to estimate the number of civilian fatalities resulting 
from deliberate acts of violence in each year of an armed conflict. For my purposes, the data 
are further subsetted to include only civil conflicts and acts of violence committed by rebel 
groups, as opposed to OSV committed by governments or episodes of OSV that took place in 
conflicts other than state-based intrastate conflicts, and matched to their corresponding civil 
conflict dyads. One challenge created by using the OSV data is that they consist only of years 
where rebels kill more than 25 civilians, so I am unable to account for years where rebels killed 
only a handful of civilians. Rebels are therefore coded as having killed zero civilians for dyad-
 
81 A non-separatist rebel, then, consists of any rebel group that does not express explicitly secessionist goals as 
coded by Cunningham et al. (2013). 
82 I use the words “secessionist” and “separatist” interchangeably throughout this dissertation. 
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years in which they did not kill more than 25 civilians. This sacrifices some granularity and 
nuance but does allow me to prioritize factors that contribute to higher levels of OSV. 
The distribution of these data is heavily skewed to the left. By that, I mean that the 
overwhelming majority of dyad-years consist of zero civilian deaths directly perpetrated by 
rebels in incidents of one-sided violence. Of the 1,099 dyad-years in the data, this is true of 804 
of them. Most other dyad-years include civilian fatality levels in the double digits. A few dyad-
years exhibit much higher levels of violence. The maximum value in the data for one-sided 
violence in a single dyad-year is 27,445,83 and several other dyad-years have fatality figures in 
the hundreds or thousands. Still, though, dyad-years exhibiting such high levels of brutality are 
significantly outweighed by years where no violence took place. To demonstrate the magnitude 
of the skewness, the mean value for the rebel civilian killing variable according to the OSV is 
just over 88, the value of the third quartile is 30 and the median value is 0. Analyzing data with 
such a heavily skewed distribution is challenging, but models exist that are designed specifically 
to handle such a distribution. I discuss this further below in my discussion of the methods. 
 The variable I use for child soldier use is borrowed from Haer and Böhmelt (2016), who 
construct a three-tiered measure of child soldier use, defined as any person under the age of 18 
who has been incorporated into an armed group as a soldier during the period 1989-2010 
(UNICEF 2007).84 They construct this measure based on independent reports from a variety of 
 
83 This estimate was perpetrated by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) in 1996, 
in their struggle against the Congolese (then Zaire) government then controlled by Mobutu Sese Seku during the 
First Congolese War. 
84 Haer and Böhmelt note that using the 18-year-old threshold is not without controversy, as different cultural 
values espouse different definitions of adulthood, and older teenagers (including 16 and 17-year-olds) are less 
easily manipulated than younger children and therefore are not subject to the same exploitative relationship with 
armed groups. They argue, however, that 18 is an appropriate threshold for analysis because it is the threshold 
used in most international legal standards that define child soldiering (UNICEF 2007). Given this justification and 
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children’s rights watchdog organizations, including Child Soldiers International and Human 
Rights Watch. The data take a value of 0 when a rebel group did not use child soldiers, 1 when 
children made up less than 50% of the overall group size, and 2 when they comprised more 
than 50%. Since the values of this variable do not change over time, the tests I conduct on these 
data take place at the dyad-level, rather than at the yearly level. This produces a sample of 243 
individual observations, 56 of which are coded as Separatist. Among the full sample, 76 dyads 
(or ~31%) take a value of 0 for child soldier use by rebel actors, 128 (or ~53%) take a value of 1, 
and 39 (or ~16%) take a value of two. 
My third dependent variable captures the extent of sexual violence used by rebel 
groups. For this, I borrow a four-tiered measure of the prevalence of sexual violence in armed 
conflict from the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset (Cohen and Nordas 2014). 
SVAC includes information on all armed conflicts between 1989 and 2009, and builds its 
measure based upon information taken from reports from the three most commonly used 
sources in the quantitative human rights literature: the US State Department annual reports, 
Amnesty International annual and periodic special reports, and Human Rights Watch annual 
and periodic special reports. Each of these are constructed into a four-tier measure indicating 
the prevalence of claims of sexual violence in a conflict in a given year: 0 for none, 1 for 
isolated, 2 for some/many, and 3 for massive. These data are further disaggregated by selection 
criteria for the victims (nationality, ethnicity, age, etc.), as well as whether the victims were 
 
the difficulty in procuring more fine-grained data on child soldiering, I follow their lead in standing by an 18-year-
old threshold for operationalizing child soldiering. 
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male, children, refugees, or detainees. The measures constructed from each source are not 
identical, but fairly close to it. 
For the purpose of this analysis, I primarily use the data collected from the State 
Department annual reports because they have the best coverage among the data points that 
include only dyad-years and sexual violence perpetrated by rebel groups specifically,85 including 
data on 1,096 dyad-years compared to 546 for Human Rights Watch and 680 for Amnesty 
International. Again, the data are skewed heavily toward the left. According to the State 
Department SVAC measure, 1,018 (~92.8%) of the total dyad-years contained 0 instances of 
sexual violence, while 45 (~4.1%) had isolated instances, 22 (~2%) had many, and 11 (~1%) 
dyad-years contained massive levels of sexual violence. The other measures exhibited similar 
distributions.86 
To measure kidnapping, I borrow data from Walsh et al.’s (2018) Rebel Contraband 
Dataset (RCD), which captures sources of rebel funding from 31 natural resources, as well as 
several crime variables, including two variables indicating when they engaged in kidnapping. 
The first is a variable indicating when rebels kidnap people from the country or area where the 
conflict occurs in exchange for payments. The second indicates whether they kidnap civilians 
where at least one of the victims is from a country outside the area of the conflict. Since my 
analysis considers how rebel actions may be viewed by domestic and international observers, I 
 
85 The original data include information on sexual violence during non-conflict years and that perpetrated by 
governments, in addition to the rebel-dyad-years subset I am using in this chapter. 
86 It is, of course, very surprising to see that only 7% of dyad-years in the data contain instances of sexual violence. 
This suggests that problems or difficulties with data collection could be biasing the figures. The SVAC data are the 
best currently available that examine sexual violence in wartime, but that does not mean their quality is above 
suspicion. The reader should take the results of these analyses with a grain of salt, and additional data collection 
efforts may be required to ensure that rebel sexual violence data are accurate. 
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conduct the primary analyses below using an aggregate measure of kidnapping in general that 
is in effect a combination of the two. That is, I code a rebel group as using kidnapping if they 
engage in the kidnapping of either domestic or foreign civilians. I then supplement this primary 
test by considering the disaggregated domestic and international measures separately, in case 
the identity of the victim(s) of kidnapping helps to explain separatist and rebel kidnapping 
patterns. If there is a difference in who tends to become the victim of rebel kidnapping, this 
may tell us something about the motivations of rebel actors vis-à-vis domestic and international 
observers. In the data, rebels engaged in kidnapping in 184 dyad-years, accounting for about 
16.7% of the sample. 
 
4.5 Control Variables 
 I include several control variables in the models below that are intended to account for 
potential confounding factors. These confounding factors include variables that are related to 
both the key IV (separatism) and the DVs, and might account for the observed relationship if 
not controlled for. Perhaps the most important such factor is whether or not a civil war has an 
ethnic component. As Ross (2010) notes, almost all separatist conflicts are comprised of some 
ethnic component. However, not all ethnic conflicts are separatist. Ethnic proclivities create 
important rebel-civilian dynamics. In particular, many rebels claim to fight on behalf of specific 
ethnic groups and draw much of their support from them in terms of manpower, funding, food, 
shelter, information, and supplies. They may also have specific in-group loyalties and out-group 
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animosities that may influence their decision of who to target, if at all. As such, failure to 
consider ethnic ties could produce woefully misleading results.87 
To measure ethnic ties, I utilize the ACD2EPR data (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012), and, 
following their lead, code a rebel group as being “ethnic” if it claims to fight on behalf of an 
ethnic group and enjoys a base of recruitment from that ethnic group. The data contain 388 
non-ethnic dyad-years (~36.5% of the sample), compared to 674 ethnic dyad-years (~63.5%). Of 
these, 359 are both ethnic and separatist dyad-years, out of a total of 373 separatist dyad-years 
in the data. Interestingly, of the 14 separatist, non-ethnic dyad-years in the data, 13 of those 
years belong to a single conflict.88 This emphasizes the importance of considering ethnicity as 
part of any study of separatism. 
 In addition, I consider the role of rebel strength. The strength of rebels has been argued 
to influence civilian targeting propensities in multiple ways. On the one hand, numerous 
scholars have argued that terrorism – and by extension, civilian targeting – is a weapon of the 
weak. Rebels utilize violence as a way of coercing support and putting pressure on adversaries 
simply because they do not have the capability to utilize less brutal strategies.89 Weak groups 
also may be more inclined to opt for a secessionist strategy if they occupy land far from the 
central government. In such cases, they likely lack the resources to take on the full might of the 
state apparatus and instead hope to bit off a small piece of territory, while simultaneously 
 
87 This is important to note, since many scholars in the legitimacy-seeking vein do not incorporate an ethnic 
dimension. This includes Jo and Fazal, upon whose works I am relying and building heavily. My inclusion of an 
ethnic variable is one of the important empirical improvements I make over existing research. 
88 That would be the conflict involving the FLEC-FAC, who waged a low-level insurgency for 13 years intermittently 
between 1994 and 2009 in support of the independence of Cabinda, an exclave of Angola which is separated from 
the rest of Angola by a narrow strip of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Even this conflict could be argued to 
be ethnic, though does not qualify according to Wucherpfennig et al.’s coding scheme so I leave it as is in the data. 
89 See Valentino (2004), Pape (2005), Wood (2010) 
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hoping merely to raise the costs of fighting for the government to the point where the latter 
decides to cut its losses and make concessions. 
On the other hand, in the Weinsteinian (2007) tradition, strong rebels rely less heavily 
on civilians and may practice less restraint vis-à-vis civilians. Such groups may even fall into the 
category of resource rich groups that attract opportunistic recruits, thereby enhancing the 
chances of indiscriminate violence against non-combatants. Strong groups may also have a 
stronger proclivity to engage in separatism than other groups, since establishing a new state is 
costly and difficult and potentially prohibitive for weak rebel groups. Thus, rebel strength and 
rebel weakness could both confound the results of the analysis. I therefore include two dummy 
variables, one that indicates rebel weakness – coded 1 if the group is weak and 0 otherwise – 
and one for rebel strength – coded in the inverse. I construct these indicators based on the five-
tiered ordinal measure of rebel strength taken from Cunningham et al.’s (2013) NSA data. In 
those data, a group is coded as 1 if the group is much weaker than the state, 3 if it is at parity, 
and 5 if it is much stronger. I code a group as “relatively weak” if it is rated at 1 or 2 in the NSA 
data, and “relatively strong” if it is rated at 4 or 5. 
According to this scale, 15 dyad-years in the data (~1.4%) involve rebel actors who are 
relatively strong, while 984 (~91.8%) are coded as relatively weak. 75 dyad-years involve a rebel 
group that is relatively at parity with the government (~7%) – i.e., rated as a 3 on Cunningham 
et al.’s scale. This is unsurprising, since civil wars are almost always asymmetric. The data I am 
using for this study indicate as much. As a robustness check, I also test a model that includes 
the original ordinal rebel strength variable rather than the dichotomous strong and weak 
variables to get a sense of how the results change at different levels of comparative strength. 
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 I also control for whether or not a rebel group receives funding from natural resources. 
Numerous scholars have examined the role of resources in disengaging rebels from the need 
for civilian support, and may make them more likely to target civilians due to poor discipline 
and the attraction of opportunistic recruits (e.g., Weinstein 2007). Resource funding may also 
predict separatism, because they provide the means through which to finance a state as well as 
potentially the motive to secede in the first place.90 In order to capture this, I utilize a variable I 
constructed using Walsh et al.’s (2018) RCD. These data represent a significant innovation over 
existing data capturing the role of natural resources in conflict. Previous studies have 
operationalized resources as the presence of a resource in the conflict area (Saleyhan et al. 
2014), the number of resources in a country (Haer and Böhmelt 2016), or the percentage of a 
country’s commodity exports (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), among others. The RCD improves 
upon this by identifying 31 resource categories and 4 funding strategies through which rebels 
actually derive funding, and does so at the yearly- rather than conflict- or country-level. In this 
analysis, a rebel group is considered to derive funding from natural resources if it engages in 
the extortion, theft, smuggling, or booty futures – that is, promising another actor exploitation 
rights over a natural resource in the event the group gains control of it – of any of the 31 
natural resources identified by Walsh et al. in a given year. In the data, rebels derive funding 
from natural resources in 360 dyad-years accounting for about 35.2% of the data.91 
 
90 Some studies (Notably, Horowitz 1985) have posited that dissatisfaction with the way in which the government 
reinvests resource profits can produce separatist proclivities in regions where resources are produced. 
91 It should of course be noted that not all sources of funding come from the sale of natural resources, and that the 
RCD also captures other sources of illicit rebel funding such as direct extortion or theft from civilians, kidnapping 
and human trafficking, smuggling of goods, piracy, and hijacking humanitarian aid. I therefore construct a more 
inclusive illicit funding variable to capture these methods of funding. For several reasons, however, I reserve these 
for the supplemental rather than primary analyses. First, most conflict studies examine natural resource funding in 
particular rather than other sources of funding, so I choose to also do so in order to best inform the literature on 
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 In addition, I account for whether or not a rebel group controls territory. This should 
theoretically be a goal of virtually all separatist groups, but the ability to establish a territorial 
foothold in conflict is a valuable piece of leverage and strategic focal point for nearly all 
combatants in armed conflicts. Save for especially inhospitable areas, civilians tend to live in 
areas controlled by armed groups in conflict, thereby presenting the opportunity and with it 
potentially the motive to target civilians. Rebel group relations with these civilians may be 
friendly, hostile, or neutral, but interactions between them are virtually inevitable. As such, 
rebel territorial control warrants consideration in any study of rebel treatment of civilians. In 
addition, any territory possessed by a rebel group has the potential to make up the territory of 
a newly formed state, thus also potentially predicting separatism. I again account for this using 
a dichotomous variable borrowed from the NSA data, which takes a value of 1 when a group 
controls territory and 0 when it does not. In these data, 412 dyad-years occur when a rebel 
group controls territory (~38.4% of the sample), while 660 do not (~61.6%). 
 I also include a variable that accounts for the duration of the conflict. As a conflict drags 
on, combatant groups may become more desperate and resort to more brutal tactics in order 
to gain a tactical advantage and bring a conflict to a more immediate conclusion. It is also 
possible that the longer a conflict rages, the more intense adversarial animosity becomes, and 
the more brutal the reprisals against civilian supporters of the enemy. Alternatively and more 
simply, rebels may just become weaker as a conflict grows older, forcing them to replenish their 
 
its own terms. Second, many other forms of illicit funding inherently involve victimizing civilians, which could bias 
my results in favor of a few cases where rebels are especially prone to civilian targeting. Third, it can be argued 
that any means through which rebels fund their activities is illicit – and it does appear that rebels derive illicit 
funding in nearly half of all observations in the data – which runs the risk of this variable driving the results of the 
statistical analyses presented below. I estimate each of the models below using the illicit funding variable in 
addition to that for resource funding, but report only those for resource funding. 
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ranks through conscription of children or to use civilian intimidation as a means of staving off 
defeat. It also appears that separatist conflicts tend to be longer than other conflicts, perhaps 
owing to the indivisible nature of the issues under contention in territorial conflicts (Toft 2003), 
and therefore conflict duration may potentially also predict separatism. To capture this, I 
borrow a variable from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Armed Conflict Data (ACD) 
(Pettersson and Eck 2018) which includes a number that indicates the number of years since 
the conflict began. The longest running conflict in the data is that between the Philippine 
government and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which had entered its 40th year 
at the end of 2009, when the data coverage stops. Most conflicts are much shorter, however, 
as roughly 65% of dyads in the data end within five years of starting. 
 Finally, I turn to the question of rebel responses to government targeting of civilians. H3 
predicts that rebels may become less restrained when the government engages in higher levels 
of human rights abuses. This prediction is born out of the observation that the four major post-
Cold War successful secessionist movements occurred, in large part, because the international 
community intervened on the side of the rebels after significant abuse of civilians on the part of 
the government. I do not argue that separatists stop caring about their legitimacy or that they 
engage in higher levels of violence out of revenge. Rather, I argue that separatists learn from 
history, and may come to believe that their greatest source of legitimacy comes from their 
parent state’s loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.92 Once the 
 
92 This implies the existence of something resembling a zero-sum relationship between state and rebel legitimacy – 
when governments come to be viewed as less legitimate, rebels challenging the government come to be viewed as 
more legitimate, regardless of their own strategic decisions. 
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government begins behaving “badly”, separatists may view their own actions as less important 
for maintaining legitimacy, and consequently may begin to act with less restraint. 
 To test this claim, I use a measure of government civilian killing borrowed from the OSV. 
Like the data from which they are drawn, the OSV variable includes fatality figures for a given 
dyad-year. I lag these figures by one year to account for the notion that rebel behavior is a 
response to actions taken by the government. I focus specifically on government killing of 
civilians here, since figures on that are the most reliable compared to the other dependent 
variables tested here. In general, it appears that governments target more civilians than rebels. 
The highest government targeting year took place during the Rwandan Genocide, when, 
according to the OSV data, over 150,000 civilians were killed by the government in one year.93 
This is, of course, a significant outlier, but several other observations have figures in the 
thousands. For comparison, 67% of the dyad-years in the data contain a value of zero for the 
lagged government targeting variable, compared to 73% for rebel civilian targeting.  
 Table 4.1 below summarizes the descriptive statistics discussed in this section, along 
with the variation inflation factors (VIFs) of the variables. The table includes only the variables 
included in the main analyses, and leaves out alternative variables used in supplemental tests 
and robustness checks. All explanatory variables are well below the VIF threshold level of 5, 
indicating that there is very little overlap or correlation between any of them.94 
 
93 It should of course be noted that other sources place the number of civilians killed during the Rwandan 
Genocide at much, much higher than 150,000. One reason for the low estimate in the OSV could simply be that 
many of the victims of the Genocide were killed by other civilians rather than the government, which would not be 
captured by the government targeting variable in the data. 
94 In the interest of saving space, VIF statistics are reported here for only the first set of models testing civilian 




4.6 Descriptive Statistics 
 Although statistical analyses can tell us the extent to which certain variables contribute 
to an outcome, considering some descriptive statistics can be useful for examining specific 
facets of the data as it relates to the broader analysis. In the preceding paragraphs, I discussed 
the distributions of the relevant variables in this analysis. But how do these distributions 
compare when they are subsetted based on the value the observations take on the 
independent variable? Doing so produces an interesting picture. 
 With respect to civilian killing in particular, the distributions suggest that non-separatist 
dyad-years exhibit higher rates of civilian killing than separatist dyad-years. Let’s start with the 
most notable attribute of the overall distribution, which is that the vast majority of the dyad-
years in the data – approximately 73% – contain zero civilian fatalities at the hands of rebels. 
For specifically separatist conflicts, this portion of the distribution increases to about 74%, 
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compared to about 71% for non-separatist dyad-years. Thus, separatism corresponds to a 
roughly 1-2% swing compared to the overall distribution. While this is a somewhat marginal 
difference, it is reflected more prominently elsewhere in the distribution. Non-separatist 
conflicts account for the 17 most deadly years in the data, and 28 of the top 29.95 Among 
separatist conflicts, the mean number of civilians killed per dyad-year is just under 32, while the 
same statistic for non-separatist conflicts is about 120.96 
 A similar pattern emerges when we consider sexual violence as the outcome, though 
the difference is not quite as drastic. In the overall sample, zero incidents of sexual violence 
occurred in about 92.6% of all dyad-years. For the separatist subset, this increases to just over 
93%, while it decreases to just under 92% for the non-separatist subset. On the other end of 
the distribution, only four dyad-years rated at a 2 or 3 in the SVAC scale for separatist conflicts, 
while 29 dyad-years reach this threshold among the non-separatist dyad-years. These data are, 
of course, more limited in their ability to tell a nuanced story than the OSV data because they 
do not include discrete figures of incidents of sexual violence, and there could still be 
considerable variation among dyad-years that count as having “massive” levels of sexual 
violence, for example. Still, at least at the margins, we are able to infer from both the OSV and 
SVAC data that separatist conflicts do correspond with lower levels of civilian victimization. 
 The same cannot be said for the use of child soldiers and kidnapping, though we can still 
infer some interesting insights. In the full sample, it appears that child soldiers were involved on 
 
95 The sole separatist dyad-year in the top 29 took place in 1990, when 711 civilians were killed at the hands of the 
LTTE in Sri Lanka. 
96 When one significant outlier is removed from the data, the mean falls to just over 81 civilians killed per dyad-
year – still significantly higher than the average for separatist dyad-years. The outlier I reference here is the AFDL 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who killed 27,445 civilians in 1996. The next closest figure is 8,360 
civilians killed at the hands of Serbian rebels in 1995 during the Yugoslav Wars. 
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the rebel side, comprising either below or above 50% of a group’s fighting force, in 167 of the 
243 dyads in the data, accounting for about 68.7%. Already, these data contain a distribution 
that differs from the other dependent variables in that the vast majority of observations do not 
take a value of zero. Even more interestingly, when the sample is disaggregated by conflict 
type, it actually appears that separatist groups use higher proportions of child soldiers. Among 
the 55 separatist groups in these data, 54.5% used child soldiers at a rate of more than 0 but 
less than 50% of their fighting force, and 21.8% groups employed filled their ranks with more 
than 50% children, compared to 52.3% and 14.8%, respectively, for the 176 non-separatist 
groups in the data. Similarly, separatists engaged in kidnapping in 59 of the 146 dyad-years in 
which rebels did so, accounting for about 40%. These 59 separatist dyad-years make up about 
15% of the full sample of separatist dyad-years, compared to just 12% of non-separatist dyad-
years where separatists engaged in kidnapping. These statistics suggest, then, that separatist 
groups may actually be more likely to use child soldiers and to engage in kidnapping. 
One potential explanation for this that would be less inconsistent with the legitimacy-
seeking theory outlined in the previous chapter could be that the children that fight for 
separatists disproportionately do so voluntarily – either having volunteered themselves or been 
so by their families – rather than forcibly conscripted. The implication of this possibility would 
be that domestic populations identify so strongly with the group that they are willing to put 
their children in harm’s way for the cause. For kidnapping, it may be that it is who the 
separatists kidnap that matters; they may be members of a rivalrous outgroup of government 
supporters, or any civilian whose support does not matter for domestic legitimacy. Of course, it 
is just as possible that separatist groups engage in higher levels of these behaviors than other 
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groups, that data limitations cloud our ability to make accurate inferences, or that there is no 
statistically significant relationship at all and that these figures are merely coincidental. I discuss 
these possibilities in more depth below in my discussion of the statistical results. 
 
4.7 Model Construction 
The data discussed in the previous sections are constructed to shed light on the civilian 
targeting patterns of rebel groups as a function of rebel legitimacy concerns. In order to test 
the claims predicted by my theory, I introduce a series of statistical tests that aim to uncover 
statistically significant relationships from which academic and policy-relevant inferences may 
be made. I select a variety of statistical tests that are appropriate to analyze the particular 
dependent variable under consideration in each model. 
In the first model below, I test civilian killing using negative binomial regression (Long 
1997). This variation of regression analysis is especially useful for this test because it accounts 
for overdispersion of the dependent variable. This is characteristic of variables with a large 
number of zeros combined with some very high values in other instances (Fjelde and Hultman 
2013), and therefore perfectly suited to account for the heavily skewed distribution of the OSV 
variable that I discussed above. 
Two of the other variables I examine, child soldier use and prevalence of sexual 
violence, are ordinal variables, meaning that they comprise an ordered scale where lower 
numbers represent lower levels of incidence, and higher numbers higher levels. The statistical 
test best-suited to examine variables that are ordinal and contain more than two possibilities is 
ordinal logistic regression, which is what I use to examine both variables discussed here. The 
final outcome variable, kidnapping, is binary, so I estimate that model using logistic regression. 
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In each analysis, I take a step-wise approach to model construction in which I 
sequentially add more variables to the models that are presented here. This is intended to 
alleviate concerns posed by Achen (2005), who called attention to the habit of researchers to 
include a plethora of explanatory variables in statistical models. Achen argues that the inclusion 
of large numbers of independent variables yields results that are difficult to interpret properly, 
and suggests that researchers should limit their models to include only a few most necessary 
independent variables. Therefore, the models included in the tables below start by presenting 
the findings from a model including only a bivariate analysis at first. I then, in a second model, 
introduce two explanatory variables into the model in addition to the primary independent 
variable. In the third model, I include the rest of the explanatory variables that I discussed 
above. Although this approach does not completely address all the concerns raised by Achen, it 
should help provide assurance that the findings presented below are robust and do not depend 
on specific variables that are included in the model. 
 
4.8 Empirical Results and Analysis 
 The models in the tables below report the results of the empirical analyses. The first 
hypothesis suggested that separatist rebel groups, due to concerns over the perceived 
legitimacy of the manner in which they carry out their struggle, and of their efficacy as a 
political entity, should kill fewer civilians than other types of rebel groups. According to Table 
4.2 below, these predictions bear out in the statistical analyses. This is true when separatism is 
considered on its own as part of a bivariate analysis, as well as when more explanatory 
variables are added to the model, indicating that the finding is especially robust against 
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alternative model specifications. From these models, we can infer with reasonable confidence 
that separatist rebel groups do tend to kill fewer civilians than other types of rebel groups. 
 Interestingly, ethnic rebel groups appear to kill significantly higher numbers of civilians. 
This runs contrary to the notion that they may be more restrained given their potentially close 
ties to civilian populations. One reason for this might be that the identity of the victims matters. 
It is possible that ethnic conflicts may produce high levels of outgroup animosity, leading to 
higher levels of brutality against civilian members of the outgroup, possibly resulting in 
attempts at ethnic cleansing. Then again, it should also be noted that in an alternative model 
that excludes the separatism variable and is not reported here, the ethnic variable loses 
significance, indicating that the strength of the ethnic predictor for civilian killing is in part 
driven by the inclusion of the separatism variable.  
 Interestingly, it does not appear that rebels that derive funding from natural resources 
kill more civilians, at least not at the yearly level. At the very least, this implies that the logic 
underpinning the “resource richness” argument in the vein of Weinstein (2007) and others is  
more nuanced than most scholars acknowledge. An interesting addition to this is the role of 
rebel strength. Scholars in the Weinstein tradition might expect strong rebels to target more 
civilians for reasons of opportunism and poor discipline; yet, while the ordinal rebel strength 
variable produces a positive and significant coefficient, the binary weakness and strongness 
variables indicate that this is driven primarily by weak rebels practicing restraint, rather than 
strong rebels lacking it. It does appear that weak rebels tend to kill many fewer civilians than 
rebels rebels that are not classified as “weak”, and this is statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. From this, we can infer that rebels that are the most likely to depend on civilian support 
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are the ones most likely to practice restraint in their interactions with them. On the other hand, 
strong rebels are not statistically significantly more likely to target higher numbers of civilians 
than other rebels. Finally, it appears that territorial control and conflict duration have no 
significant effect on civilian fatality levels at the hands of rebels. 
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 In Table 4.3 below, I turn my attention to the analysis of separatism and sexual violence 
against civilians. The findings reported here are less robust than for the civilian killing variable, 
but it does appear that separatists are less inclined to engage in sexual violence than other 
rebel groups. Although separatism is not significantly associated with lower levels of sexual 
violence in the bivariate analysis, it is negative and significant at the 0.05 level in models two 
and three when more covariates are included. As model four indicates, separatism loses 
significance again when the ordinal rebel strength variable is included in the model. One way to 
interpret this is that this variable is sensitive to alternative model specifications. This is possible, 
given that the variable lacks the nuance of the fatality figures in the dependent variable in the 
previous model.  
Another possibility however, which model 5 addresses, is that separatism may not effect 
the degree of sexual violence to any robust extent, but rather its occurrence. Indeed, model five 
considers an alternative measure of sexual violence wherein the SVAC measure is adapted to 
take a binary structure; that is, I recode the SVAC scale such that any dyad-year where rebels 
engage in sexual violence takes a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. In this model, separatism is 
negatively and significantly associated with the use of sexual violence against civilians.97 To 
summarize these findings, then, separatists appear to engage in lower levels of sexual violence, 
and to engage in sexual violence less often, than other rebel groups. 
 As with the tests exploring civilian killing, ethnic conflict is associated with higher levels 
of sexual violence,98 while rebel weakness corresponds with significantly lower levels of sexual  
 
97 This model is estimated using logistic regression, owing to the binary structure of the dependent variable. 
98 Though, again, the variable loses some significance (at the 0.1 level rather than 0.01) when separatism is 




violence. Rebel strength is again positive and significant in model four, but, again, this appears 
to be driven by weak rebels practicing restraint rather than strong rebels practicing the lack of 
it. Resource funding appears to translate into higher levels of sexual violence, supporting the 
notion that resource richness untethers rebels from the need for civilian support and promotes 
opportunism and poor discipline within the rank-and-file. All other variables in the models have 
no significant effect on the level of sexual violence perpetrated by rebel groups against civilians. 
 A new dynamic becomes evident in the models estimating child soldier use, reported in 
Table 4.4 below. Interestingly, it appears that separatism has no significant effect on the 
incidence of child soldier use. This is notable for two reasons. The first is simply that separatist 
groups should according to the theory outlined in the previous chapter practice restraint as it 
relates to conscripting children into their fighting works, but according to these data they do 
not. The second is that these results run counter to results reported by other scholars, namely 
Hyeran Jo (2015). She argues that separatist groups should be less likely to use child soldiers, 
but finds the opposite – that they are actually more likely to do so. As I mentioned above, she 
attributes this unexpected finding to potential volunteerism, rather than forced conscription, 
though she does not explore this in more depth. As I discussed above, my data differ somewhat 
from hers. A reasonable conclusion then might be that differences in different statistical 
measures of child soldier use might account for differing results and the lack of significance in 
the models presented here.  
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 Another possible explanation for this disparity might emanate from Jo’s exclusion of a 
measure indicating ethnicity. Models three and four reported in Table 4.4 show that ethnic 
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conflict is significantly associated with higher levels of child soldier use, albeit at the 0.1 level. 
Given the potentially strong levels of loyalty between ethnic groups and rebels fighting on their 
behalf, this finding could very well hint at a mechanism similar to Jo’s suggestion of 
volunteerism that might account for the higher levels of child soldier use on the part of ethnic 
rebels. Then again, the separatism variable does not gain significance in either direction when 
ethnicity is removed from the models, so any speculation that this model choice could be 
driving my or Jo’s results is exactly that. One final potential explanation is the fact that in most 
academic studies children are operationalized as any combatant under the age of 18, but as I 
have discussed briefly this cut-off is culturally dependent. In some societies, some older 
teenaged soldiers may be viewed as adults who made a conscious decision to fight and 
therefore their participation is not viewed as anything resembling the victimization of civilians 
at all, thereby biasing the results. At the least, this finding indicates that research in this area 
requires significant progress. 
 Very interestingly, the duration of a conflict and rebel territorial control appear to be 
positively and significantly associated with child soldier use. These are not surprising 
theoretically. One might expect an armed group to have a greater need for more recruits as a 
conflict drags on. Thus, we might very reasonably expect longer conflicts to lead armed groups 
to dip into non-traditional recruitment pools. With respect to territorial control, it may simply 
be a function of opportunity. When rebels control territory, they have easier access to civilian 
populations, and may consequently end up with higher numbers of children populating their 
fighting ranks. Resource funding is also positively and significantly associated with child soldier 
use, further lending support to the notion that resource richness may lead rebels to behave 
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with less restraint vis-à-vis civilians. Finally, the variables measuring rebel strength appear to 
have no significant effect on the use of child soldiers.99 
 Table 4.5 below the results of the analysis exploring separatist propensities to engage in 
the kidnapping of civilians. It appears from model two of Table 4.5 that separatists may 
interestingly be more likely to kidnap civilians; however, the fact that this effect loses 
significance and that the signs are not consistent across all four models suggests that this 
finding is an artifact of model specifications. Table 4.6 further below sheds insightfully nuanced 
light on this relationship, though, so I hold off on engaging in a discussion of the relationship 
between separatists and the kidnapping of civilians for the time being. 
 It appears that ethnic groups engage in kidnapping less often, though this finding is only 
significant at the 0.1 level in the full models. One possible explanation for this is that ethnic 
rebels might be more geographically fixed and isolated than other rebels and are also 
disinclined to kidnap members of their own in-group, rendering their lack of propensity to 
kidnap as one that is merely a lack of opportunity. Interestingly, rebel weakness appears to 
actually be a strong positive predictor of kidnapping. It is possible that rebels who are weak 
view kidnapping as a relatively low-cost way to engage in intimidation of civilian populations 
and also to procure funds via ransoming.100 “Resource rich” rebels also appear to kidnap 
civilians  
 
99 This is potentially counterintuitive, given that weaker rebels may be exactly the groups who need the support of 
more recruits who come at a low cost. It might be that weak rebels simply lack the capacity to forcibly conscript 
anybody, let alone children. 
100 However, huge coefficient for the binary strong rebel variable suggests that the effects for these two variables 
might be an artifact of the data structure. The strong rebel variable contains only 15 dyad-years where rebels were 
considered to be strong, which means that all the rest of the observations, except for the 74 dyad-years where 
rebels were at parity, were classified as weak – over 91% of the data. Given the relative rarity of the dependent 
variable – kidnapping – and the likelihood that these were perpetrated by weak rebels, it is probable that these 
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more often. It appears, once again, that such rebels seem to be more opportunistic and place 
less of an emphasis on practicing restraint in their interactions with civilians. Finally, territorial 
 
binary measures are inappropriate for estimating the effect of rebel strength on kidnapping propensities. By 
contrast, the ordinal rebel strength variable in model 4 appears to be the more reliable measure by which to 
measure this effect. Using this measure, it appears that rebel strength is associated with lower levels of rebel 
kidnapping of civilians. 
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control appears to have no effect on the use of kidnapping, while conflict duration appears to 
only influence kidnapping under certain model specifications.  
 Table 4.6 below, however, injects a great deal of nuance into this discussion. 
Interestingly, although separatists are not more or less likely to kidnap civilians in general, they 
are statistically significantly less likely to kidnap international civilians in particular. This finding 
has interesting implications for the legitimacy-seeking framework. While separatists in general 
have incentives to avoid alienating important domestic and international audiences, they 
appear from this finding to be especially concerned with how they are perceived by the 
international community. If we could further disaggregate the domestic subsample, we might 
find further that who they are kidnapping, when they do, might produce an additional piece of 
the puzzle. If their domestic kidnapping efforts were directed primarily at civilians associated 
with the government or rivalrous outgroups, or simply civilians that they did not expect to 
make up their future domestic citizenry, then we could infer a great deal regarding the 
emphasis separatists place on legitimacy concerns. As it relates to these findings in particular, 
though, we can at least say that separatists do appear to be concerned with how their 
movement is perceived internationally, and that they try to mitigate the extent to which they 
are received poorly internationally.101  
In the disaggregated sample, ethnic rebels remain statistically significantly less likely to 
kidnap both domestic and international civilians, while rebels that enjoy natural resource 
 
101 Then again, it is also true the separatist rebels tend to operate in more disparate areas of countries far from 
government bases of power and, coincidentally, centers of international travel. This finding may be more the result 
of a lack of access to foreign nationals (i.e., opportunity) than it is about selectiveness of kidnap victim. An in-depth 
qualitative study may be required to distinguish between these two causal processes in practice. 
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funding and rebels that are weaker remain more likely to do so. Interestingly, rebels that 
control territory are only more likely to kidnap domestic civilians, implying that opportunity 
may play a role in predicting civilian kidnapping patterns. Finally, longer conflicts appear to 
result in more international civilians being kidnapped by rebels, but not domestic civilians. This 
potentially may result from the desperation felt by rebels in the later stages of conflicts and the 
impulse to gain international visibility in an effort to bring conflicts to a swifter conclusion. 
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 I now turn to a discussion of the relationship posited in Hypothesis 3, which argues that 
separatists may relax their legitimacy-oriented proclivities when the government they are 
fighting engages in higher levels of civilian targeting. However, interpreting the coefficients of 
models that include an interaction term are not straightforward. I therefore first generate 
predicted values for the interactive effect of civilian killing by rebels and that by the 
corresponding government in the previous year. Figure 4.1 below shows the predicted 
relationship between lagged government civilian killing and rebel civilian killing, attenuated by 
whether the rebel group in question is separatist or non-separatist. Interestingly, according to 
the figure, separatist groups are not expected to kill more civilians at higher levels of  
 
government targeting. Non-separatist groups, on the other hand, do appear to be expected to 
behave according to this dynamic. Unsurprisingly, non-separatist groups appear to kill more 
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civilians than non-separatist groups, and to become more volatile at higher levels of adversarial 
violence.  
These predicted values only provide one piece of the puzzle, however. Table 4.7 below 
reports the regression coefficients for the statistical tests of hypothesis 3. In these models, I 
only report the results of the models considering civilian killing and sexual violence. I do this for 
two reasons. One is that separatism already appears to have no relationship with child soldier 
use and a conditional relationship on kidnapping, and therefore is unlikely to reflect change 
based on an additional variable.102 The other is that the conflict-level structure of the child 
soldier data precludes the inclusion of the one-year lag I use for the government OSV data. I 
therefore explore this relationship by examining only the other two dependent variables. 
In both models, it appears that the government OSV variable, when interacted with 
separatism, has a dampening effect on rebel OSV or sexual violence levels. Separatism on its 
own is negatively and significantly associated with both civilian killing and sexual violence, yet 
these effects are moderated when interacted with higher levels of government killing in the 
previous year. This interaction causes significance to disappear entirely for the model 
measuring sexual violence, and reduces the magnitude for civilian killing to merely 0.007 – 
although this effect is still negative and significant. These findings support hypothesis 3, which 
argues not that separatists become more likely to target civilians when governments engage in 
higher levels of violence, but rather that they become less likely to practice restraint, a notion 
that is clearly supported in the table. The other variables reported in the table appear to 
resemble the results reported above. Ethnic rebels are more likely to kill civilians and to engage  
 




in higher levels of sexual violence, while the opposite is true for weaker rebel groups. Rebels 
that benefit from natural resource funding engage in higher levels of sexual violence, but not 
civilian killing. The other variables in the models have no significant effect on civilian targeting 
with the inclusion of higher levels of government OSV.  
Indeed, if rebels learn from history and adjust their strategies accordingly, then we can 
expect more rebels to behave according to this dynamic over time. As Fazal (2018: 249-252) 
points out, the international community is playing a dangerous game if its members only feel 
compelled to support separatism as a punitive measure against a government, rather than as a 
reward granted to a rebel movement that has taken great care to develop legitimacy. This 
possibility has the most immediate policy relevance out of the five hypotheses considered in 
this chapter since it is the one that international audiences can most readily act upon. As such, 
significant benefit might be gained from much greater scholarly attention, probably most 
fruitfully at the case-study level. 
 
4.9 Discussion and Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have taken the first steps toward evaluating the merits of the argument 
I advanced in Chapter 3. I suggested that a first step in further examining what I refer to as the 
legitimacy-seeking theoretical framework is to broaden the scope of outcomes examined within 
its parameters. In the preceding analyses and discussion, I have demonstrated that separatist 
groups, due to concerns of legitimacy, do appear to behave systematically according to 
concerns of legitimacy, albeit with some caveats. In addition, context matters. I came to this 
conclusion by testing several outcomes consistent with legitimacy-seeking behavior – namely, 
levels of civilian killing, prevalence of sexual violence, use of child soldiers, and kidnapping of 
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civilians – as well as one aspect of a conflict that may dampen legitimacy concerns – the level of 
one-sided violence perpetrated by the government in a conflict. 
In general, separatists clearly kill fewer civilians than non-separatists, and this is robust 
across multiple model specifications. In addition, separatists appear to use sexual violence 
against civilians less often than other rebels, and under some model specifications it also 
appears that they engage in lower levels of it than other rebels, though this finding is not as 
robust, suggesting that other factors may matter more in predicting the prevalence of sexual 
violence. Similarly, it does not appear that separatists are less likely to kidnap civilians in 
general, but they are less likely to kidnap civilians who are foreign nationals, implying that 
separatists place specific emphasis on the international dimension of their legitimacy-seeking 
calculations – that is, that they take extra precautions to avoid alienating international 
audiences specifically. And indeed, the contextual extension of these findings such as who the 
targets of certain forms of civilian targeting are means that they certainly warrant further 
consideration, perhaps on a micro, small-n level or with the advent of future potential data 
innovations that allow for more fine-grained analysis. Readers should take this finding as an 
early exploration into the separatist propensity to target civilians via sexual violence and 
kidnapping. 
 By contrast to these outcomes, it appears that separatism has no relationship with child 
soldier use at all. In fact, according to the descriptive statistics presented in Section 4.5 above, 
the proportion of a fighting force made up of child soldiers is actually higher among separatists 
than non-separatists. This is not born out with any significance in the statistical analyses, but 
that may merely be the product of the low number of observations in the data. Again, it may be 
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useful to subject this dynamic to further testing via small-n qualitative research or by taking 
advantage of empirical innovations if or when they become available. 
 It also appears that the higher levels of civilian killing perpetrated by the government 
can have a dampening effect on separatism as a driving force for restraint. While the 
government OSV variable is not a significant predictor of higher levels of rebel OSV, the 
magnitude of the coefficient for the separatism variable decreases in the rebel OSV test when 
government OSV is added to the model and interacted with separatism – though it remains 
significant. Similarly, the inclusion of government OSV causes the magnitude and significance of 
the separatism variable to depreciate in the rebel sexual violence models. This finding is 
consistent with hypothesis 3, which suggests that legitimacy concerns matter less when rebels 
only need to be on better behavior, so to speak, than their government counterpart in order to 
gain more favor with the international community. 
 To summarize, then, the tests above lend robust support to hypotheses 1a and 1b, 
contextual support for hypotheses 1d and 3, and no support for hypothesis 1c. The major 
takeaway appears to be that legitimacy concerns do appear to matter, but they are only one 
piece of a complicated puzzle. Taken together, the findings reported above provide a useful 
point of departure for our journey in the next two chapters explore certain economic forms of 
civilian victimizations that may be attenuated by separatist legitimacy concerns, as well as to 
identify which group- and micro-level factors do help contribute to civilian targeting patterns in 
spite of the incentives to practice restraint. In the next chapter, I explore separatist propensities 
to steal from civilians, to intercept or ransom humanitarian aid, and to engage in the extortion 
of civilians. After that, I dive deeper into micro-level contextual factors while focusing 
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specifically on civilian killing since it is the most robustly consistent outcome examined in this 
chapter and enjoys the best granularity among the three main dependent variables I consider. 
The findings in this chapter, then, serve to set the macro-level stage for a deeper dive into the 
micro-level nuances of legitimacy, strategy and tactics, and civilian targeting patterns in 
separatist civil war.
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Chapter 5: Separatism and the Economic Victimization 
of Civilians in Civil War 
“All we want is to carry out the greatest expression of a free democracy and vote on Catalonia’s 
future. This is not about independence; it is about fundamental civil rights and the 
universal right to self-determination.” – Carles Puigdemont, Catalan Politician 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 I turn in this chapter to another side of the civilian victimization coin. I established in the 
last chapter that, owing to legitimacy concerns, separatist rebel groups engage in lower levels 
of violence against civilians. But violence is not the only form of targeted interactions that can 
be immensely disruptive to civilians living in conflict zones. Rebels often target civilians’ ability 
to survive, rather than their lives directly. In contrast to the theoretical rationale for the violent 
targeting of civilians, rebels may engage in economic victimization for reasons that go beyond 
intimidating civilian populations, coercing support, and deterring defection. These may also be 
the case for economic forms of targeting, but this is in addition to the material gains that rebels 
may procure from forcefully extracting funds or resources from civilians that can be immensely 
important for a rebel group’s sustenance. 
 As I have outlined, however, separatist rebel groups appear to behave systematically 
differently compared to other rebel groups. Existing research has explored this notion vis-à-vis 
violent outcomes, which I expanded upon in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I expand upon it even 
further by considering several economic interactions that rebels may have with civilians that 
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still result in the victimization of those civilians.103 I test this claim using three easily observable 
forms of civilian targeting that target civilian populations’ livelihoods rather than their direct 
personal security, so I consider them to comprise a form of economic targeting. To reiterate the 
propositions I explore here, I predict that: 
 
H2a: Separatist rebel groups engage in theft from civilians less often than other rebel 
groups. 
H2b: Separatist rebel groups intercept humanitarian aid less often than other rebel 
groups. 
 
Conversely, I argue that separatist groups are actually more likely to engage in extractive 
behaviors that contribute to statemaking efforts. One such extractive behavior would be to 
extort of civilians. Levying taxes, soliciting funds in exchange for protection, and other forms of 
extortion are also exactly the kind of behaviors that established states actively engage in as not 
only accepted by domestic civilians, but expected by members of the international community 
of a legitimate state capable of financing its own institutions and operations. Despite the 
negative and illegal connotation of the word extortion, in practice the concept differs very little 
from legal fund-procurement practiced by states. Non-state actors that seek to become states 
should be expected to engage in these practices as well. And indeed, several separatist rebel 
groups in the real world appear to have derived large sums of funding from “extortive” 
practices that differ very little from legitimate taxation. For example, the Movement of the 
Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal funded their operations in part through 
 
103 These interactions may still, of course, be violent, but the violence itself is not the primary goal. 
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the taxation of timber and agricultural exporting, while the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA) often offered security services in exchange for payment – practice that differs very little 
from funding required to provide police or military protection in legitimate states. With this 
theory and these examples in mind, I argue that: 
 
H4: Separatist rebel groups are more likely to engage in extortion of civilians than other 
rebel groups. 
 
 In the rest of this chapter, I explore these claims using models similar to those estimated 
in Chapter 4, in order to evaluate the merits of these hypotheses. The results of this analysis 
suggest that the legitimacy-seeking framework continues to perform well even for economic 
forms of civilian victimization. The findings in this chapter are discussed in turn and in much 
more depth below, but the major takeaway appears to be that legitimacy concerns do appear 
to matter even for economic forms of civilians targeting, but they are still only one piece of a 
complicated puzzle. Taken together, they supplement the findings from Chapter 4 in order to 
paint a more comprehensive picture of the systematic differences between separatist and non-
separatist conflicts and the combatants that participate in them, while also allowing us to 
establish a point of departure in identifying the micro-level factors that do help contribute to 
civilian targeting patterns in spite of the incentives to practice restraint. 
 
5.2 Overview of the Data and Methodology 
 I identify a universe of cases of economic victimization of civilians conceptualized in 
three different ways: 1) Theft, 2) Interception of humanitarian aid, and 3) Extortion, though as I 
argue throughout this chapter, the latter of these is less a form of civilian victimization as it is 
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one of statebuilding and civic institutionalism. The final dataset constructed for these analyses 
is built from multiple data sources, and is identical to the data used to conduct the tests used in 
Chapter 4. In the interest of avoiding redundancy, I do not engage in a lengthy discussion the 
data structure or of temporal or operational choices, since these are discussed in the previous 
chapter. The only significant difference between the tests conducted in this chapter and the 
previous chapter are the dependent variables. Thus, I allocate the most thorough discussion 
here to these new outcome variables. 
 
5.3 Dependent Variables 
 The three hypotheses examined in this chapter explore different outcomes that 
represent an additional dimension of the legitimacy seeking framework. Accordingly, the 
models use three distinct variables: theft, interception of humanitarian aid, and extortion. Each 
of these variables is drawn from Walsh et al.’s (2018) rebel contraband dataset (RCD), which 
identify various methods from which rebel groups draw funding on a yearly basis. In addition to 
data on 31 resource categories and 4 funding strategies through which rebels may derive 
resource funding, they also include information on other “crime variables” that do not involve 
natural resources. This information includes rebel funding that is derived from theft, 
humanitarian aid, and extortion.104 
 
104 Other crime variables in the RCD data include piracy, smuggling, and human smuggling. I do not use them as 
outcome variables here because there is too much uncertainty regarding what comprises them. For example, 
human smuggling on the surface certainly sounds like it should be a form of civilian targeting, but it could certainly 
be true that the humans being smuggled submitted to it voluntarily in order to gain entry to a new country or to 
flee their home country undetected. Piracy, too, is problematic because, as a seaborn practice, it should only apply 
to rebels in coastal countries, and therefore is likely to bias the results of the statistical tests conducted on all rebel 
dyad-years. That said, these outcomes could very well be consistent with the overall theoretical framework of this 
dissertation and are well worth exploration by future scholarship pending data innovations or the resources to 
conduct in-depth qualitative research. 
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 Walsh et al. define theft as large-scale seizure of money or valuable goods, such as bank 
robberies, stealing of vehicles or valuables, credit card fraud, and so on. They also include 
variables that indicate when rebels engage in the theft of any of the 31 resources identified in 
the RCD. I combine these variables to produce a comprehensive theft variable. Extortion 
includes “taxes” that are levied on the economic activity in a particular area, and can take the 
form of roadblocks, “protection” rackets, and other forms of regular and institutionalized 
extractive interactions. They also include extortion variables specific to each of the resources 
covered in the data in order to indicate when “taxes” were levied on resource revenues. As I did 
with the theft variable, I combine all of the extortion variables in the RCD to produce a 
comprehensive variable. According to Walsh et al., rebels derive funding from humanitarian aid 
when they either require aid organizations to pay them to deliver aid, effectively holding it for 
ransom, or when they steal the aid before it can be delivered to its intended recipients. Theft 
and the seizure of humanitarian aid create an economically exploitative relationship between 
rebels and civilians that separatist rebel groups should try to avoid in order to avoid incurring 
legitimacy costs. Extortion, while extractive, can actually help procure legitimacy gains since 
extortive practices in multiple forms are virtually expected of states.  
 These data are dichotomous contain information on rebel funding at the yearly level, 
and therefore take a value of 1 in a year when rebels derived funding from that strategy and 0 
when they did not. By far the rarest of these practices is the seizure or ransoming of 
humanitarian aid. In the data, rebels derived funding from humanitarian aid in only 35 dyad-
years, accounting for a mere 3.3% of the sample. The next most prominent of these outcomes 
is theft. In the full sample, rebels derived funding from theft in 135 dyad-years, accounting for 
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about 12.3% of the data. Finally, extortion is the most common. Rebels derived funding from 
extortion in 554 dyad-years – roughly 50.4% of the observations. 
 
5.4 Control Variables 
 I utilize the same set of controls for these analyses as I did in Chapter 4. Control 
variables again were selected based on their potential to predict the dependent variables and 
the independent variable and therefore confound the results. As the distributions for these 
variables do not differ from those outlined in Chapter 4, I summarize them in Table 5.1 below 
rather than engaging in a lengthy discussion. The reader may consult this same section in 
Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of the control variables than I offer here, which includes merely 
a discussion of the rationale for including each variable as it relates to the dependent variables 
examined in this chapter. 
The first and most prominent of the control variables included in the analyses below is 
that of ethnicity. I argue that it is most prominent because nearly all separatist groups espouse 
some ethnic affiliation. Thus, not only could ethnic affiliation produce similar incentives to 
interact with local civilians with restraint, it could also predict a group’s proclivity to seek 
separation from a parent state. Obviously, not all ethnic rebellions are separatist, but the reality 
that nearly all separatist rebellions occur along ethnic lines renders the inclusion of ethnicity in 
any analysis of separatism essential. The ethnic variable is drawn from the ACD2EPR data 
(Wucherpfennig et al. 2012), and following their lead, I code a rebel as being “ethnic” if it claims 
to fight on behalf of an ethnic group and enjoys a base of recruitment from that group. 
The control of territory is of similar importance to any analysis of separatist conflicts. 
Separatism by definition requires the control of territory, so virtually all separatist groups aspire 
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to it. Given that strategically important territory tends to consist of towns, cities, or other areas 
where civilians tend to live, the control of it inherently increases the likelihood of interactions 
with civilians, thereby enhancing the opportunity rebels have to practice restraint – or not to do 
so – in their interactions with civilians. The presence of civilians also enhances the opportunity 
and potentially also the motivation to extract economic resources from those civilians, who 
could be seen as a valuable source of funding for rebels controlling that territory. This variable 
is borrowed from Cunningham et al.’s (2013) Non-state Actor (NSA) data and takes a value of 1 
when a rebel controls territory, and 0 when it does not. 
I also include a variable for resource funding, adapted from Walsh et al.’s (2018) rebel 
contraband dataset (RCD). Numerous scholars (e.g. Weinstein 2007) argue that “resource rich” 
rebels become disengaged from civilians and require their support to a lesser extent, and may 
therefore act with less restraint in their interactions with civilians. On the other hand, since the 
dependent variables considered here relate specifically to rebel funding, the derivation of 
resource funding may actually compel rebels to engage in lower levels of economically 
extractive practices. Resources may also help predict separatism. Rebel groups with access to 
resource funding may view those resources as a viable way of financing a state. Alternatively, 
resource rich groups may choose separatism as a response to government mismanagement of 
resources and a failure to re-invest resource profits in their regions of origin. This variable takes 
a value of 1 if, in any given year, rebels derive funding through any of 4 funding strategies 
applied to any of 31 resource categories identified in the RCD data. 
I also consider the role of rebel strength. Weak rebels may engage in higher levels of 
civilian targeting because they are the groups that are most in need of civilian sources of 
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support and funding – if they are unable to obtain those things from civilians willingly, they may 
feel compelled to engage in the forceful coercion of the former and extraction of the latter. 
Weak groups, especially those that occupy land further from the central government, may also 
be more inclined to select separatism as their end goal. In light of such operational realities, 
they may view it as more manageable to bite off a small piece of territory and to raise the costs 
of fighting for the government to the point where the latter chooses to offer concessions, than 
it would be to take on the full might of government forces. 
On the other hand, strong rebels rely less heavily on civilians and may practice less 
restraint in their interactions with them. Such groups may even fall into the category of 
resource rich groups that attract opportunistic recruits, thereby enhancing the chances of 
indiscriminate extractive practices directed against non-combatants. Strong groups may also 
have a stronger proclivity to engage in separatism than other groups, given the potentially 
prohibitive costliness of establishing a new state. Thus, rebel strength and rebel weakness 
could both confound the results of the analysis. As I did in Chapter 4, I address this concern by 
including two dummy variables, one that indicates rebel weakness – coded 1 if the group is 
weak and 0 otherwise – and one for rebel strength – coded the inverse way. These variables are 
adapted from the rebel strength variable in the NSA data. Rebels are coded as weak if they take 
a value of 1 or 2 according to NSA’s 5-tier measure of rebel strength, and they are coded as 
strong if they take a value of 4 or 5 on this scale. As a robustness check, I also include the full 5-
tiered measure of rebel strength in a supplemental analysis instead of the two disaggregated 
measures 
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Finally, I also account for the duration of the conflict. As a conflict drags on, combatant 
groups may find themselves in more dire financial straits and begin resorting to more 
economically extractive practices over time. In addition, as I show in Chapter 6, separatist 
conflicts also tend to last longer than non-separatist conflicts, so the inclusion of this variable 
should account for the possibility that longer separatist conflicts drive the results of the 
analyses presented below. To capture this, I calculate the duration of the conflict by subtracting 
the current year of each observation by the start year of the conflict identified in the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Armed Conflict Data (ACD) (Pettersson and Eck 2018). 
105 
 
Table 5.1 above reports the summary statistics for the distributions of the variables 
discussed above, as well as the variation inflation factors (VIFs) each of them. The table includes 
only the variables included in the main analyses, and leaves out alternative variables used in 
supplemental tests and robustness checks. All explanatory variables in the models considered 
 
105 Conflict duration is the only variable in the models that is not dichotomous. The longest conflict in the data is 
that between the Philippine government and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which had been 
ongoing for 40 years at the conclusion of the temporal period covered in the data in 2009. 
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below are well below the VIF threshold level of 5, indicating that there is very little overlap or 
correlation between them.106 
 
5.5 Descriptive Statistics 
 Although statistical analyses tell us more about the extent to which certain variables 
contribute to an outcome, considering a few descriptive statistics once again sheds insight on 
how the distributions of separatism and the three dependent variables interact. Of the 35 dyad-
years where rebels derived funding from humanitarian aid, 11 of those include rebels that are 
separatist groups, compared to 24 that are non-separatist – a two-to-one ratio. Those 11 dyad-
years where rebels benefited from the interception of humanitarian aid account for 2.9% of all 
separatist dyad-years in the data, while the 24 non-separatist dyad-years in the same category 
account for about 3.5% of all non-separatist groups. Both of these represent a small minority of 
separatist and non-separatist cases, so it appears that the seizure (or ransoming) of 
humanitarian aid is a rare phenomenon to begin with. The fact that non-separatist dyad-years 
where rebels intercepted humanitarian aid account for a higher percentage of the overall 
sample of non-separatist dyad-years, and account for roughly two thirds of all dyad-years 
where rebels derived funding from that funding source, is not inconsequential. 
 A similar – and starker – trend emerges when we look at the separatist and non-
separatist dyad-year distribution for the theft variable. Of the 135 dyad-years where rebels 
derived funding from theft, only 37 were separatist – accounting for just over one fourth of 
theft-funding dyad-years. The 98 non-separatist dyad-years where rebels derived funding from 
 
106 This is also true for all variables not reported directly in Table 5.1. 
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theft account for 13.8% of all non-separatist dyad-years, while that same percentage for 
separatist dyad years is only 9.5%. Once again, non-separatist dyad-years where rebels engaged 
in theft far outweighs separatist dyad-years, and they account for a fairly larger percentage of 
the overall non-separatist sample than separatist-dyad years. The implication of these statistics, 
without the analytical power of a statistical test, is that separatist groups do tend to practice 
restraint as it relates to economic forms of civilian victimization. 
 In spite of this, however, it also appears that separatists are more prone to engaging in 
extractive interactions with civilians that can assist statebuilding, help develop institutional 
efficacy in the eyes of observers, and contribute to the procurement of legitimacy gains. Of the 
554 dyad-years where rebels engaged in extortion, nearly 45% of those – 249 to be exact – 
were separatist dyad-years. Moreover, these 249 separatist dyad-years account for fully 63.7% 
of all separatist dyad-years in the data. Although non-separatist dyad-years account for just 
over 55% (305) of the dyad-years where rebels engaged in extortion, this subset accounts for 
less than 44% of all non-separatist dyad-years, supporting the notion that separatists place a 
higher degree of emphasis on extractive institutions than other groups. It also appears from the 
statistics presented in this section, taken together, that separatist groups place a higher degree 
of emphasis on extractive institutions than they do on resorting to petty crime. I discuss these 
possibilities in more depth below in my discussion of the results of the statistical tests. 
 
5.6 Model Construction 
 The data discussed above are constructed to shed light on economic forms of civilian 
victimization by separatist rebel groups as a function of legitimacy concerns. In order to test the 
claims predicted by the theory, I introduce a series of statistical tests that aim to uncover 
 118 
statistically significant relationships from which academic and policy-relevant inferences may 
be made. I test each of the models considered below using logistic regression, owing to the 
binary structure of the dependent variables. 
 As I did in Chapter 4, for each analysis I take a step-wise approach to model construction 
in which I add more variables to the models with each iteration. This is intended to alleviate 
concerns posed by Achen (2005) that models that include too many control variables may run 
the risk of producing coefficients that are dependent upon specific model decisions. Therefore, 
I estimate an initial, bivariate test for each dependent variable that includes only the DV and 
primary independent variable – separatism. I then expand the number of variables to include 
only two additional explanatory variables. In a third (“full”) model, I introduce the rest of the 
control variables, and in a fourth I introduce an alternative treatment of “rebel strength” to the 
“full” model. Although this approach does not completely address all of Achen’s concerns, it 
should help provide assurance that the findings presented below are robust. 
 
5.7 Empirical Results and Analysis 
 The models in the tables below report the results of the empirical analyses. Hypothesis 
2a suggested that separatist rebel groups, due to concerns over their legitimacy as a viable 
political entity, should rely less often on theft as a source of funding. Table 5.2 below mostly 
supports this notion. In the bivariate analyses and in the fuller analyses it appears that 
separatist rebel groups are less likely to use theft as a source of funding, a finding that is 
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statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This effect disappears in model 2 but reappears once 
additional covariates are added to the model.107 This suggests that separatist groups do tend to  
 
 
107 This is potentially the product of the relatively small sample size of dyad-years where rebels engated in theft. It 
is also possible that controlling for ethnicity or conflict duration could have a stronger effect on theft, but this 
seems unlikely for duration since its significance disappears in models 3 and 4, coincidentally at the same time that 
separatism regains significance. Finally, it is possible that the relationship between separatism and theft just isn’t 
robust across multiple model specifications, but this seems to be a limited concern given that the effect remains 
negative and significant in three out of four models. 
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try to avoid criminally extractive practices that negatively impact civilians in their attempts to 
secure funding.  
 It also appears that ethnic rebels are less likely to engage in theft against civilians, 
though it is important to note that this finding loses significance in models 3 and 4 and 
therefore is likely to be sensitive to model specifications. If it is not, then the logic at work here 
might be similar to that underlying the separatism variable: that ethnic rebels try to avoid 
engaging in extractive practices that negatively impact their co-ethnic civilians. Interestingly as 
it relates to this logic, rebels that control territory are actually more likely to engage in theft 
from civilians. This finding in the context of the previous two is notable because it suggests that 
the mere opportunity to thieve from civilians actually increases the chances it will happen, but 
this effect is secondary when rebel groups have a specific connection to the territory they 
control, which is the case for most separatist and ethnic rebel groups. 
 Rebels that benefit from resource funding also appear to engage in theft more often. 
This suggests that resource rich rebels are more prone to engage in practices that create civilian 
victims, at least in part because they are less tethered to civilian support or because they 
attract more opportunistic recruits who are more likely to steal from civilians than might be the 
case otherwise. Conflict duration appears to matter in the limited model, but not in the full 
models, suggesting that other explanatory variables matter more for explaining the prevalence 
of rebel use of theft as a source of funding. Additionally, all three of the variables capturing 
rebel strength appear not to matter for explaining rebel theft.  
 Table 5.3 reports similar results regarding the seizure of humanitarian aid, though these 
should be taken with more caution given the rarity of the dependent variable. In the bivariate 
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analysis, separatism appears to have no significant effect on rebel proclivities to steal or ransom 
humanitarian aid. In the fuller analyses, however, this variable becomes negative and significant 




 By contrast, ethnic rebels actually appear to be more likely to intercept humanitarian 
aid. This is counterintuitive, given their proclivity to avoid stealing from civilian populations. 
One possible explanation for this is that they tend to steal aid that is intended for civilians that 
are not their coethnics and instead divert it to their own supporters, or just pocket it as 
material and financial support for the cause.108 Rebels that control territory are also more likely 
to intercept humanitarian aid. Some sort of rent-seeking behavior may be at work here, 
whereby rebels that control territory extract fees from aid organizations in exchange for the 
passage of aid through their territory. Alternatively, rebels that control territory may just have 
an easier time seizing aid that is intended for civilians living in or near that territory. Rebels that 
derive funding from natural resources appear to be less likely to seize humanitarian aid. 
Although resource rich rebels do seem to engage in more opportunistic practices, the presence 
of other, potentially more reliable funding sources may serve to placate their need to target 
humanitarian aid as a funding source.  
Rebel strength appears to correlate with higher levels of humanitarian aid seizure on the 
part of rebel groups. The binary weak rebel variable is negative and significant, seemingly 
indicating that this effect is driven by weak rebels practicing restraint rather than strong rebels 
practicing the lack of it. However, its corresponding inverse variable strong rebel possesses a 
very high coefficient and standard error, which should cause us to take pause before inferring 
anything from these variables. And indeed, as I pointed out in Footnote 99 in Chapter 4, such a 
result may indicate that the structure of the data are not well suited for interpretation using 
 
108 A qualitative case study might be able to contribute more valuable insight on these competing explanations. 
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these variables. Thus, the result derived from the ordinal rebel strength variable is very 
probably more reliable. 
Finally, conflict duration is associated with more incidence of aid-stealing. This finding 
might point to higher levels of desperation later in conflicts among rebel groups. That is, they 
may become more inclined to steal humanitarian aid when other sources of funding or support 
have dried up. Alternatively, this may indicate combatants are more desperate to bring a 
conflict to an end later in conflicts and see an opportunity to “starve out” the government by 
inflicting costs on civilians by seizing aid intended for them. 
The results reported in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 lend consistent support to hypotheses 2a and 
2b. It appears that separatist rebels do tend to engage less often in economically extractive 
practices aimed at civilians. Yet, as I argued above, not all economically extractive practices are 
seen as an illegitimate use of a rebel group’s power and standing vis-à-vis domestic civilians. 
Hypothesis 3 argues that, as separatist groups attempt to establish the institutions required of a 
state and demonstrate their political efficacy, not only is funding essential for the procurement 
of functioning political institutions, the sequestration of that funding from local civilians is in 
fact expected of any viable political entity by both domestic populations and international 
audiences. The method by which rebels sequester these funds, for the purpose of these 
analyses, is termed as extortion because it is not legally sanctioned by a recognized state 
government, but as it involves the compulsory payment of money or property in exchange for 
protection and other services, differs very little from legitimate taxation. 
Indeed, it does appear that separatist rebel groups are statistically significantly more 
likely to engage in extortion of civilians than are other rebel groups. This relationship is strong 
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and consistent across all four models, indicating that separatist rebels place an emphasis on 
state-building measures that help them procure legitimacy gains as a viable political entity, 
capable of collecting taxes and funding their operations and institutions. 
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 Interestingly, ethnic rebels appear not to engage in extortion of civilians. One potential 
explanation for this might be that not all ethnic rebels are engaged in secessionist rebellion and 
therefore do not as systematically have the same incentives to establish viable extractive 
institutions, and in the absence of such incentives choose also to find sources of funding that do 
not require them to engage in extractive practices aimed at their own co-ethnic civilians.109 
Rebels that control territory also seem to systematically engage in lower levels of extortion 
once we control for separatism. Such rebels may be stronger and better able to procure funds 
from other sources, but it is instructive that territorial control is a predictor of lower levels of 
extortion when the control of territory is virtually required for groups that want to establish a 
new state. This supports the notion that statebuilding and the legitimacy gains thereby 
conferred may be driving the higher levels of extortion engaged in by separatist groups. Ethnic 
rebels and rebels that control territory are both systematically less likely to extort civilians, yet 
separatist groups, who are overwhelmingly ethnic and who require the control of a piece of 
territory to be successful, are more likely to do so. The part of the equation that most easily 
solves this puzzle is legitimacy, since separatists need to establish extractive institutions that 
help demonstrate to relevant audiences that they are capable of surviving as a viable political 
entity. 
 Longer conflicts appear to be associated with more extortion on the part of rebels. This 
perhaps stems from a combination of the accumulation of conflict costs and diminished funding 
from other sources over time. Rebels that become more desperate for funding later in a conflict 
 
109 It is also worth noting that the ethnic variable loses significance when separatism is removed from the model, 
indicating that the negative relationship for ethnic rebels is especially driven by non-separatist ethnic rebels. 
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may view extortion from civilians as a stable funding strategy after other sources of funding 
have dried up. It is also possible that, over time, rebels have developed the institutional and 
bureaucratic capacity necessary to extort, though it is also true that not all rebels focus on 
institution-building to the same extent.110 Finally, natural resource funding has no significant 
relationship with rebel extortion,111 nor do the rebel strength variables. 
 The findings presented above indicate robust support for the hypotheses examined in 
this chapter. Separatist groups are indeed less likely to engage in the economic victimization of 
civilians through means such as theft and the seizure or ransoming of humanitarian aid. They 
are significantly more likely, though, to engage in extractive economic practices that can help 
with statebuilding and lead to the procurement of legitimacy-gains, such as through levying 
taxes and other fees that can be considered to be extortion. 
 
5.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have continued the process of evaluating the merits of the arguments I 
advanced in Chapter 3. After applying the legitimacy-seeking framework to a few violent forms 
of civilian targeting in Chapter 4, I turned in this chapter to several forms of economic targeting 
of civilians, as well as one way in which separatist rebel groups may actually engage in 
 
110 An alternative possibility here is that the duration of a conflict actually endogenously relates to extractive 
practices on the part of civilians. That is, extortion (and other extractive practices) may actually drive longer 
conflicts. This perhaps indicates that rebels may have little incentive to end a conflict that is profitable, but 
probably more likely such practices enhance rebel capacity to continue fighting when rebels without the ability to 
extract finances from civilians would have lost the fight long ago. 
111 Though the extremely high coefficients and standard errors for this variable indicate that there is something 
about the distribution of the variable that renders it inestimable in this model. In this case, it appears that there is 
considerable overlap between the resource funding and extortion variables, in that the vast majority of dyad-years 
where rebels derived funding from natural resources in the data did so through extortive interactions. Thus, we 
cannot make any useful inferences from the resource funding variable, but it would be interesting in a future 
ieration of this analysis to explore this relationship using an alternative measure of rebel resource funding. 
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economically extractive practices while actually procuring legitimacy gains, rather than 
incurring legitimacy costs. The basis for these arguments rests on the notion that although 
economic forms of civilian victimization are less visible than violent forms in that they do not 
create a body count or produce physical trauma, and that they are less targeted in the sense 
that the primary goal of such actions does not necessarily primarily rest on coercing civilians 
and instead may serve merely to fund a rebel group’s operations, they still make victims out of 
civilians in ways that separatist groups should hope to avoid if they want to avoid alienating 
important domestic and international supporters. 
 I find support for this notion by testing two forms of economic victimization of civilians: 
theft and seizure of humanitarian aid. Separatists are consistently and significantly less likely to 
steal from civilians and to intercept humanitarian aid – or to hold that aid for ransom – than are 
other types of rebel groups. This is consistent across almost all model specifications, though it is 
of course worth noting that the latter of these – seizure of humanitarian aid – is a fairly rare 
phenomenon. A statistical analysis produces valuable insight regarding the forces that 
contribute to a specific outcome, but we can learn a great deal regarding the motivations 
behind it through more case-specific research that examines the circumstances that lead to 
those outcomes. Given the rarity of rebel interception of humanitarian aid, this is one area 
where in depth qualitative analysis could contribute valuable insight to shed light on the results 
of the statistical analysis presented here. For example, case study research would be able to 
focus on one specific case in order to unpack the complex forces at play that might drive a rebel 
group to seize humanitarian aid intended for civilians. Such forces might be as simple as 
opportunity or as complex as the nature of previous interactions a group might have had with 
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an aid organization. Such findings would contribute valuable insight but are ultimately outside 
the purview of this dissertation. Rebel theft could benefit from similar in-depth analysis, but it 
is a far less uncommon phenomenon and we can therefore take the results of the statistical 
analysis with a smaller grain of salt. 
 The third major finding in this chapter is the most interesting. The theoretical logic to 
this point in this dissertation has posited that rebels should be expected to strategically avoid 
making decisions that turn local civilians into victims. They do this because they expect those 
local civilians to make up their constituency in a newly formed state, should they ever be 
successful, and because they need the support of the international community – or at least 
important members of it – in order to establish that state. But what if the group has already 
established a social contract with the civilians living under their control, who have willingly 
“agreed” to submit as citizens under the leadership of a de facto state government? One of the 
primary civic duties of a legitimate citizenship is tax payment, and one of the basic functions of 
a legitimate state is the ability to collect taxes. Extortion, as basically the illegal version of tax 
collection,112 is one form of economically extractive behavior that separatist groups should 
actually be expected to do more often than other groups. 
 And, as the results reported above show, this appears to be the case in practice. 
Separatist rebel groups are significantly more likely to engage in extortion than are other rebel 
groups. This is consistently true across multiple model specifications and robustness checks. It 
appears that, even though extortion is an illegal practice, it is one that separatists view as 
 
112 And as an inherently illegal entity, separatists are incapable of engaging in legal tax collection before they are 
granted statehood 
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essential for building state-like institutions and for procuring legitimacy-gains in the eyes of 
domestic audiences who make up the citizenry of the nascent government and international 
audiences who view the ability to fund governing institutions as an essential component of 
demonstrating political efficacy. 
 The major takeaway from the findings in this chapter is that legitimacy concerns matter, 
even for economic forms of civilian victimization. It is especially notable that separatist groups, 
while practicing restraint in some areas, actively engage in other extractive practices where 
legitimacy gains may be procured. Taken together, these findings contribute to a complex 
picture of rebel-civilian strategic interactions in separatist civil wars. This chapter and the 
previous chapter have helped to establish the base-line expectations we can have for separatist 
groups at the macro-level. Yet clearly separatist groups are not on their best behavior at all 
times. If we can predict why separatists practice restraint, then we can also predict why – or 
when – they deviate from restraint in the comparatively few instances when they do. Such an 
analysis would require a deeper, more fine-grained analysis that examines group- and micro-
level factors that do help contribute to civilian targeting patterns in spite of the incentives for 
separatists to practice restraint. 
 I turn to such an analysis in the next chapter. In Chapter 6, I engage in a more fine-
grained analysis of separatist civilian targeting patterns by examining within-conflict strategic 
dynamics that might influence short-term tactical decisions that result in the victimization of 
civilians even in spite of the long-term strategic incentives to practice restraint. For this 
analysis, I focus specifically on civilian killing as the civilian targeting outcome that enjoys the 
best granularity at the micro-level of any I have examined in the past two chapters. The findings 
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in this chapter and Chapter 4, then, serve to set the macro-level stage for a deeper 
investigation into the micro-level nuances of legitimacy, strategy and tactics, and civilian 
targeting patterns in separatist civil war. 
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Chapter 6: Separatism and the Micro-Level Dynamics of 
Civilian Targeting in Civil War 
“Vietnam should have taught us that nationalism, with its engines of independence and self-
determination, is a more powerful force by far than Marxism and must be understood and 
respected.” – Pete Hamill, American Journalist 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapters, I established the face-validity of the theoretical notion that 
separatist groups tend to behave systematically according to concerns of long-term legitimacy. I 
also noted, however, that this relationship is not without caveats. In this chapter, I explore one 
of those caveats in more depth. In particular, I examine how developments within the conflict 
space might influence short-term strategic decisions in spite of long-term interests. As I 
outlined in Chapter 3, legitimacy concerns are only one piece of the broader strategic puzzle 
that rebel commanders must consider. Separatists care about how their movement is 
perceived, but they also have competing concerns, such as how to handle the day-to-day 
minutia of tactical decisions with an eye on short-term advantages, as well as how to respond 
to major developments within conflicts that alter the strategic playing field. 
 The nuanced findings from Chapters 4 and 5, therefore, could very well hint at these 
competing strategic forces. The macro-level analyses in those chapters assume that all 
separatist groups enjoy the luxury of long-term strategic considerations, which should most of 
the time take priority over short-term tactical considerations. Following from this, they also 
assume that a rebel group’s strategic decisions are static and that conflict circumstances remain 
unchanged from moment-to-moment. Obviously, neither of these assumptions is consistently 
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true in practice. Some rebel groups may be forced to make strategic decisions that are aimed at 
simply maximizing their chances of living to fight another day, often in response to 
developments within the conflict. 
 I make the first of these assumptions because, as I argue throughout this dissertation, 
long-term legitimacy considerations should be strong enough to be predominantly operative 
when separatist groups have a fairly realistic chance of success. I make the second assumption 
simply to follow convention established in the vast majority of civil war literature, which studies 
armed conflict at the conflict- or conflict-year level. This is, of course, the result of limitations in 
the micro-level civil conflict data that has forced conflict research, until relatively recently, to 
focus on macro-level trends. The goals of this chapter, then, are two-fold: 1) to clarify the scope 
of the legitimacy-seeking framework by 2) utilizing recent data innovations that will push the 
boundaries of civil war research at large by focusing on within-conflict factors that may drive 
certain conflict trends. In other words, this chapter attempts to demonstrate the validity of the 
first assumption regarding separatists’ ability to focus primarily on long-term considerations by 
relaxing the second one that emphasizes the role of macro-level factors. 
 In order to do this, I focus on very specific circumstances that will demonstrate the role 
of both legitimacy concerns and within-conflict dynamics as it relates to rebel-civilian relations 
in separatist civil conflicts. In particular, I explore exclusively the outcome from Chapters 4 and 
5 for which we have the best, most fine-grained data – civilian killing. Second, I discuss civilian 
killing as the result of one specific, easily observable “wartime shock” that can be argued to 
have generalizable effects for a variety of other developments that may take place within 
conflicts. My theory here specifically explores the propensity of a negative shock to a rebel 
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group’s fighting capabilities to influence it to prioritize short-term tactical considerations. Such 
a negative shock should come in the form of a recent development that puts a group’s chances 
of success in doubt. 
 Such circumstances should, in part, help explain the considerable micro-level variation 
in one-sided violence (OSV) in a subset of armed conflicts that we do not get to see in 
traditional yearly- or other macro-level quantitative conflict studies. This variation is shown in 
Figure 6.1 below for two conflicts that are demonstrative of the effect that negative shocks 
have on rebel strategic civilian targeting decisions. The first conflict is that between the Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA) and Algeria, and the second is that between the Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM) and Indonesia. The latter of these is a separatist conflict, while the former was an 
Islamist, center-seeking insurgency. As should be evident from these case choices, separatist 
rebel groups are not immune from strategic choices foisted upon them by developments within 
conflicts that may result in higher levels of violence, even though separatist groups do tend to 
kill fewer civilians per conflict-month.113 
The figure features a roughly five-year segment of two conflicts in the data where 
several monthly spikes in OSV are evident. For the GIA-Algeria conflict there are three general 
spikes in OSV. The biggest spike occurred in August and September of 1997, when GIA engaged 
in several high-profile massacres that resulted in the deaths of 320 civilians according to the 
OSV data. These incidents corresponded with the period just after the GIA leader had been 
assassinated in 1996, and a 1997 election in which rival groups (armed and not) gained 
 
113 In the data, separatist groups tend to kill about 1.3 civilians per month with a maximum of 485 (Kashmiri 
insurgents in India in August of 2000), while nonseparatist groups kill just under 10 civilians per month, with a 
maximum of 10,945 (the AFDL in the DRC in October of 1996). 
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considerable political power at GIA’s expense. Another, albeit smaller, spike occurred at the 
end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000, in which GIA killed nearly 150 civilians in the wake of  
 
the new Algerian government’s policy of general amnesty in an attempt to bring the civil war to 
an end, and the rebel defections that followed. A final spike occurred in 2002, just as Algeria 
had all but defeated the last remnants of GIA. A clear pattern emerges here: GIA killed more 
civilians when contextual developments threatened their ability to wage an effective campaign 
relative to earlier conflict periods.114 
 
114 See Kapil (1998), Associated Press (1997), Amnesty International (1997) 
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Similarly, spikes in OSV perpetrated by GAM in their war for Aceh independence 
envisage patterns of civilian targeting that correspond to negative conflict shocks. GAM 
engaged in by far its highest levels of OSV in 2003 and 2004 – the period that corresponds with 
the biggest Indonesian offensive in the war.115 It is instructive of one of the overall narratives in 
this dissertation – that separatist groups tend to kill fewer civilians than other rebel groups – 
that this conflict saw fewer spikes in OSV as well as fewer civilians killed in these episodes of 
OSV. It is also instructive of another major theme, however, which is that separatist groups do 
respond to negative shocks in much the same way as other rebel groups: by engaging in higher 
levels of OSV in order to deter defection and coerce support when they need it most.116 
 Empirically, operationalizing a “negative shock” is challenging. There are potentially 
unlimited developments that could count as a shock, but not many of them might be 
systematically observed across many conflicts. Even fewer lend themselves to reliable data 
collection, at least at the present. Thus, I operationalize a negative shock according to one 
phenomenon that is easily and consistently observable as well as evident in current data 
collection efforts: rebel battlefield fatalities.117 Theoretically, the aftermath of a major defeat or 
costly victory should serve as an example of such a pivotal strategic crossroads that might put 
the group’s chances of future success in serious doubt. Since the targeting of civilians can be 
strategically useful for coercing support or deterring defection, I expect the killing of civilians to 
 
115 CBS News (2003) 
116 It is important to mention, however, that no direct evidence ties these spikes in violence to an explicitly 
acknowledged strategy of defection deterrence of coerced support. Such evidence would essentially require rebel 
leaders admitting to a war crime on record, which few are likely to do. What we can do, however – and which I do 
in the statistical tests presented below – is demonstrate a statistically significant level of correspondence between 
negative strategic shocks and higher levels of civilian killing in a broader sample of separatist conflicts. 
117 Future scholarship can shed considerable light on other potential negative (and positive) conflict shocks. I 
discuss this further in the conclusion of this chapter. 
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increase in the aftermath of significant battlefield losses. As a restatement of the hypothesis 
examined in this chapter, then, I argue that: 
 
H5: Separatist rebel groups kill more civilians after suffering significant losses on the 
battlefield than they do otherwise. 
 
 In the rest of this chapter, I explore this claim empirically. I first discuss the data and 
methods I use to test these hypotheses. I consider multiple types of models as well as multiple 
operationalizations of the primary independent variable (significant battlefield fatalities) in 
order to determine the best possible strategy for examining micro-level conflict trends. I then 
discuss these analyses and their implications for my theory and for civil war research more 
generally. I then conclude with a brief characterization of the discussion to follow in the next 
chapter. 
 
6.2 Overview of the Data 
 For these analyses, I use a novel monthly-level approach that takes advantage of recent 
innovations in micro-level conflict data. To construct the data I analyze below, I manipulate the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Sundberg and 
Melander 2013) to produce monthly data that include information on a rebel group’s battle 
losses and the number of civilians they killed in a given month. Each observation in the data is a 
month in an ongoing armed conflict dyad during the time-period 1989-2018. A conflict is coded 
as ongoing for every month between the official month of the start of hostilities in the GED 
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data and the official month of the final hostilities in the data.118 Since I am specifically 
examining the behavior of separatist groups, I consider a separatist-only subset of conflict data. 
 For the primary analyses, this produces a scheme that includes 10,544  dyadic conflict-
months from 66 separate armed-conflict dyads. The longest conflict in the data – that between 
Turkey and the PKK – lasted 358 months – or nearly the full 30-year sample in the data.119 The 
conflict between India and Kashmir Insurgents was one month shorter, while that between 
Indonesia and the Free Papua Movement (OPM) lasted 353 months.120 Two dyads comprised 
the shortest in the data, raging for only six months – that between Yemen and South Yemen in 
1994 and between Ukraine and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) in 2014. The average 
number of dyad-months per conflict in the data is 160 (just over 13 years), while the median is 
144 (or 12 years). The conflict-month format of these data allows for an in-depth analysis of 
micro-level conflict processes that to this point have received relatively little attention in the 
conflict literature. In the tests below, I show that a recent and significant battlefield shock in 
the form of significant battlefield losses suffered by the rebel group corresponds with a higher 
number of civilians killed by separatist groups. 
 
118 This coding scheme differs somewhat from that of UCDP, which considers a conflict to be ongoing when it 
produces 25 battle-related fatalities in a given year. This means that my data contain some months and years that 
the UCDP data would not consider to be part of an ongoing conflict. I construct the data in this way because rebel 
one-sided violence (OSV) against civilians do not count toward the battle-related fatality count required to 
consider a conflict “active”, and thus may take place in months where the conflict is considered to be inactive by 
the UCDP data. Such events may still be considered part of an ongoing conflict, even if that conflict is not in a state 
of active hostilities between combatants. I therefore consider a conflict to be “ongoing” so long as a rebel group is 
operating in opposition to the government, but I do control for whether a conflict is considered “active” according 
to the UCDP data, and examine the “active” subset of dyad-months in the supplemental analyses in section 5.6.2 
below to check the robustness of my findings. 
119 And, of course, is still ongoing today. 
120 Though it should be noted that many conflicts were ongoing prior to the start of the data coverage period in 
1989. This will be discussed in more depth when I discuss my use of conflict duration as a control variable in the 
models below. 
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 I use multiple independent variables to capture alternative operationalizations of the 
negative shock associated with rebel battlefield fatalities. The notion of a shock implies that 
fatalities suffered as part of that shock deviate considerably from what is regarded as normal in 
a specific conflict. Some conflicts are especially brutal, with high numbers of fatalities on all 
sides as the norm; others subsist at a low intensity and a few fatalities could be exceptionally 
high based on what is typical in that conflict. Thus, it is not enough to measure battlefield losses 
strictly in terms of the number of fatalities. Instead, I construct two measures that capture 
alternative conceptions of significant losses. Both come with advantages and disadvantages, so 
I use them both in the tests presented below. 
 The simpler of these measures captures the change in battlefield fatalities suffered by a 
rebel group from one month to the next. This variable can therefore take a positive or negative 
value, depending upon whether or not a group suffered more or fewer fatalities in the current 
month compared to the previous month. The biggest positive change in the data occurred in 
March of 1993 when Sikh insurgents suffered 245 more fatalities at the hands of the Indian 
government compared to the previous month. The following month in this same conflict 
comprises the largest negative change, when the insurgents suffered 256 fewer fatalities in 
April after their costly March.  In the vast majority of cases – 7,906 months or just under 75% of 
the data – rebel groups suffered no change in the number of fatalities from the previous 
month. It logically follows that both the mean and median values for this variable are also 0. In 
the models below, I code the negative values of this variable as missing in order to avoid biasing 
the results in a test aimed at examining increases in battlefield fatalities over time. This, of 
course, creates that possibility that my results will be biased in favor of a positive result. 
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Alternatively, I could code all negative values as 0 or use the full scale of monthly fatality 
changes instead of dropping all negative observations. The problem with doing the former is 
that the number of months with a negative change combined with those with no change would 
produce data that are heavily skewed toward zero, thereby discarding considerable variance 
and hampering my ability to isolate relationships that lead to positive changes. The problem 
with the latter is similar. Indeed, the highest absolute value for the fatality change variable 
takes a negative value. Including all negative values, and considering the magnitude of negative 
change, could bias my results in a negative direction, similarly discarding model variance and 
hampering my ability to isolate positive relationships. Focusing only on positive changes in 
battlefield fatalities is not without problems, of course, but using multiple measures to capture 
a negative shock should help to mitigate this concern. 
 The benefit to this measure is that it allows us to gauge the effect of a change in 
battlefield losses on a continuous scale at different levels of magnitude. The drawback, 
however, is that the severity of the conflict may dictate the degree to which rebels view higher 
numbers of additional fatalities as impactful to their overall goals. Rebels engaged in low-
intensity conflicts where their monthly battlefield losses are regularly in the single or low 
double digits is likely to view an increase of 10 fatalities as much more costly than a rebel group 
that regularly loses higher numbers of soldiers. 
 The second variable I use to test the effect of a negative shock on civilian targeting 
patterns accounts for this drawback. This variable consists of a binary variable indicating 
whether a rebel’s losses in a given month break the threshold of one standard deviation above 
the overall mean for that conflict. As I referenced above, the data contain many observations 
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where the conflicts are considered to be “inactive”. In order to avoid mean and standard 
deviation figures that are biased downward, I calculate them only using years where the 
conflict is coded as “active” in the UCDP data. I also calculate a second version measure for any 
year where a conflict event was recorded, even in “inactive” years, in order to include years 
where a group is operative, even if it avoids direct or substantial confrontations with the 
government.121 The highest mean value for dyad-months in active years in the data is 13,122 
while the highest mean for years with an active event is 11.123 Just under 7% of dyad-months in 
the data – 731 to be exact – reached a level of severity where rebel fatalities surpassed one 
standard deviation above the conflict mean that was constructed using active-years. This figure 
using event-years is slightly higher – 849 dyad months or roughly 8% of the sample. 
 The advantage of this measurement is that it allows us to capture the effect of 
battlefield losses that are truly significant in that they are considerably higher than what rebels 
typically experience, and avoids the arbitrariness of establishing a threshold based off of a 
certain number of new fatalities required to consider those losses to represent a shock. The 
downside, of course, is that it does not allow for gauging the effect of different levels of 
battlefield losses on a continuous basis. By using these two measures in combination, I am able 
to leverage the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of both in order to paint a more 
nuanced picture of civilian targeting patterns in separatist conflicts as a strategic response to 
negative shocks. I lag both of these variables by one month in order to account for the notion 
 
121 I argue that a conflict dyad can be considered active if the rebel group is still engaging in conflict-related 
activities, even if it hovers at a level lower than the battle-deaths threshold established by UCDP in order to 
officially be considered “active” in that year. 
122 Morocco vs. Polisario 
123 Sri Lanka vs. LTTE 
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that separatist civilian targeting patterns take place as a response to negative shocks, rather 
than both occurring nearly simultaneously as a result of an especially brutal month. 
 
6.3 Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in this chapter is civilian killing, measured as civilian fatality 
figures listed in the UCDP GED data (Sundberg and Melander 2013). These data are again 
aggregated for events on a monthly basis. Like the variable capturing fatalities suffered by rebel 
groups, the vast majority of dyad-months in the data – 9,583, accounting for just under 91% of 
the sample – produced 0 civilian fatalities. The heavily zero-inflated distribution is further 
underscored by other elements of the data: the median number of civilian deaths by month is 0 
and the mean is 1. The deadliest month for civilians in the data occurred in August of 2000, 
when Kashmiri insurgents in India killed 485 civilians, while the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) killed just one fewer in Sri Lanka in August of 1990.124 
 
6.4 Control Variables 
 I use the same set of control variables in these analyses as in Chapter 4, though their 
distributions differ as a result of coding efforts to ensure they fit the unit of analyses and 
temporal range of these analyses. The data used in Chapter 4 are constructed in a dyad-year 
format, and only cover the period 1989-2009. These data, as I have already discussed, are 
constructed at the dyad-month level and cover data on all dyad-months between 1989 and 
2018. It is important to note, however, that I do not consider the role of ethnicity in these 
 
124 Of course, as a proportion of each state’s overall population, Sri Lanka experienced a much deadlier month in 
August of 1990 as a result of LTTE actions than did India in 2000 as a result of those of Kashmiri insurgents. 
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analyses. As I discussed in Chapter 4, ethnicity is strongly correlated with separatism. In fact, 
nearly 100% of the separatist conflicts in the data are also ethnic conflicts.125 There is therefore 
little that can be learned, and much that can be clouded, from the inclusion of an ethnic 
variable. 
 The other control variables in the primary analyses below are the same as in Chapter 4. 
One of these is rebel strength. The rebel strength variable consists of a 5-tiered measure where 
a value of 1 indicates a rebel that is weak relative to the government, 3 indicates a rebel that is 
at parity with the strength of the government, and 5 indicates a rebel that is strong relative to 
the government.126 This variable is borrowed from the NSA data (Cunningham et al. 2013). In 
the data, the vast majority of rebel groups are weak relative to the government – the average 
strength rating of rebels in these data is 1.44, while the maximum strength rating is 3 – or 
relative parity with the government.127 
 I also control for whether or not a rebel group receives funding from natural resources. 
This variable is again adapted from Walsh et al.’s RCD. To reiterate, rebel group is considered to 
derive funding from natural resources if it engages in the extortion, theft, smuggling, or booty 
futures – that is, promising another actor exploitation rights over a natural resource in the 
event the group gains control of it – of any of the 31 natural resources identified by Walsh et al. 
 
125 The only conflict in the data that is coded as separatist but not ethnic is the Kata Katanga insurgency in the DRC 
that fought for the independence of the Katanga region between December 2011 and July 2016, accounting for 
only 56 months out of the full sample of 10,544. 
126 I do not include separate measures indicating relative strength or weakness as I did in Chapters 4 and 5 
because, simply, there are no separatist groups in the data that could be coded as “relatively strong” compared to 
the government. 
127 Of the four separatist conflicts that consist of rebels that are at parity with the government (consisting of 311 
total months in the data), two became independent states (Croatia vs. the government of Bosnia during the 
Yugoslav wars, and the government of Armenia vs. the Soviet Union), while another retains its de facto 
independence (Nagorno-Karabakh, ostensibly part of Azerbaijan). The fourth is that between the government of 
Papua New Guinea and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). 
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in a given year. The variable takes a value of 1 if this is the case and 0 otherwise. In the data, 
rebels derive funding from natural resources 2,338 dyad months, accounting for about 22.2% of 
the data.128 
 In addition, I account for whether or not a rebel group controls territory. This should 
theoretically be a goal of virtually all separatist groups, but the ability to establish a territorial 
foothold in conflict is a valuable piece of leverage and strategic focal point for nearly all 
combatants in armed conflicts. Save for especially inhospitable areas, which have little strategic 
value for combatants to try to control anyway, civilians tend to live in areas controlled by 
armed groups in conflict, thereby presenting the opportunity and with it potentially the motive 
to target civilians. Rebel group relations with these civilians may be friendly, hostile, or neutral, 
but interactions between them are virtually inevitable. As such, rebel territorial control 
warrants consideration in any study of rebel treatment of civilians. I again account for this using 
a dichotomous variable borrowed from the NSA data, which takes a value of 1 when a group 
controls territory and 0 when it does not. In the data, 3,679 dyad-months include a rebel group 
that controls territory, accounting for just under 35% of the sample.129 
 
128 It should of course be noted that not all sources of funding come from the sale of natural resources, and that 
the RCD also captures other sources of illicit rebel funding such as direct extortion or theft from civilians, 
kidnapping and human trafficking, smuggling of goods, piracy, and hijacking humanitarian aid, many of which I 
explored as dependent variables in Chapter 5. I therefore construct a more inclusive illicit funding variable to 
capture these methods of funding. For several reasons, however, I reserve these for the supplemental rather than 
primary analyses. First, most conflict studies examine natural resource funding in particular rather than other 
sources of funding, so I choose to also do so in order to best inform the literature on its own terms. Second, many 
other forms of illicit funding inherently involve victimizing civilians, which could bias my results in favor of a few 
cases where rebels are especially prone to civilian targeting. Third, it can be argued that any means through which 
rebels fund their activities is illicit – and it does appear that rebels derive illicit funding in nearly half of all 
observations in the data – which runs the risk of this variable driving the results of the statistical analyses 
presented below. I estimate each of the models below using the illicit funding variable in addition to that for 
resource funding, but report only those for resource funding. 
129 This is interesting, since virtually all rebel groups should have some aspiration to control at least some portion 
of territory. 
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 Further, I include a variable that accounts for the duration of the conflict. As a conflict 
drags on, combatant groups may become more desperate and resort to more brutal tactics in 
order to gain a tactical advantage and bring a conflict to a more immediate conclusion. It is also 
possible that the longer a conflict rages, the more adversarial the animosity becomes, and the 
more brutal the reprisals against civilian supporters of the enemy. Alternatively and more 
simply, rebels may just become weaker as a conflict grows older, forcing them to use higher 
levels of civilian intimidation in order to stave off defeat. This variable in the data contains a 
number indicating the number of years since the start of the conflict. I constructed it by 
subtracting the current year of each observation by the start year, which I determined based on 
the UCDP dyadic conflict data (Harbom et al. 2008).130 The average conflict length in the data is 
about 18 years, while the median is about 15.131 The longest conflict in the data, which lasted 
11 years longer than the next longest, was that between the Democratic Party of Iranian 
Kurdistan (KDPI) and Iran, which had been ongoing for 72 years at the end of the temporal 
period in the data.132 
 Finally, I control for whether a month in the data occurs during an “active” dyad year, as 
well as whether a dyad event took place in that year. I do this in order to account for months of 
conflict inactivity and to ensure that statistical tests performed on “inactive” or “non-event” 
 
130 It should be noted that the data include conflicts that began prior to the beginning of the temporal period in 
1989. As such, some dyads have durations that last longer than the number of years in the data. 
131 This is notable in comparison to the full sample of conflicts for the same period (separatist and non-separatist). 
The mean and median conflict duration for all conflicts in this period are 15 and 11, respectively, suggesting that 
separatist conflict on average last longer than non-separatist conflicts. This is especially striking when we consider 
that separatist groups also tend to kill fewer civilians, despite the longer average conflict periods. 
132 This case is demonstrative of the many years of inactivity for some conflicts that are included in the data. I 
account for this in two ways. I first control for whether a conflict dyad is active in that year, as well as whether an 
event takes place in that year (I discuss this in the next paragraph). Second, I conduct the same tests on only the 
subsets of dyad-months that are considered to be “active” and which produce conflict events. I discuss this further 
below. 
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periods do not bias my results toward a statistical finding. As this implies, I conduct two 
separate models; one that controls for whether a dyad is “active” and one that controls for 
whether there is an event in that dyad in that year.133 I code a conflict as “active” if it produced 
25 or more battle-related fatalities in that year, based on UCDP coding rules. A conflict is coded 
as “event-positive” if a conflict event takes place in that year. In the data, 4,795 dyad-months 
take place in an active year, accounting for about 45.5% of the data. Alternatively, 8,012 dyad-
months – or roughly 76% of the data – occur in a year that a conflict event took place. 
 
 Table 6.1 above summarizes the descriptive statistics discussed in this section, along 
with the variation inflation factors (VIFs) of the variables. The table includes only the variables 
included in the main analyses and leaves out alternative variables used in supplemental tests 
and robustness checks. The version of the independent variable included in the table is the 
continuous change in battle deaths variable in order to most clearly demonstrate the 
 
133 The distinction is important because some conflict events might take place in years that are technically 
considered to be “inactive” according to the UCDP data. I argue, however, that there is a limit to how “inactive” a 
conflict can truly be if it is still engaging in hostilities, even at a very low level. I include the event-based variable 
essentially as a more inclusive version of the active variable. 
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distribution of the values in the data. All explanatory variables are well below the VIF threshold 
level of 5, indicating that there is very little overlap or correlation between them. 
 
6.5 Model Construction 
 These data are constructed to shed light on the civilian targeting patterns of separatist 
rebel groups as a strategic response to developments within the conflict space. In order to test 
the claims predicted by the theory, I introduce a series of statistical tests that aim to uncover 
statistically significant relationships from which academic and policy-relevant inferences may 
be made. The statistical tests in the models presented below are dictated by features of the 
particular dependent variable under consideration. 
 I use two different types of tests in the models below, each selected for advantages they 
offer given the unique structure of the data. In the first set of models, I follow the lead of other 
scholars in the legitimacy-seeking tradition and use negative binomial (NB) regression (Long 
1997). This variation of regression analysis is employed for models of counts of events (here, 
civilian fatalities) given “overdispersion” on the dependent variables, which is to say a large 
number of zeroes combined with very high values in other observations (Fjelde and Hultman 
2013). 
 I supplement these analyses by then estimating models using zero-inflated negative 
binomial (ZINB) regression. ZINB is arguably more appropriate in this chapter for estimating 
relationships in a data distribution where zeros are generated according to more than one data 
generation processes. That is, some of the zeros in the data receive that value because no 
civilian deaths occurred in that month, while other observations take a value of zero simply 
because a conflict is inactive in that month and there is thus no possibility of the observation 
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taking a non-zero value. ZINB estimates models in two stages, first estimating a logit to 
determine the likelihood of event non-occurrence – i.e., it predicts the “certain-zeros” – and 
then estimates broader trends in the “non-certain-zero” data using NB regression (Beaujean 
and Grant 2016). A standard NB regression does not distinguish between these two processes, 
creating the possibility that results could become biased toward a positive result in the analysis. 
There is no clear rule-of-thumb for adjudicating which model is more appropriate, so I 
estimate both in order to account for the possibility that NB results could in part be driven by 
the dual data-generation process in the dependent variable. To account for dependence within 
dyads, I cluster the standard errors using the dyadic ID variable for each individual conflict dyad. 
This should ensure that variation in the analysis is not the result of within-dyad dependence. 
I again estimate both tests using a step-wise approach wherein I sequentially add more 
variables to the models in order to alleviate concerns raised by Achen (2005) that results 
estimated by large models with many control variables run the risk of producing coefficients 
that are dependent on the inclusion of specific variables. I do this by first introducing a bivariate 
model that consists of only the dependent and independent variables. I then, in a second 
model, introduce two more explanatory variables. After that, I introduce a third model that 
consists of the full set of controls in addition to the primary variables of interest. I do this three 
times in order to consider the effect of all three measures of significant battlefield losses under 
different model specifications. Conducting the analyses in this way should help provide 
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assurance that the findings presented below are robust and do not depend on specific variables 
that are included in the model.134 
 
6.6 Empirical Results and Analysis 
6.6.1 Primary Analyses 
 The models in the tables below report the results of the empirical analyses. Hypothesis 
5 suggested that separatist groups tend to kill more civilians when they have recently suffered a 
significant number of fatalities on the battlefield. According to Table 6.2 below, which measures 
significant fatalities as a continuous variable, the statistical analyses lend support to this 
prediction. In the bivariate analysis exploring the direct correlation between changes in rebel 
fatalities and civilian killing in the following month, it is clear that separatists who have recently 
suffered a higher number of losses compared to the previous month tend to kill more civilians. 
This relationship remains consistent in model two. In this model, a strong positive relationship 
emerges between resource funding and rebel civilian killing, lending support to the 
Weinsteinian notion that “resource rich” rebels behave in ways that reflect a “detachment” 
from local civilian populations. It does not appear in the limited model that duration has any 
significant relationship with civilian killing.  
This relationship takes an unexpected turn in the full model when all of the relevant 
covariates are included, however. In model 3, it appears that longer conflicts are actually 
associated with fewer civilians killed by separatist groups. This is counterintuitive, since 
empirically-based conventional wisdom in the literature posits that longer conflicts produce 
 
134 I do this only for the first set of tests that use NB regression. Since I am mainly using ZINB to supplement the 
first analyses, I jump right into a comparison of NB and ZINB after estimating the full NB models. 
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more animosity which leads to more brutal conflicts. One possible explanation for the negative 
relationship indicated here might be that longer conflicts may produce stickier relationships 
and more loyalty between rebels and civilians. In other words, as a conflict rages longer over  
 
time, rebels may come to rely on civilians for material support to a greater extent over time as 
their capabilities wear away. The need to preserve civilian support may then translate to higher 
levels of restraint. In addition, if civilians have expended considerable political capital 
supporting a specific party to a conflict for a long time, then their own fates may be tied to the 
success of the group, which simultaneously could reinforce civilian loyalty and undercut the 
need for rebels to deter defection violently. Further, the longer a group enjoys civilian support 
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and, especially, a base of recruitment, the more their own interests may become tied to those 
of the local civilians. These processes could make it more likely that the relationship between a 
rebel group and its civilian supporters could become closer over time. Then again, it is equally 
possible that this result is simply driven by the inclusion of many “inactive” months in the 
data.135 I explore this possibility in more depth below. 
 In the full model, a greater increase in separatist fatalities is once again positively and 
significantly associated with civilian deaths in the following month, as is enjoying the support of 
funding derived from natural resources. By contrast, rebel territorial control is negatively 
associated with civilian killing. This is somewhat striking, since at the very least the control of 
territory presents rebels with more opportunity to target civilians, but they tend more often to 
practice restraint. This suggests that separatist rebel groups tend to systematically recognize 
the utility to preserving good relationships with the civilians living in the territory they control. 
This has important implications for the legitimacy-seeking framework, since rebel groups, even 
non-separatist rebel groups as I show in the supplemental models below, appear to care at 
least somewhat about their ability to control territory if they are not on good terms with local 
civilians. Interestingly, it appears that rebel strength has no effect here. This is likely simply a 
function of the lack of variation in this variable in the separatist-only sample. As I discussed 
above, no separatist groups in the data were considered to be strong relative to the 
government, and only a few were considered to even be at parity. Finally, the active year 
 
135 In addition, as I noted above, separatist conflicts tend to be both less violent and longer. This finding could 
simply be an artifact of the separatist-only subset examined in this chapter. 
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variable is unsurprisingly positive and significant, indicating merely that the civilian deaths 
disproportionately occur in years that a conflict is actually ongoing. 
 Table 6.3 below reports the results of the other independent variables, which 
operationalize a negative shock as a rebel group’s fatalities suffered in a given month 
surpassing one standard deviation above the conflict mean. As I discussed above, I generated 
two measures of this, one of which captures this shock based on the mean and standard 
deviation for active years only, and the other for any years containing a conflict event – the 
latter of these in practice produces a threshold of what counts as a shock that is lower and 
more forgiving, allowing me to test this effect at two different degrees of severity. 
 
 152 
 This decision bears fruit in the models reported in Table 6.3. Both measures appear to 
positively influence separatist civilian killing patterns, but this finding is only robust across 
model specifications when the lower-threshold measure is used. This indicates, in part, that the 
results for the higher threshold measure could be driven by a smaller number of cases where 
rebel fatalities reached a sufficiently high level to be considered a shock. The lower threshold 
measure is, naturally, more inclusive and also produces results that are robust across all three 
models in which it is included.136 These findings, in combination with the first measure 
capturing the magnitude of an increase in rebel fatalities, allows us to infer that separatist 
groups do in fact tend to kill more civilians after suffering more significant fatalities of their 
own. As I show below, these findings are robust across several alternative model specifications. 
 Once again, resource funding is strongly associated with higher levels of civilian killing, 
though not in all four models, indicating that it is at least somewhat dependent upon model 
specifications.137 Conflict duration is negatively associated with civilian killing, but only in model 
3, indicating that this relationship is not robust and therefore casting doubt on the conjectures 
posited in my discussion of similar inconsistency for this variable in Table 6.2 above. Territorial 
control is once again negatively associated with civilian killing, while the rebel strength has a 
significant association in both models but differs in direction depending upon which variable is 
used as the primary independent variable, indicating that the effect of this variable is not 
 
136 It should be noted, however, that the higher-threshold measure regains significance when the Active Year 
variable is removed from the model. I test these again below on a smaller subset of the data that removes inactive 
and non-event years from the sample to determine whether these control variables are driving the results in these 
models. 
137 When this variable is replaced with the more inclusive illicit funding variable, on the other hand, it is 
considerably more strongly and positively associated with civilian killing, further lending support to the 
Weinsteinian notion that rebels only practice restraint vis-à-vis civilians when they do not have other sources of 
sustenance upon which to rely. 
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robust across model specifications and any conclusions drawn from it should be done with 
caution. Finally, the active year and (especially) the event year control variables are positively 
and significantly associated with civilian killing. The extraordinarily high coefficient for the event 
year variable can almost certainly be attributed to the fact that virtually all episodes of civilian 
killing by definition occur at least in years where an event took place. Since the inclusion of 
these variables may be problematic, I consider only the active- and event-year subsets in the 
supplemental analyses in the next subsection, in which I also shed more light on the 
inconsistencies evident in the other variables included in these models. 
 
6.6.2 Robustness Checks 
 Tables 6.2 and 6.3 above suggest an interesting trend. Separatist groups do appear to 
kill more civilians when they have recently suffered higher numbers of fatalities of their own, 
but this is not necessarily reflected at the highest levels of fatalities suffered for separatists. I 
also noted, however, that this finding is sensitive to a few model specifications, which I account 
for in the tests to follow. 
 Most importantly, I acknowledged above that negative binomial regression is only one 
way to deal with overdispersion in the independent variable. Arguably, zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression is a better method by which to estimate relationships in overdispersed data 
where the zeros are generated through two or more data generating processes. In the data 
analyzed here, observations in the dependent variable – civilian killing – take the value of zero 
either because no conflict was ongoing at that point and it was always going to take a value of 
zero, or because conflict, though occurring, did not produce civilian deaths, notwithstanding, 
some ex ante probability that that observation would not take a value of zero. In effect, ZINB 
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estimates are produced through two models calculated in succession. The first stage calculates 
in a logistic regression model the extent to which a variable influences observations in the 
response variable’s likelihood of appearing in the “certain zero” group. The second stage then 
calculates in a negative binomial regression the extent to which each variable in the model 
influences the level of civilian killing for observations that do not appear in the “certain zero” 
group. 
 Table 6.4 below reports the results of a ZINB estimated using two of the three 
independent variables examined above.138 Models 1 and 3 report the results of the stage one 
logit of the model predicting the influences of each input variable on the likelihood that an 
observation in the dependent variable has no probability of taking the value of zero, while 
models 2 and 4 report the results of the NB regression models that estimate the effect of each 
variable on the magnitude of values in the dependent variable that have a non-zero probability 
of taking a value of zero. 139 
 For the most part, results remained consistent across the two ZINB models estimated. 
The most notable difference manifests with respect to the two alternative measures capturing 
the primary independent variable. Both an increase in rebel fatalities from the previous month 
and losses that constitute a negative shock reduce the likelihood that an observation appears in 
the “certain-zero” group, while only a true shock contributes to civilian killing in the 
observations where there was some positive probability of an observation taking a non-zero 
 
138 For the variable capturing rebel fatalities as a negative shock, I use the variable constructed using event years in 
order to capitalize on the lower threshold of what counts as a shock and the consequent higher number of 
observations. 
139 I remove the active- and event-year controls from these models, since the ZINB model accounts for the same 
inactivity in certain observations. 
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value. This implies that a simple increase in the number of fatalities is not enough to cause 
separatist groups to engage in higher levels of violence against civilians, but especially 
significant losses that might constitute a legitimate shock appears to have this effect. This 
suggests that, consistent with H5, separatist rebel groups become less restrained when their 
chances of success become suddenly diminished. 
 
 There is some inconsistency among the other variables as well. Across both models, 
longer conflicts appear to be negatively associated with observations that occur in inactive 
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periods, as well as lower levels of civilian killing in potentially active years.140 Similarly, 
territorial control also appears to negatively influence civilian killing, but it is less clear whether 
it has any effect on an observation’s likelihood of taking place in an inactive year. The rebel 
strength variable is similarly inconsistent in the logit models predicting its influence on zero-
generation, but does seem to significantly influence higher levels of civilian killing in the second 
stage of the models. Finally, resource funding produces curious results. It does negatively 
influence an observation’s likelihood of taking place in an inactive year, which is not 
unexpected. However, it appears that in months that are potentially active, resource funding 
actually negatively influences the number of civilians killed. This is quite counterintuitive, since 
the previous models as well as prevailing theory posits that natural resources should either 
have no effect or positively influence conflict severity.141 
 The ZINB models can still be somewhat misleading though, since they are conducted on 
a sample of data that includes information on months where some conflicts are inactive. Table 




140 This is interesting considering the non-robustness of the duration variable in the results reports in Table 6.3. By 
contrast, it appears here that longer conflicts do tend to be less deadly for civilians, at least for separatist groups. 
This means that there may really be something to the propositions I discussed above regarding stickier civilian-
rebel relations over time. Then again, the sample under consideration here includes only separatist groups, which I 
have already noted elsewhere in this dissertation tend to kill fewer civilians and last longer than other conflicts. 
This implies that separatist conflicts may have a propensity to linger and fester at a low intensity for a long time, 
perhaps owing to the indivisibility of secessionist issues as well as the war weariness of combatants over time that 
could produce diminishing returns in the severity of conflict flare-ups.  
141 It should be noted that when I substitute this variable with the more inclusive illicit funding variable, it again 
produces a positive and significant coefficient. This might suggest, among other possibilities, the negative result 
reported for the resource funding variable could be driven by the comparatively few observations in which rebels 
derive funding from those sources. Alternatively, it is possible that “illicit funding” is a better, more inclusive 
measure of resource-richness than is “resource funding”. 
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regression model on a sample that considers only active conflict dyad-months.142 In these 
models, it appears that higher levels of separatist fatalities as well as rebel fatalities that are 
sufficiently high to constitute a negative shock to the group’s fighting capabilities in the 
previous month are positively and significantly associated with higher levels of civilian killing in 
the current month. Given the consistency with which this result has appeared over nearly all 
models, we can infer that although separatists may tend to kill fewer civilians in general, when 
 
142 The subsetted sample in this model that drops all observations where a conflict is not active negates the 
primary utility of using ZINB instead of NB, which is to account for overdispersed data where zeros in the response 
variable are generated through two distinct processes. Since the subset of observations containing all of the data 
points generated through one of those processes is dropped in these analyses, NB regression should produce 
model estimates that are appropriate for the data considered here.  
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they do target civilians it is disproportionately in response to negative developments within 
conflicts.  
 Once again, stronger rebels tend to kill more civilians, while rebels that control territory 
tend to kill fewer. Interestingly, conflict duration is associated with more civilians killed, which 
contradicts findings in the previous models but corresponds to conventional wisdom in the 
literature that implies that longer conflicts produce more violent interactions. This finding 
suggests that the negative relationship reported in previous models may in part have been 
driven by the inclusion of many observations where a conflict was inactive.143 Finally, there 
appears to be no consistent statistically significant relationship between natural resource 
funding and civilian killing.144 Together, these results lend robust and fairly consistent support 
for the notion that separatist rebel groups, even in spite of other factors that may contribute to 
their decisions to kill more civilians, tend to do so at least in part in response to strategic shocks 
that put their chances of success in doubt. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have continued the process of evaluating the merits of the argument I 
advanced in Chapter 3. After establishing in Chapters 4 and 5 that separatists do tend for the 
most part to behave systematically differently compared to other rebel groups, I established in 
this chapter certain scope conditions to help explain the circumstances when this behavior 
deviates from the norm. I did so by examining developments within the conflict space that may 
 
143 And also implies that separatist conflicts may endure longer, but tend to fester at lower levels in the process. 
144 Once again, however, the substitution of the more inclusive illicit funding variable yields strongly positive and 
significant results, indicating that other sources of funding may be powerful drivers of rebel disengagement with 
civilians even though the literature tends to focus on natural resources specifically. 
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force rebel strategists to come up with a new plan ad hoc in response to developing tactical 
circumstances. I argued, specifically, that a negative shock to a rebel’s fighting capabilities 
should force rebel groups to prioritize decisions that maximize their chances of survival, and to 
(potentially) temporarily forget about the luxury of long-term strategies. I also showed 
graphically that these contextual factors can be explicitly traced in some conflicts. In the 
statistical analysis, I operationalized such a negative shock as a significant number of fatalities 
suffered on the battlefield. 
 According to the statistical analyses, it is clear that separatist groups tend to kill more 
civilians after they have suffered significant battlefield fatalities. This is robust across multiple 
operationalizations of the dependent variable, in multiple models, and within multiple samples. 
A higher number of fatalities in the previous month in most models corresponded with more 
civilians killed in the current month in all but the ZINB model. An actual shock, operationalized 
as a number of fatalities that surpasses one standard deviation above the conflict mean, was 
robustly associated with more civilians killed across all models reported above. This suggests 
that this effect is robust, but especially so at the highest levels of rebel setbacks. 
 Conflict scholars can build upon these findings in order to better inform research on 
legitimacy in armed conflict in several ways. The first is to explore other contextual 
developments that could be considered a negative shock to a rebel group’s relative fighting 
capabilities. I explored only battlefield fatalities in this chapter due to current data availability, 
but other potential shocks could be even more insightful. As I mentioned above in my 
discussion surrounding Figure 6.1, negative shocks can manifest in potentially unlimited ways. 
In the examples used in that figure, rebel OSV spikes corresponded with periods in which 
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governments engaged in military offensives of offered amnesty deals to rebel combatants as 
well as when rebels faced enhanced domestic political opposition, suffered high-level 
assassinations, or were on the verge of defeat. 
These developments would be difficult to observe systematically across conflicts, but 
other conceivable shocks might be if considerable data collection efforts are devoted to 
capturing them. The loss of territory by a rebel group might be one such shock that could 
produce rebel OSV aimed at deterring civilian defection. The entry of a new actor into a conflict 
on the side of the government or otherwise, or the loss of an external supporter on the side of 
the rebels,145 could have a similar effect, since it would tangibly and abruptly tip the balance of 
power in a new direction. Examining shocks such as these, and potentially others, could not 
only broaden the scope of the analysis presented in this dissertation but also shed more 
insightful light on the nature of contextual developments within ongoing conflict, as well as 
how legitimacy concerns and other strategic considerations factor into these responses. 
An additional facet to this dynamic would be to examine how rebels might respond to 
positive strategic shocks. If a group is expected to react to a negative shock with, among other 
responses, higher levels of violence against civilians, then a positive shock could entice the 
opposite reaction – especially among separatist groups who have the most incentive to practice 
restraint when their chances of success are higher. Certain positive developments, such as the 
acquisition of new territory, could even present actors with the opportunity to target more 
 
145 The years surrounding the end of the Cold War could be an interesting period within which to examine this 
dynamic, since many combatants in armed conflicts around the world enjoyed Soviet and Cuban support until such 
arrangements abruptly ended at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. Others, who enjoyed American 
support, may also have lost important allies when the end of the Cold War reduced US interests in maintaining 
rebel alliances in many conflicts. 
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civilians simply by virtue of more interactions with them. If rebels in general, and separatists 
specifically, practice restraint in light of this opportunity, then such a finding would shed 
important light upon rebel priorities and strategic considerations. Once again, data limitations 
preclude my ability to examine this here, but the findings presented above establish the 
theoretical and empirical groundwork for future scholars to build upon if and when future data 
innovations allow for more fine-grained analysis. 
In the next chapter, I conclude this dissertation with an in-depth discussion of the 
contributions the preceding chapters have made to the literature on separatist conflict, civilian 
targeting, legitimacy, and statemaking. I also discuss how researchers can build upon these 
findings in order to advance the field even further, and how policy-makers can learn from them 
in order to address the scourge of armed conflict for civilians living in conflict zones.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
“No people and no part of a people shall be held against its will in a political association that it 
does not want.” – Ludwig von Mises, Austrian Economist 
 
7.1 Summary 
 This project started with the observations that separatist civil wars tend to kill fewer 
civilians than other conflicts, despite lasting longer and despite not killing fewer combatants. 
The fact that they tend to last longer can probably be attributed to the indivisibility of territorial 
issues146 – separatist groups are unwilling to accept compromises short of independence (or at 
least nearly full autonomy) at the same time that states are unwilling to compromise their 
territorial integrity, sacrifice potentially valuable or culturally/historically important territory, 
and risk setting a dangerous example for other potential self-determination movements. And so 
separatist conflicts languish in a state of open hostilities into the long-term. For separatists that 
do manage to establish de facto independence, the wariness of the international community to 
set a similar precedent and proclivity to prioritize the principle of territorial integrity leaves 
them in a state of de jure illegality that puts them at odds with both the international system 
and their parent state in potential perpetuity. 
 The former of these observations can, it turns out, be attributed in part to group-level 
responses to the unique pressures self-determination movements face. Separatists confront an 
up-hill battle in their endeavor to establish a new state. Rebellion is inherently illegal, and the 
two principles of legal sovereignty in international law – that of self-determination and that of 
territorial integrity – are diametrically opposed. Owing to this inherent contradiction, states in 
 
146 See Walter (2003) for more on this 
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the international system, including some of its most important members upon whose 
leadership and authority the establishment of new states depends, tend to oppose the premise 
of a state established on the back of rebellion. In addition, separatists require some subset of 
the domestic population to willingly agree to a social contract legitimating their authority. 
 Indeed, the establishment of a new state is extremely rare. Of the new states that have 
emerged since the end of the Cold War, only four emerged as the direct result of a war of 
secession, despite the fact that separatist civil wars have counted for about one third of all civil 
wars in that period. Moreover, separatists are aware of the challenge they face in establishing 
themselves as a legitimate political entity in the eyes of important domestic and international 
audiences, and, as recent research shows, appear to make strategic decisions accordingly.147 In 
this dissertation, I have embedded these observations within a broader framework for making 
sense of the strategic decisions of rebels in at least this subset of armed conflicts. I termed this 
theoretical framework the legitimacy seeking framework, and conceptualize of separatist 
decisions according to two dimensions – legitimacy gain procurement and legitimacy cost 
avoidance – whereby separatist rebels make conscious strategic decisions that are specifically 
intended to demonstrate their willingness and ability to play by the rules of the international 
system as well as those expected by their domestic constituents. 
 I then demonstrated that the framework continues to perform well when new behaviors 
and outcomes are taken under consideration. Building upon existing research, I presented an 
argument and derived a set of hypotheses linking separatists to various forms of civilian 
targeting that included both violent and economic varieties. The empirical tests of these 
 
147 E.g., Jo (2015), Fazal (2018), Stewart (2016), Huang (2016), Coggins (2015) 
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arguments show that separatists do, indeed, victimize civilians significantly less often than 
other rebel groups, and that moreover they engage in certain behaviors that actually help to 
enhance their legitimacy. Beyond that, I also establish certain scope conditions that 
demonstrate the empirical and contextual limits of the legitimacy-seeking framework. 
 In so doing, this dissertation moves our knowledge of separatist civil war – and civilian 
targeting in all civil wars – forward by linking a well-developed research area (civilian targeting) 
to a context that is less well-developed in the literature (separatism), while considering novel 
theories and outcomes that help bridge the gap. I also help to demonstrate that the 
observation noted at the outset of this chapter is the result of deliberate, group-level factors 
rather than spurious conflict-level factors. In what follows, I briefly reiterate the theoretical 
argument and summarize the findings in this dissertation. I close with a brief discussion of this 
project’s contributions, some avenues for future research, and its implications for both scholars 
and policy makers. 
 
7.2 Separatism, Legitimacy, and Violence Against Civilians 
 Chapter 4 directly examined the merits of the argument concerning the violent targeting 
of civilians. Do separatist groups really engage in lower levels of violence than other rebel 
groups, owing to concerns of internal and external legitimacy? Using existing data on 
separatism and one-sided violence (OSV), sexual violence, child soldier use, and kidnapping, it 
appears that they do in fact engage in lower levels of violence against civilians. This appears to 
be especially the case for the killing of civilians and the use of widespread sexual violence. As 
predicted, separatists kill significantly fewer civilians and engage in significantly lower levels of 
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sexual violence, and this is robust across multiple model specifications. This notion has 
somewhat less support for the kidnapping of civilians. Separatists are not less likely to engage in 
kidnapping, but they are less likely to engage in the kidnapping of international civilians, 
supporting the notion that separatists take the perceptions of the international community into 
account and lending contextual support to the kidnapping hypothesis. By contrast, there is no 
support for the hypothesis that separatists use fewer child soldiers. This may indicate, among 
other possibilities, that separatists actually elicit a degree of volunteerism among their 
supporters, whereby children are not forcibly conscripted and therefore it is not seen so much 
as a form of civilian victimization as it is of local civilians throwing their lot more definitively in 
with that of the rebel group by signing their children up to fight. It is also possible that this 
result is biased by the use of the age of 18 as the cut-off for adulthood, a distinction that can be 
dubious and culturally dependent. Given current data realities, discerning such a relationship 
would likely require a qualitative investigation. 
 Interestingly, the behavior of the government that a rebel group is fighting also seems 
to matter. In multiple models that test Hypothesis 4, it appears that the separatist proclivity to 
kill fewer civilians and use lower levels of sexual violence is dampened somewhat when the 
government engages in higher levels of violence against civilians. The logic at play here appears 
to be that separatists come to view their own behavior as less important when the government 
is guilty of more severe transgressions and therefore may take advantage of a perceived 
“longer leash” as it relates to their own transgressions. And indeed, it does appear in practice 
that the international community most often supports rebels’ cause of separatism when the 
state they are fighting has engaged in more or more severe human rights abuses, as was the 
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case in East Timor as well as several of the self-determination wars in the former Yugoslavia. 
These lessons have clear implications for policy makers. If separatists learn from history – and it 
would be foolish to believe they do not – then they may come to view their own actions as 
unimportant if they come to believe that the international community only cares about 
punishing state violence. Failing to reward “good” behavior on the part of separatist rebels then 
can lead to diminishing returns as it relates to the normatively positive outcomes in the 
legitimacy seeking framework over time. 
 
7.3 Separatism, Legitimacy, and Economic Civilian Victimization 
 In Chapter 5 I explored the dimensions of the theory and associated hypotheses that 
examined economic forms of rebel targeting of civilians. According to the statistical tests, the 
separatist propensity to practice restraint vis-à-vis civilians extends to their economic 
interactions as well. Separatist groups are significantly less likely to engage in theft and to 
intercept humanitarian aid than are other rebel groups. By contrast, and very interestingly, 
separatist groups seem to actually be significantly more likely to extort civilians, as expected. 
Extortion, in this analysis, is operationalized as the “taxation” of economic activity in the areas 
under its control. Indeed, the primary difference between extortion and taxation is legality, 
which separatists inherently both lack and aim to gain. A mature institution for levying and 
collecting taxes is expected of any legitimate political entity, and consent to a taxation regime is 
a crucial component of any social contract an entity has with its citizens. In practice, it appears 




7.4 Separatism and Within-Conflict Dynamics 
 There do appear to be limits to the outcomes consistent with the legitimacy-seeking 
framework, however. Chapter 6 tests one of these scope conditions. I argued that separatist 
groups consider legitimacy as only one of many strategic considerations, and while they should 
generally prioritize legitimacy concerns, developments within conflicts may force them to 
prioritize other strategies that have a higher likelihood of yielding positive short-term tactical 
advantages, such as the targeting of civilians. I argued that one such development might be a 
negative shock to the group’s relative fighting capabilities. I operationalized such a shock as a 
costly period in terms of extraordinarily high number of battlefield fatalities suffered by the 
rebel group. Across several analyses using multiple types of statistical tests and model 
specifications, it appears that separatist rebel groups kill a statistically significantly higher 
number of civilians immediately following costly periods than they do otherwise, even though 
separatists at the monthly level still kill fewer civilians than other groups in the absence of such 
costly periods. This suggests that not only do separatists still tend to prioritize legitimacy 
concerns when they have the luxury of long-term considerations, but that certain contextual 
factors are important for predicting when bouts of separatist violence against civilians do occur. 
It also demonstrates that battlefield developments can be important forces influencing various 
dimensions of armed conflicts that have to this point been left relatively understudied. 
 
7.5 Caveats and Limitations 
  Statistical analyses are powerful tools for determining general, probabilistic trends, but 
no statistical analysis represents a perfect model of reality. This study is no different in that 
respect, and a few important limitations and caveats in this dissertation are worth noting. The 
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first and most fundamental of these is whether or not I have truly and fully tested the theorized 
causal mechanism. Throughout this dissertation I have argued that separatist rebel groups, due 
to concerns over the perceived legitimacy of their existence as a viable political entity, make 
strategic decisions that are designed to minimize legitimacy costs and maximize legitimacy 
gains, usually as it relates to their interactions with civilians. I have tested this theory on roughly 
a half dozen outcomes that are consistent with this notion and find strong support for the 
posited causal processes. 
Indeed, separatist conflicts are less deadly for civilians than other conflicts, despite 
lasting longer. But is there some conflict-level factor that I have not taken into account such as 
the possibility that separatist conflicts may take place further from zones of stronger 
government control that accounts for the lower levels of one-sided violence against civilians? 
An examination of the UCDP georeferenced events data (Sundberg and Melander 2013) 
indicates that separatist conflicts are not less severe than other armed conflicts in terms of 
overall fatalities, but they do tend to result in many fewer civilian deaths. This suggests that 
conflict-level factors are not sufficient for explaining this trend, but rather group-level factors 
that seek to explain combatant choices are a more appropriate lens through which to examine 
this observation. This notion, taken together with the findings in this dissertation and of other 
scholars, as well as the anecdotal evidence presented throughout this dissertation of separatist 
groups deliberately making decisions that can be considered to be normatively “positive,” 
suggests that separatists do indeed make decisions that are strategically designed to elicit 
sympathy from the international community and domestic supporters. These findings can be 
supplemented further by future scholarship that considers other micro-level dimensions or 
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which dives deeper into some specific cases to further elucidate some of the processes at work 
within the legitimacy-seeking framework. I discuss some of these possibilities in more depth 
below. 
 Second, and perhaps most limiting, has to do with the availability of data on the 
outcomes examined in this dissertation. Data on the killing of civilians are by far the most 
complete in the analyses explored in Chapters 4-6. These figures contain count data on the 
number of civilians killed by rebel actors on a yearly basis (for Chapter 4) and in specific events 
(for Chapter 6, which I subsequently aggregated to the monthly level). Yet these data are drawn 
from media sources covering the specific conflicts in question and as such are subject to 
reporting biases as well as difficulty in obtaining exactly accurate numbers. The same 
challenges exist with respect to the rebel fatalities figures used to construct the primary 
explanatory variable in Chapter 6. The UCDP has gone to great lengths to ensure the accuracy 
of these figures, yet to an extent it is impossible to ensure that they are completely accurate. 
These figures should therefore be viewed as approximate, but probably a very strong 
approximation. 
 All of the other outcome variables enjoy considerably less data granularity. This is, of 
course, in part due to the difficulty in obtaining discreet victimization figures when there is not 
a body count. Discerning anything relating to the magnitude of the outcomes is therefore 
inherently problematic, though Cohen and Nordas’ (2014) sexual violence (SVAC) data and Haer 
and Böhmelt’s (2015) data on child soldiering attempt to mitigate this challenge by constructing 
tiered index measures. These help to add considerable nuance to studies that take the 
magnitude of an outcome into account, but they are far from ideal. The child soldiering data in 
 170 
particular present the additional challenge of only containing data at the conflict level rather 
than at the conflict-year, prohibiting me from examining variation of child soldier use to any 
extent within individual conflicts. Then again, given the difficulties in determining discreet 
figures on the victims of sexual violence or numbers of child soldiers used by specific rebel 
groups, these might be the best and most accurate we can hope for.148 
The data sources drawn from the Rebel Contraband Data (RCD) (Walsh et al. 2018) – 
kidnapping, theft, humanitarian aid seizure, and extortion149 – contain figures that are only 
binary. That is, they indicate that rebels profited from these funding strategies, but say nothing 
of the extent of these practices or the amount of money earned.150 They do, however, contain 
data at the yearly level, allowing me to account for more variation and nuance. Although more 
fine-grained data would be ideal for these practices, the RCD data already represent a 
significant innovation over existing data on rebel funding practices,151 so I stop short of being 
too critical here. Still, the reader should be wary of drawing any conclusions here relating to the 
extent of these outcomes, and instead acknowledge that I am testing only their occurrence. 
A final caveat that is important to consider has to do with the temporal scope of the 
data. The analyses undertaken in this dissertation consider outcomes only in the post-Cold War 
era. Obviously, trends in international politics can manifest differently according to different 
systemic conditions in different eras. I argued in Chapter 4 that the period after 1989 is exactly 
 
148 The child soldiering data also only consider child soldiering to involve the use of soldiers under the age of 18, 
despite the considerable debate in international law regarding what constitutes a child. They acknowledge this 
challenge and choose to follow the lead of UNICEF (2007), an operational decision that I view as legitimate and 
have accordingly followed suit. 
149 Not to mention natural resource funding variables I use as control variables throughout this dissertation 
150 The RCD do include a variable with information on the amount earned via a each funding strategy by rebel 
groups, but these variables are missing for the majority of observations. 
151 See Chapter 4 for a deeper discussion. 
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the period in which we are most likely to see the theorized relationships occur, but it is of 
course important to point out that the results in this dissertation might look different under 
alternative systemic conditions. For example, prior to the end of the Cold War, many civil wars 
featured one or both of the United States and Soviet Union supporting one or more of the 
warring actors, so the most fruitful way a rebel group could secure international support was 
not necessarily a good human rights record but rather to espouse a certain ideology. Moreover, 
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, enacted in 1977, represent the first time a 
widespread human rights regime applied specifically to internal conflicts, which meant that 
rebel groups may have had no compelling institutionalized legal or normative incentive to 
behave a certain way even if they would have been receptive to it, or at least not as 
systematically as today. 
Indeed, whereas the international system of the Cold War era was characterized 
primarily by bipolarity and ideology, it is today characterized by a highly developed human 
rights normative and legal regime that appears to incentivize and hold accountable warring 
actors in ways that were not possible in earlier periods. While practices such as the use of child 
soldiers and of sexual violence, for example, are criminalized by various international laws, 
children have often made up considerable portions of state militaries and some have even been 
highly celebrated, and the ancient Greek and Latin languages did not even have a word that can 
be directly translated to the concept of “rape” today.152 Thus, the modern norms against the 
victimization of civilians are very much that: modern norms. It is therefore quite appropriate 
 
152 Words existed to explain acts that we might describe as rape today, but in their time comprised a much broader 
semantic spectrum (see for example Koutsopetrou, 2019). 
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that the practices considered in this dissertation have been examined using modern data. 
Examining how separatist and other rebel strategic decisions might differ based on systemic 
conditions might very well be a fruitful endeavor, but it is not the goal of this dissertation and 
therefore I focus only on the period that is most appropriate for assessing the posited 
relationships. 
 
7.6 Future Research 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have hinted at a few potential avenues for extensions 
and future research that are based both on the doors nudged open by this project as well as on 
its shortcomings. Indeed, facilitating the continuation of a progressive research program was 
one of my primary goals in establishing a broad theoretical framework within which analyses of 
legitimacy in armed conflict could be imbedded. I tested a few outcomes that related 
specifically to the targeting of civilians, but there are plenty of other aspects of separatist and 
other legitimacy-oriented conflicts that can be studied according to this logic. For example, 
existing studies show that separatists are more likely to establish education and hospital 
services for civilians living under their control (e.g., Stewart 2016), but to what lengths do 
separatists go to try to establish legitimate institutions targeting the rule of law, such as 
establishing police forces for law enforcement and courts for meting out justice? How about 
institutions for settling civil disputes or adjudicating contracts or delivering mail? What about 
the writing of a constitution? There may be virtually unlimited outcomes that would fall within 
the purview of the legitimacy-seeking framework for scholars interested in exploring 
statemaking, non-state actors, and separatism specifically and civil conflict more generally. That 
is an undertaking I leave to future scholarship. 
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 Other potential avenues for future research would conceivably build upon a few of the 
shortcomings of this dissertation. The biggest shortcoming of the empirical analyses presented 
in this project relate to the current availability of data on certain types of civilian targeting. The 
field could especially benefit from more detailed data on the use of child soldiers. In Chapter 4, 
I analyzed the extent to which rebel groups use child soldiers based on a tiered measure of the 
percentage of a fighting force made up of children at the conflict-level. I found no relationship 
between separatism and the use of child soldiers in this analysis. Higher data granularity might 
help shed insightful light on the driving forces behind child soldier use and perhaps even the 
relationship between separatism and child soldiering. Innovations on child soldier data might 
include better information on the number or percentage of children in a fighting force, changes 
in these figures on a yearly level, and perhaps even information on whether the children had 
been forcibly conscripted or whether they volunteered – or were volunteered by their families. 
This, undoubtedly, would require considerable data collection work, but could prove 
immeasurably insightful for the literatures on separatism in particular and on child soldier use 
at large. 
 Similar data innovations could be eminently useful for examining several of the other 
outcomes explored here as well. Specifically as it relates to data on rebel funding sources, 
information on the amount of money or the proportion of a rebel group’s revenue a specific 
funding source accounts for could be useful in drawing more insightful conclusions based on 
those outcomes.153 It would also be especially useful to further disaggregate some of these 
 
153 Again, the RCD attempt to do this, but their data coverage for these variables in particular are insufficient for 
any systematic analysis. 
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measures. The variable capturing extortion for example includes practices that, in a legal state, 
could include legitimate taxes or classical extortion practiced by organized criminals such as 
protection or insurance rackets. It also includes practices whereby rebels extort other actors 
engaged in illicit activities, such as the drug trade, which would not be viewed as viable even if 
the method of extortion really did closely resemble legitimate taxation. It would be useful, 
especially as it relates to the argument tested in Chapter 5 to be able to distinguish these in 
order to more definitively examine practices that are designed to contribute to legitimate state 
institutions independent of other, more criminal practices. Doing so would require considerable 
capital devoted to data collection but would help lead to significant contributions for the 
literatures on statebuilding and on rebel funding in civil war, and higher data granularity on all 
of the outcomes considered here may allow scholars to consider more than just civilian killing 
in micro-level conflict studies. 
 I offer two more research areas that could serve as an extension of this project. In 
Chapter 6, I tested the argument that developments within conflicts, such as a negative shock 
to relative fighting capabilities, could help account for changes in rebel strategy in the midst of 
a conflict. The tests in that chapter supported this argument. Future scholarship can build on 
this in a few key ways. First, I operationalized a negative shock as a significant loss in terms of 
battlefield fatalities. While it appears that significant battlefield losses translate to increased 
targeting of civilians, there are other within-conflict developments that could count as a 
negative shock and produce a similar outcome. Arguably, certain negative shocks, such as the 
sudden involvement of a new actor or the loss of territory, may even more dramatically impact 
rebel strategic calculations and have a stronger effect on civilian targeting patterns. Second, if 
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negative shocks induce rebels to engage in more transgressions, then positive shocks might 
have the opposite effect. For example, future scholarship might be able to subject the 
legitimacy-seeking framework to further scrutiny by seeing whether separatist groups practice 
higher levels of restraint after they acquire new territory compared to other rebels. Similarly, 
gaining a new external state sponsor may have a similar dampening effect on separatist civilian 
targeting patterns. Data availability precludes me from exploring these in as much depth as I 
would like, but these represent fertile research areas for future scholarship. Finally, I explored 
these outcomes only as it relates to separatist conflicts, yet similar and interesting trends might 
emerge if we consider within-conflict strategic developments as they relate to all armed 
conflicts. This falls outside the purview of this dissertation so I stop short of examining it here, 
but conflict scholars stand to learn much about micro-level conflict dynamics based on strategic 
developments. 
 Another extension of this dissertation relates to the identity of the victims of one-sided 
violence. I established in Chapters 4 and 5 that separatists target civilians less often and at 
lower levels than other rebel groups. I then established in Chapter 6 that much of the variation 
in when separatists do target civilians can be accounted for by looking at when in a conflict the 
targeting takes place. An additional dimension of the separatist civilian targeting puzzle would 
be to examine who they are targeting when they do. While the claims in this dissertation rest 
on the assumption that targeting civilians should result in legitimacy costs for the group in 
question, there may very well be legitimacy gains to be earned by targeting certain civilians. 
There is always a possibility that certain elements within a domestic population are unlikely to 
ever support a rebel group’s conversion to government of a new state and consent to a social 
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contract with them, and therefore are a threat to the group’s domestic legitimacy from the 
outset. A group might be able to procure some domestic legitimacy gains by preemptively 
eliminating these non-supporters in order to consolidate the support of domestic audiences 
that can be coopted. Furthermore, in identity-based conflicts, a well-documented process of 
othering takes place whereby through some combination of vitriolic propaganda, group loyalty, 
and repeated violent interactions, members of a rivalrous outgroup can come to be seen with 
hatred and as subhuman by members of the ingroup.154 In such conflicts, supporters of the 
rebel group may actually encourage or at least condone violence against members of the 
outgroup. Rather than practicing restraint, then, the group may actually earn domestic 
legitimacy gains by engaging in the selective targeting of certain civilians. 
 A few recent projects have allowed for researchers to explore the role of identity in 
explaining civilian targeting patterns, albeit without examining separatism specifically.155 
Indeed, an earlier version of this dissertation featured a chapter attempting to utilize Fjelde and 
Hultman’s (2013) replication data for this exact purpose. Unfortunately, however, the data 
were not usable in their current format for my purposes, as they lacked any observation 
identification variables that allowed me to match observations in their data to specific conflict 
dyads with reasonable certainty. Coding efforts to retrace Fjelde and Hultman’s steps in 
compiling these data, while feasible, proved to be too daunting to tackle for one chapter in a 
dissertation. That does not mean, however, that it is an impossible task to take up given the 
time and resources. I believe this is an eminently fertile place to start for any scholar interested 
 
154 See Horowitz (1985) 
155 Fjelde and Hultman (2013), Fjelde et al. (2019) 
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in exploring how civilian targeting patterns manifest according to identity-based factors. I leave 
it to future scholarship to take up the task of exploring these ideas further. 
 One final extension of this dissertation has to do with questions examined in Chapter 4 
that can be further elucidated with in-depth qualitative investigations. One outcome in 
particular that could benefit from such an investigation is the association between separatism 
and child soldier use. In chapter 4, I found no relationship between them. One potential 
explanation for this is that some sort of volunteerism might be at work, whereby children are 
not forcibly conscripted but rather voluntarily enlisted. It is possible that separatist groups in 
particular, owing to their connection to local civilians, might feature higher levels of 
volunteerism among child combatants than non-separatist groups. One way this might be 
explored is by selecting 1-2 primarily separatist groups and 1-2 primarily non-separatist groups 
and exploring the child soldier-enlistment patterns by type of rebel group. 
 It may also be worthwhile to explore kidnapping qualitatively. I found that separatist 
groups are less likely to kidnap foreign nationals in particular, but not all civilians in general. I 
posited that this could be the result of an interest in avoiding incurring the wrath of important 
members of the international system, but it could just as well be a function of opportunity – 
separatists tend to occupy territory further from national centers of power and therefore 
simply have less access to places where foreign nationals are likely to be. A study that traces 
and compares the processes of separatist and non-separatist kidnapping cases could shed 





7.7 Implications and Conclusions 
 I started this project with the observation that separatist conflicts tend to kill fewer 
civilians, despite lasting longer on average than other conflicts and not resulting in fewer 
combatant deaths than other conflicts. It became clear upon consulting recent scholarship as 
well as a few actual cases that this observation is the result of deliberate group-level decisions 
and not just the byproduct of conflict-level conditions. This project has attempted to clarify the 
forces underpinning this observation more comprehensively. I did so by first embedding 
existing research and conceivable future research within a theoretical framework that is useful 
for making sense of rebel strategic decisions in legitimacy-oriented conflicts. This framework 
predicts that separatist rebels should make strategic decisions designed to maximize legitimacy 
gains and minimize legitimacy costs in the eyes of important international and domestic 
audiences. I then proposed several hypotheses that expanded the coverage of existing research 
that falls within the legitimacy-seeking theoretical framework. In subsequent chapters, I tested 
these hypotheses and found considerable support for the premise that separatist groups do 
indeed make strategic decisions that prioritize legitimacy concerns. In general, it appears that 
separatist rebel groups kill fewer civilians, use lower levels of sexual violence, and less often 
kidnap foreign nationals, steal from civilians, and intercept humanitarian aid than other rebel 
groups. Interestingly, they engage in higher levels of extortion, potentially as a way of 
establishing a legitimate tax-collection regime. The legitimacy-seeking framework also has 
important limitations, however, as it appears that certain contextual factors can also influence 
separatist civilian targeting patterns. 
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 With this dissertation project, I have made a few important contributions to the 
academic literature. First, I have shed light on important aspects on a specific class of civil 
conflicts – separatist conflicts. The theoretical framework I established in Chapter 3 as well as 
the findings in Chapters 4 and 5 overwhelmingly support the notion that separatist conflicts 
unfold systematically differently compared to other conflicts. This is in large part the result of 
separatist rebel groups making strategic decisions aimed at demonstrating their willingness and 
ability to play by the rules of the international system and to uphold their end of a social 
contract with a domestic citizenry. By extension, these theoretical and empirical insights also 
inform the academic discussion surrounding statemaking and legitimacy, both of which are 
inherently relevant to any discussion of separatism. 
Second, my theory and findings have important implications for the literature on civilian 
targeting at large. I do this in part by considering additional outcomes that go well beyond 
simply studying rebel killing of civilians. In addition, I conduct the empirical analyses in Chapters 
4-6 while employing a set of theoretically informed covariates based on existing literature on 
civilian targeting in civil war, but test them on new outcomes and in a few cases using newer 
and improved data sources, thereby contributing new insights to the literature on civilian 
targeting that moves beyond examining merely the role of separatism. 
Finally, I contribute to conflict research in general by exploring the dynamic nature of 
armed conflicts. In Chapter 6, I went beyond focusing on group- and conflict-level factors to 
explain conflict outcomes by examining micro-level within-conflict factors. In doing so, I have 
demonstrated that developments within conflicts can strongly influence how conflicts unfold, 
specifically as it relates to combatant strategic decisions. The scope of this part of the analysis 
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has been quite limited, as I applied it only to one specific context in one specific type of conflict, 
but the insights gleaned from this analysis have important implications for future research, 
which I have discussed at length elsewhere in this chapter. 
 I conclude this dissertation with a discussion of a some of the important implications the 
theory and findings in this dissertation has for policymakers and practitioners dedicated to 
reducing civilian suffering and addressing challenges of human security in armed conflicts. One 
of these is that legitimacy concerns appear to only represent one factor influencing separatist 
tactical thinking, and they can sometimes take a back seat depending upon contextual factors. 
In Chapter 6, I demonstrated that separatists do tend to kill more civilians after suffering a 
costly month in terms of battlefield fatalities. While the scope of this analysis is a bit limited, 
the logic can be extended well beyond this lone context. The implication of this that is 
particularly policy-relevant is that there may be certain critical points within conflicts where 
engagement with armed groups is especially important in order to mitigate the dangers civilians 
face in their relationships with combatants. 
 Another limitation of the legitimacy-seeking framework that perhaps has even more 
potent policy-relevance is that separatists seem to de-prioritize their own legitimacy-oriented 
strategies when the government they are fighting engages in higher levels of civilian killing. This 
observation becomes especially important when we take into account that in several of the few 
successful separatist movements of the past two decades, the international community only 
intervened on the side of the rebels after the government in question engaged in widespread 
human rights abuses. The implications of this are that the international community tends to 
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hold states to a higher standard than rebel groups, and that they are not particularly interested 
in rewarding “good” behavior on the part of rebels. This is a dangerous reality. 
Existing research suggests that non-violent forms of dissent meet with success more 
often than violent ones, except when they are self-determination movements (Chenoweth and 
Stephan 2011). This is likely due to the priority individual states as well as the international 
community at large place on the principle of territorial integrity rather than the contradictory 
principle of self-determination. This means that if self-determination movements ever hope to 
meet success, violent secession might be their only recourse. But if successfully establishing a 
new state after rebellion requires the support of important members of the international 
community who oppose the premise of their existence in principle and who only support the 
cause of separatism when the government engages in widespread transgressions, then what 
incentives do separatist groups have to continue playing by the international community’s 
rules? Further, what incentive do they have to not engage in strategies that deliberately draw 
the violent ire of the state they are fighting? If rebels learn from history, then members of the 
international community, as well as states facing domestic self-determination movements, are 
playing with fire if they continue to choose not to take seriously the commitment of separatist 
rebels to play by their rules. 
On the other hand, the findings and implications of this dissertation highlight the 
importance of a real, concerted effort on the part of the international community to engage 
with rebels that demonstrate a value for the observation of human rights and the development 
of viable political institutions. If international actors truly value efforts to protect civilians, to 
prioritize human security in war zones, and to incentivize political and institutional stability, 
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then rewarding such normatively “good” behavior is an important first step in influencing other 
rebels to employ similar strategies with the hope that they will meet with success. In the long 
run, this could help lead to a world where the devastation and human suffering stemming from 







Achen, Christopher H. 2005. “Let’s Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits 
Where they Belong.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 22(4): 327-339. 
Amnesty International. November 18, 1997. “Algeria: Civilians Caught in a Spiral of Violence 
Amidst the Indifference of the International Community.” Retrieved from: 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/164000/mde280351997en.pdf 
Arendt, Hannah. 1970. On Violence. Orlando: Harcourt, Inc. 
Associated Press. September 22, 1997. “53 Algerians Massacred as Killing Goes On.” Retrieved 
From: https://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/22/world/53-algerians-massacred-as-killing-
goes-on.html 
Associated Press. December 31, 2018. “UN threatens to Slash Yemen Food Aid over Theft by 
Rebels.” 
Balcels, Laia. 2010. “Rivalry and Revenge: Violence against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars.” 
International Studies Quarterly 54: 291-313. 
Beber, Bernd and Christopher Blattman. 2013. “The Logic of Child Soldiering and Coercion.” 
International Organization 67(1): 65-104. 
Blakkisrud, Helge, and Pal Kolsto. 2011. “From Secessionist Conflict Toward a Functioning State: 
Processes of State- and Nation-Building in Transnistria.” Post-Soviet Affairs 27(2): 178-
210. 
Boylan, Brandon M. 2015. “In Pursuit of Independence: The Political Economy of Catalonia’s 
Secessionist Movement.” Nations and Nationalism 21(4): 761-785. 
 184 
Byman, Daniel. 1998. “The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 21(2): 149-
169. 
Capizzi, Elaine, Helen Hill, and Dave Macey. 1976. “FRETILIN and the Struggle for Independence 
in East Timor.” Race and Class 17(4): 381-395. 
Caspersen, Nina. 2015. “Degrees of Legitimacy: Ensuring Internal and External Support in the 
Absence of Recognition”.  Geoforum 66: 184-192. 
Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic 
of Nonviolent Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Clark, Roger S. 1980. “The ‘Decolonization’ of East Timor and the United Nations Norms on Self-
Determination and Aggression”. The Yale Journal of World Public Order 7(1): 2-44. 





Coggins, Bridget. 2015. “Rebel Diplomacy: Violent Non-State Actors and the Strategic Use of 
Talk,” in Rebel Governance in Civil War, Arjona, Ana, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah 
Mampilly, Eds. Cambridge University Press. 
Coggins, Bridget. 2011. “Friends in High Places: International Politics and the Emergence of 
States from Secessionism.” International Organization 65(3): 433-467. 
Cohen, Dara Kay. 2010. “Explaining Sexual Violence during Civil War.” Ph.D. Dissertation. 
Stanford University. 
 185 
Cohen, Dara Kay and Ragnhild Nordas. 2014. Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Dataset, from 
the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Dataset website: 
http://www.sexualviolencedata.org. 
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler.  2002.  “The Political Economy of Secession.”  Working Paper, 
Development Research Group, World Bank. 
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic 
Papers 56: 563-595. 
Correlates of War Project. 2017. “State System Membership List, v2016.” Online, 
http://correlatesofwar.org. 
Cox, Rory. 2017. “Expanding the History of the Just War: The Ethics of War in Ancient Egypt.” 
International Studies Quarterly 61(2): 371-384. 
Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2009. “It Takes Two: A 
Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(4): 
570-597. 
Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. 2014. Inside the Politics of Self-Determination. Oxford 
University Press. 
Dastpish, Hesam, and Monique Smits. 2019. “Human Rights in Kurdistan of Iran.” Democratic 
Party of Iranian Kurdistan. 
Denny, Elaine K., and Barbara F. Walter.  2014.  “Ethnicity and Civil War.”  Journal of Peace  
Research 51(2): 199-212. 
Deslauriers, Marguerite, and Pierre Destree. 2013. The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s 
Politics. Cambridge University Press. 
 186 
Djuhari, Lely T. May 19, 2003. “Indonesia Goes After Aceh Rebels.” Associated Press. Retrieved 
from: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/indonesia-goes-after-aceh-rebels/ 
Downes, Alexander B. 2008. Targeting Civilians in Civil War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Dupuy, Kendra, Scott Gates, Havard M. Nygard, Ida Rudolfsen, Siri Aas Rustad, Havard Strand, 
and Henrik Urdal. 2017. “Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2016.” White Paper Report. 
Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich. 
Eck, Kristine and Lisa Hultman. 2007. “One-sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from 
new Fatality Data.” Journal of Peace Research 44(1): 233-246. 
Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2002. “How Much War Will we see? Explaining the 
Prevalence of Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(3): 307-334. 
Ellingsen, Tanja. 2000. “Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew? Multiethnicity and 
Domestic Conflict during and after the Cold War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44(2): 
228-249. 
Fazal, Tanisha. 2018. Wars of Law. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Fearon, James D. 1994. “Domestic Political Audience Costs and the Escalation of Militarized 
Interstate Disputes.” American Political Science Review 88(3): 577-592. 
Fjelde, Hanne and Lisa Hultman. 2013. Weakening the Enemy: A Disaggregated Study of 
Violence against Civilians in Africa. Journal of Conflict Resolution 58(7): 1230-1257. 
Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, Livia Schubiger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, and Margareta 
Sollenberg. 2019. “Introducing the Ethnic One-Sided Violence Dataset.” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science. 
Florea, Adrian. “Rebel Governance in De Facto States. Unpublished Manuscript. 
 187 
Fortna, Virginia Page. 2015. “Do Terrorists Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War 
Outcomes.” International Organization 69: 519-556. 
Fortna, Paige, Michael A. Rubin, and Nicholas Lotito. “Terrorism in Armed Conflict (TAC): 
Introducing a New Data Set on Terrorism in Civil Conflicts, 1970-2012.” Unpublished 
Manuscript. 
Fortna, Paige, Michael A. Rubin, and Nicholas Lotito. Forthcoming. “Don’t bite the Hand the 
Feeds: Rebel Funding Sources and the Use of Terrorism.” International Studies 
Quarterly. 
Friday, Karl F. 2004. Samurai, Warfare and the State in Early Medieval Japan. Routledge. 
Geneva Call. 21 April 2010. “Iranian Kurdish Organizations Prohibit the Use of Anti-Personnel 
Mines.” 
Geneva Call. 19 December 2012. “Iranian Kurdish Armed Non-state Actors Commit to a 
Prohibition on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict and to Improving Child Protection.” 
Geneva Call. 16 June 2014. “Syrian Kurdish Armed Non-state Actor Commits to ban on Anti-
personnel Mines, Sexual Violence, and Child Recruitment.” 
Geneva Call. 28 June 2015. “Iran: A Kurdish armed Movement takes Official Commitments to 
Reinforce the Protection of Civilians.” 
Godelmann, Iker Reyes. 2014. “The Zapista Movement: The Fight for Indigenous Rights in 
Mexico.” Australian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from: 
http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/news-item/the-zapatista-movement-the-fight-
for-indigenous-rights-in-mexico/ 
Goodwin, Jeff. 2006. “A Theory of Categorical Terrorism.” Social Forces 84(4): 2027-2046. 
 188 
Green, Amelia Hoover. 2011. “Repertoires of Violence against Noncombatants: The Role of 
Armed Group Institutions and Ideologies.” Ph.D. Dissertation. Yale University. 
Griffiths, Ryan and Tanisha Fazal. 2014. “Membership has its Privileges: The Changing Benefits 
of Statehood”. International Studies review 16(1): 79-196. 
Haer, Roos van der and Tobias Böhmelt. 2016. “The Impact of Child Soldiers on Rebel Groups’ 
Fighting Capacities. Conflict Management and Peace Science 33(2): 153-173. 
Harbom, Lotta, Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen. 2008. “Dyadic Dimensions of Armed 
Conflict, 1946-2007.” Journal of Peace Research 45(5): 697-710. 
Hardine, Matthew. 2000. “East Timor, the United Nations, and the International Community: 
Force Feeding Human Rights into the Institutionalised Jaws of Failure.” Pacifica Review: 
Peace, Security & Global Change 12(1) 
Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. “Toward a 
Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992.” The 
American Political Science Review 95(1): 33-48. 
Högbladh, Stina. 2019. “UCDP GED Codebook version 19.1.” Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala University. 
Högbladh, Stina, Therese Pettersson, and Lotta Themner. 2011. “External Support in Armed 
Conflict 1975-2009. Presenting new data.” Paper presented at the 52nd Annual 
International Studies Association Convention, Montreal, Canada, 16-19 March 2011. 
Holtermann, Helge. 2019. “Diversionary Rebel Violence in Territorial Civil War.” International 
Studies Quarterly 63(2): 215-230. 
Horowitz, Donald L.  1985.  Ethnic Groups in Conflict.  Berkeley:  University of California Press. 
 189 
Huang, Reyko. 2016. The Wartime Origins of Democratization. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hultman, Lisa. 2007. “Battle Losses and Rebel Violence: Raising the Costs for Fighting.” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 19(2): 205-222. 
Hultman, Lisa. 2012. “Attacks on Civilians in Civil War: Targeting the Achilles Heel of Democratic 
Governments.” International Interactions 38(2): 164-181. 
Human Rights Watch. August 27, 2007. “No One is Safe: Insurgent Attacks in Thailand’s 
Southern Border Provinces.” Retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/08/27/ 
no-one-safe/insurgent-attacks-civilians-thailands-southern-border-provinces. 
Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2006. “Handling and Manhandlins Civilians in 
Civil War.” American Political Science Review 100(3): 4292-447. 
IHL Database: Rule 93. Rape and other forms of Sexual Violence. International Committee of the 
Red Cross. 
International Laws and Child Rights. Child Soldiers International. Retrieved 5 November 2018. 
Jackson, Ashley. 2016. “In their Words: Perception of Armed Non-State Actors on Humanitarian 
Action.” Geneva Call. https://www.genevacall.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/WHS_Report_2016_web.pdf. 
Jardin, Matthew. 2010. “East Timor, the United Nations, and the International Community: 
Force Feeding Human Rights into the Institutionalized Jaws of Failure.” Pacifica Review 
12: 47-62. 
Jo, Hyeran. 2015. Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 190 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University Press. 
Kalyvas, Stathas N. 2012. “Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending 
the Control-Collaboration Model.” Terrorism and Political Violence 24(4): 658-668. 
Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Matthew Adam Kocher. 2009. “The Dynamics of Violence in Vietnam: 
An Analysis of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES).” Journal of Peace Research 46(3): 
335-355. 
Kapil, Arun. 1998. “The Algerian Civil War: A Review Essay.” Middle East Studies Association 
Bulletin 31(2): 155-160. 
Klabbers, Jan. 2006. “The Right to be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination and International 
Law.” Human Rights Quarterly28: 186-206. 
Kocher, Matthew Adam, Tom Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas. 2011. “Aerial Bombing and 
Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War.” American Journal of Political Science 55(2): 1-
18. 
Koos, Carlo. 2017. “Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts: Research Progress and Remaining 
Gaps.” Third World Quarterly 9: 1935-1951. 
Koutsopetrou, Sotiria. 2019. “Rape and Rape Culture in Ancient Greece? Was rape “really” rape 
in Ancient Greece?” Master Thesis, Department of Archaeology, History, Cultural 
Studies, and Religion, University of Bergen. 
Kuperman, Alan J. 2008. “Mitigating the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons 
from Economics.” Global Governance 14: 219-240. 
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). GlobalSecurity.org. 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kdpi.htm. 
 191 
Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. “The Strategies of Terrorism.” Quarterly Journal: 
International Security 31(1): 49-80. 
Lacina, Bethany. 2006. “Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
50(2): 276-289. 
Lake, David A. 2002. “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First 
Century.” International Organization Spring: 15-29. 
Larmer, Miles and Erik Kennes. 2019. “Katanga’s Secessionism and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.” In: de Vries, Lotje, Pierre Englebert, and Mareike Schomerus (eds.) Secessionism 
in African Politics. Palgrave MacMillan. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1983. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. London: Heineman. 
Long, Scott J. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Loyle, Cyanne E. and Helga Binningsbo. 2018. “Justice During Armed Conflict from 1949 through 
2011: A New Dataset.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(2): 442-466. 
Metelits, Claire. 2010. Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior. 
New York: New York Press. 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2017. 
Global Terrorism Database. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. 
Noack, Rick. 2018. “The Nobel Peace Prize Elevates Understanding of Rape as a War Crime.” 
Chicago Tribune. 
Offstein, Norman. 2003. “An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: 
FARC, ELN, EPL.” Desarrollo y Sociedad 52(1): 99-142. 
 192 
Owens, Patricia. 2017. “Critical Dialogue: ‘Economy of Force’ and ‘Violence and Restraint in Civil 
War.’” Perspectives on Politics 15(4): 1102-1107. 
Pape, Robert A. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” American Political Science 
Review 97(3): 343-361. 
Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random 
House. 
Pettersson, Therese, Stina Högbladh, and Magnus Öberg. 2019. “Organized Violence, 1989-
2018, and Peace Agreements.” Journal of Peace Research 56(4). 
Regan, Patrick M. Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Interventions and Intrastate Conflict. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Robinson, Paul 2003. Just War in Comparative Perspective. New York: Ashgate. 
Robinson, Paul. 2006. Military Honour and the Conduct of War. New York: Routledge. 
Ross, Michael L. 2004. “What do we Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?” Journal of 
Peace Research 41(3): 337-356. 
Ross, Michael L. 2012. The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of 
Nations. Princeton University Press. 
Salehyan, Idean, David Siroky, and Reed M. Wood. 2014. “External Rebel Sponsorship and 
Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities.” International 
Organization 68(3): 633-661. 
Salla, Michael E. 1995. “Australian Foreign Policy and East Timor.” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 49(2): 207-222. 
 193 
Savun, Burcu and Daniel C. Tirone. 2011. “Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How 
Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” American Journal of Political Science 55(2): 
233-246. 
Stanton, Jessica. 2008. Strategies of Violence and Restraint in Civil War. Columbia University 
Press, New York. 
Stanton, Jessica. 2016. Violence and Restraint in Civil War: Civilian Targeting in the Shadow of 
International Law. Cambridge University Press. 
Stewart, Megan A. 2016. “Civil War as State Building: Strategic Governance in Civil War.” 
International Organization. 
Strand, Havard, Siri Aas Rustad, Henrik Urdal, and Havard Mokleiv Nygard. 2019. “Trends in 
Armed Conflict, 1946-2018.” Conflict Trends 3 Prio: Oslo. 
Sundberg, Ralph, and Erik Melander. 2013. “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event 
Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 50(4): 523-532. 
Thomas, Dorothy Q. and Regan E. Ralph. Rape in War: Challenging the Tradition of Impunity. 
SAIS Review 14(1): 81-99 
Toft, Monica Duffy.  2003.  The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the 
Indivisibility of Territory.  Princeton University Press. 
UNICEF. 2007. “The Paris Principles. Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with 
Armed Forces or Armed Groups.” Available at: https://www.unicef.org/ 
mali/media/1561/file/ParisPrinciples.pdf. 
United States Army and Marine Corps. 2007. Counterinsurgency Field Manual. University of 
Chicago Press. 
 194 
Valentino, Benjamin A. 2004. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Valentino, Benjamin A. 2014. “Why We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence Against 
Civilians.” Annual Review of Political Science 17: 89-103. 
Valentino, Benjamin, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay. 2004. “’Draining the Sea’: Mass Killing 
and Guerrilla Warfare”. International Organization 58: 375-407. 
Valentino, Benjamin, Paul Huth, and Sarah Croco. 2006. “Covenants without the Sword: 
International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War. World Politics 58(3): 
339-377. 
Vargas, Gonzalo. 2009. “Urban Irregular Warfare and Violence Against Civilians: Evidence from 
a Colombian City.” Terrorism and Political Violence 21(1): 110-132. 
Vickman, Elisabeth. 2005. “Ancient Origins: Sexual Violence in Warfare, Part I.” Anthropology & 
Medicine 12(1): 21-31. 
Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, 
and Luc Girardin. 2015.  “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The 
Ethnic Power Relations Dataset Family.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(7): 1327-1324. 
Walsh, James Igoe, Justin Conrad, Beth Elise Whitaker, and Katelin Hudak. 2018. “Financing 
Rebellion: Introducing the Rebel Contraband Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 55(5): 
699-707. 
Walter, Barbara. 2003. “Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict.” International Studies 
Review 5(4): 137-153. 
 195 
Walter, Barbara. 2009. Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts are so Violent. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Weidnamnn, Nils B. 2011. “Violence ‘from Above’ or ‘from Below’? The Role of Ethnicity in 
Bosnia’s Civil War.” Journal of Politics 73(4). 
Weinstein, Jeremy M.  2007.  Inside Rebellion: the Politics of Insurgent Violence.  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wemmers, Jo-Anne. 2009. “Victims and the International Criminal Court (ICC): Evaluating the 
Success of the ICC with Respect to Victims.” International Review of Victimology 16: 211-
227. 
Whitaker, Beth Elise, James Igoe Walsh, and Justin Conrad. Forthcoming. “Natural Resource 
Exploitation and Sexual Violence by Rebel Groups. The Journal of Politics 1-10. 
Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2009. “Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When is Wartime Rape Rare.” 
Politics & Society 37(1): 131-162. 
Wood, Reed M. 2010. “Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians”. Journal of 
Peace Research 47(5): 601-614. 
Wood, Reed M. 2014. “From Loss to Looting? Battlefield Costs and Rebel Incentives for 
Violence.” International Organization 68(4): 979-999. 
Wood, Reed M., Jacob Kathman, and Stephen Gent. 2012. “Too Much of a Bad Thing? Violence 
against Civilians and the Outcome of Civil Wars.” British Journal of Political Science 
44(3). 
Wucherpfennig, Julian, Nils W. Metternich, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 
2012. “Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War.” World Politics 64(1): 79-115. 
 196 




Appendix: Data and List of Cases 
Rebel Group Government Actor Separatist Group Years Active (Period 1989-2018) 
POLISARIO Morocco Yes 1989 
Lebanese Forces Lebanon No 1989 
PFLP-GC Israel No 1989 
Islamic Legion Chad No 1989-1990 
NPFL Liberia No 1989-1990 
Military faction (forces of Honasan, Abenina 
& Zumel) 
Philippines No 1989-1990 
Contras/FDN Nicaragua No 1989-1990 
JVP Sri Lanka No 1989-1990 
ABSU India No 1989-1990 
EPL Colombia No 1989-1990 
Forces of Michel Aoun Lebanon No 1989-1990 
MNLF Philippines No 1989-1990, 1993, 2000 
LRM Laos No 1989-1990, 1999 
EPLF Ethiopia Yes 1989-1991 
SNM Somalia No 1989-1991 
SPM Somalia No 1989-1991 
JSS/SB Bangladesh No 1989-1991 
FMLN El Salvador No 1989-1991 




Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction Afghanistan No 1989-1991 
LRA Uganda No 1989-1991, 1994-1998, 2000-2006, 2008, 
2010, 2013-2014 
UPA Uganda No 1989-1992 
OLF Ethiopia No 1989-1992, 1994-1995, 1998-2013, 2015-
2016 
PUK Iraq No 1989-1992, 1995-1996 
Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan Afghanistan No 1989-1992, 1996 
Renamo Mozambique No 1989-1992, 2008, 2013, 2016 
KIO Myanmar (Burma) No 1989-1992, 2011-2018 
Sikh insurgents India Yes 1989-1993 
MRTA Peru No 1989-1993 
PIRA United Kingdom Yes 1989-1994 
URNG Guatemala No 1989-1995 
Hizb-i Wahdat Afghanistan No 1989-1995 
CPP Philippines No 1989-1995, 1997, 1999-2018 
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Sendero Luminoso Peru No 1989-1999, 2007-2010 
ELN Colombia No 1989-2000, 2002-2006, 2010, 2015-2016, 
2018 
LTTE Sri Lanka Yes 1989-2001, 2003, 2005-2009 
SPLM/A Sudan No 1989-2004 
PKK Turkey Yes 1989-2013, 2015-2018 
FARC Colombia No 1989-2014 
FUNCINPEC Cambodia 
(Kampuchea) 
No 1989, 1991, 1996 
PFLP Israel No 1989, 2001, 2010 
MPS Chad No 1990 
MPA Mali No 1990 
NMSP Myanmar (Burma) No 1990 
EPRDF Ethiopia No 1990-1991 
USC/SSA Somalia No 1990-1991 
GAM Indonesia Yes 1990-1991, 1999-2005 
KNU Myanmar (Burma) Yes 1990-1992, 1994-1995, 1997-2011 
Fatah Israel No 1990-1992, 2000-2002, 2005-2007 
FPR Rwanda No 1990-1993 
ABSDF Myanmar (Burma) No 1990-1994, 1997 
Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan Afghanistan No 1990-1995, 2000, 2002-2003, 2006, 
2008-2011, 2013 
Hezbollah Israel No 1990-1999, 2006 
Kashmir insurgents India Yes 1990-2014, 2016-2018 
MFDC Senegal Yes 1990, 1992-1993, 1995, 1997-1998, 
2000-2001, 2003, 2011 
BRA Papua New Guinea Yes 1990, 1992-1996 
KDPI Iran Yes 1990, 1993, 1996, 2016, 2018 
MQM Pakistan No 1990, 1994-1996, 2001 
ULFA India Yes 1990, 1994-2010 
MILF Philippines No 1990, 1994, 1996-2009, 2011, 2015 
ETA Spain Yes 1991 
Republic of Armenia Russia (Soviet 
Union) 
Yes 1991 
Takfir wa'l Hijra Algeria No 1991 
Republic of Croatia Serbia (Yugoslavia) Yes 1991-1992 
Palipehutu Burundi No 1991-1992 
FLAA Niger No 1991-1992 
DHKP-C Turkey No 1991-1992, 1995, 2000 
MDD Chad No 1991-1993, 1997 
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FRUD Djibouti No 1991-1994 
PWG India No 1991-1994, 1996-2004 
Republic of Artsakh Azerbaijan Yes 1991-1994, 1997-1998, 2005, 2008, 2012, 
2014-2017 
USC/SNA Somalia No 1991-1996 
SCIRI Iraq No 1991-1996 
RSO Myanmar (Burma) No 1991-1996 
RUF Sierra Leone No 1991-2001 
MEK Iran No 1991, 1993, 1997, 1999-2001 
NSCN-K Myanmar (Burma) Yes 1991, 1995, 2000-2001, 2005-2007 
Military faction (forces of Hugo Chavez) Venezuela No 1992 
Zviadists Georgia No 1992-1993 
Serbian Republic of Krajina Croatia Yes 1992-1993, 1995 
Republic of Abkhazia Georgia Yes 1992-1993, 2001 
CSNPD Chad No 1992-1994 
FNT Chad No 1992-1994 
Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Bosnia-Herzegovina Yes 1992-1995 
Serbian irregulars Bosnia-Herzegovina Yes 1992-1995 
UTO Tajikistan No 1992-1996, 1998 
AIS Algeria No 1992-1997 
NSCN-IM India Yes 1992-1997, 2000-2001 
KNPP Myanmar (Burma) Yes 1992, 1996, 2005 
ATTF India Yes 1992, 1997 
Republic of South Ossetia Georgia Yes 1992, 2004, 2008 
Military faction (forces of Suret Husseinov) Azerbaijan No 1993 
Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Bosnia-Herzegovina Yes 1993-1994 
Croatian irregulars Bosnia-Herzegovina Yes 1993-1994 
CNR Chad No 1993-1994 
UNLF India Yes 1993-1994, 1999-2000, 2004-2007, 2009 
Hamas Israel No 1993-1994, 2000, 2002-2009, 2011-2012, 
2014, 2018 
MTA Myanmar (Burma) Yes 1993-1995 
Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia Bosnia-Herzegovina Yes 1993-1995 
Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami Afghanistan No 1993-1995 
al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya Egypt No 1993-1998 
ASG Philippines Yes 1993-1998, 2000-2018 
GIA Algeria No 1993-2003 
AIAI Ethiopia No 1993, 1996, 1999 
Ninjas Congo No 1993, 1998-1999 
Democratic Republic of Yemen Yemen (North 
Yemen) 
Yes 1994 
FIAA Mali No 1994 
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CRA Niger No 1994 
EZLN Mexico No 1994 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Russia (Soviet 
Union) 
Yes 1994-1996, 1999-2007 
CNDD Burundi No 1994-1998 
FLEC-FAC Angola Yes 1994, 1996-1998, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2009 
NDFB India Yes 1994, 1996-2004 
FLEC-R Angola Yes 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002 
ONLF Ethiopia Yes 1994, 1998-2007, 2009-2016 
FDR Niger No 1995 
OPON Forces Azerbaijan No 1995 
PLA India Yes 1995-1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2017 
Taleban Afghanistan No 1995-1996, 2003-2017 
CNRT Indonesia Yes 1995, 1997-1999 
WNBF Uganda No 1996 
EPR Mexico No 1996 
God's Army Myanmar (Burma) No 1996 
AFDL DR Congo (Zaire) No 1996-1997 
ALiR Rwanda No 1996-2000 
NDA Sudan Yes 1996-2001 
UIFSA Afghanistan No 1996-2001 
RCSS Myanmar (Burma) Yes 1996-2002, 2005-2011, 2013 
ADF Uganda No 1996-2002, 2007-2008, 2010-2011, 2014-
2015, 2017-2018 
CPN-M Nepal No 1996-2006, 2009 
PNA Israel No 1996, 2000-2002 
MCC India No 1996, 2001-2004 
Frolina Burundi No 1997 
Kamajors Sierra Leone No 1997 
Cobras Congo No 1997 
UNRF II Uganda No 1997 
UFRA Niger No 1997 
FARF Chad No 1997-1998 
Forces of Khudoberdiyev Tajikistan No 1997-1998 
Cocoyes Congo No 1997-1999 
AFRC Sierra Leone No 1997-1999 
Palipehutu-FNL Burundi No 1997-2000, 2002-2004, 2006, 2008 
EIJM - AS Eritrea No 1997, 1999, 2000, 2003 
UWSA Myanmar (Burma) No 1997, 2001 
RIRA United Kingdom Yes 1998 
UCK Serbia (Yugoslavia) Yes 1998-1999 
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Military Junta for the Consolidation of 
Democracy, Peace and Justice 
Guinea-Bissau No 1998-1999 
Ntsiloulous Congo No 1998-1999, 2002, 2008, 2016 
RCD DR Congo (Zaire) No 1998-2001 
CNDD-FDD Burundi No 1998-2003 
MLC DR Congo (Zaire) No 1998, 2000 
FRUD-C Djibouti No 1999 
IMU Uzbekistan No 1999-2000 
NLFT India Yes 1999-2003 
MDJT Chad No 1999-2003 
AQIM Algeria No 1999-2008, 2010-2018 
CPI-ML-J India No 2000 
RFDG Guinea No 2000-2001 
LURD Liberia No 2000-2003 
Forces of Mullo Abdullo Tajikistan No 2000, 2010 
Military faction (forces of Andre Kolingba) Central African 
Republic 
No 2001 
UCK Macedonia, FYR No 2001 
SRRC Somalia No 2001-2002 
PIJ Israel No 2001-2002, 2004, 2006-2014 
FDLR Rwanda No 2001-2002, 2009-2012, 2016, 2018 
AMB Israel No 2001-2003 
al-Qaida United States of 
America 
No 2001-2013, 2016 
MNLF - NM Philippines No 2001, 2005, 2013 
Forces of Francois Bozize Central African 
Republic 
No 2002 
MPIGO Ivory Coast No 2002-2003 
JEM Sudan No 2003-2005, 2007-2011 
SLM/A Sudan No 2003-2006, 2008-2011 
Patani insurgents Thailand Yes 2003-2018 
NDPVF Nigeria Yes 2004 
NLFT-B India Yes 2004 
JIG Uzbekistan No 2004 
Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa Nigeria No 2004 
Ansar al-Islam Iraq No 2004-2007, 2011 
IS Iraq No 2004-2018 
BLA Pakistan Yes 2004, 2006-2009, 2011-2016 
al-Mahdi Army Iraq No 2004, 2007 
FRCI Ivory Coast No 2004, 2011 
MKP Turkey No 2005 
PBCP Bangladesh No 2005 
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FUCD Chad No 2005-2006 
PBCP-J Bangladesh No 2005-2006 
RJF Iraq No 2005-2007 
PJAK Iran No 2005-2008, 2011, 2018 
CPI-Maoist India No 2005-2018 
BDK DR Congo (Zaire) Yes 2005, 2007-2008, 2017 
Baloch Ittehad Pakistan Yes 2006 
PRC Israel No 2006 
NRF Sudan No 2006 
SLM/A - MM Sudan No 2006 
RAFD Chad No 2006 
UFDD Chad No 2006-2007 
ARS/UIC Somalia No 2006-2008 
CNDP DR Congo (Zaire) No 2006-2008 
Jondullah Iran No 2006-2010 
Seleka Central African 
Republic 
No 2006, 2012-2013 
MNLF - HM Philippines No 2007 
SLM/A-Unity Sudan No 2007-2008 
MNJ Niger No 2007-2008 
ATNMC Mali No 2007-2009 
Forces of the Caucasus Emirate Russia (Soviet 
Union) 
No 2007-2015 
TTP Pakistan No 2007-2018 
AN Chad No 2008 
PULF India No 2008 
ETIM China Yes 2008 
KCP India Yes 2008-2009 
PREPAK India Yes 2008-2009 
BRA Pakistan Yes 2008-2009, 2012, 2014-2015 
Al-Shabaab Somalia No 2008-2018 
NDFB - RD India Yes 2009-2010 
Hizbul Islam Somalia No 2009-2010 
Lashkar-e-Islam Pakistan No 2009-2010, 2012-2014 
CPJP Central African 
Republic 
No 2009-2011 
AQAP Yemen (North 
Yemen) 
No 2009-2015, 2018 
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad Nigeria No 2009, 2011-2018 
AQIM Mali No 2009, 2013-2017 
MNDAA Myanmar (Burma) No 2009, 2014-2015, 2017 
FPRN Chad No 2010 
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AQIM Mauritania No 2010-2011 
SSDM/A Sudan No 2010-2011 
IMU Tajikistan No 2010-2011 
DKBA 5 Myanmar (Burma) Yes 2010-2011, 2013 
NTC Libya No 2011 
SSLM/A South Sudan No 2011-2012 
CNPSC (Yakutumba) DR Congo (Zaire) No 2011-2012, 2014, 2017-2018 
SRF Sudan No 2011-2018 
SSPP Myanmar (Burma) Yes 2011, 2013, 2015 
SPLM/A-North Sudan No 2011, 2015-2016 
Military faction (Red Berets) Mali No 2012 
TTP - TA Pakistan No 2012 
MUJAO Algeria No 2012 
Ansar Dine Mali No 2012-2013, 2015-2016 
M23 DR Congo (Zaire) No 2012-2013, 2017 
BIFM Philippines Yes 2012-2016 
GNLA India Yes 2012, 2014 
CMA Mali No 2012, 2014-2015 
BLF Pakistan Yes 2012, 2015 
BIFM Philippines No 2013 
SSDM/A - Cobra Faction South Sudan No 2013 
MUJAO Mali No 2013 
anti-Balaka Central African 
Republic 
No 2013 
NDFB-S India Yes 2013-2014 
Kata Katanga DR Congo (Zaire) Yes 2013-2014 
APCLS DR Congo (Zaire) No 2013-2014 
PSLF Myanmar (Burma) No 2013-2015, 2017-2018 
SPLM/A - IO South Sudan No 2013-2018 
SARC Sudan No 2013, 2017 
IMU Pakistan No 2014 
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar Pakistan No 2014 
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis Egypt No 2014 
Zintan Military Council Libya No 2014 
al-Murabitun Mali No 2014 
RED-TABARA Burundi No 2014 
Darfur Joint Resistance Forces Sudan No 2014-2015 
Ansarallah Yemen (North 
Yemen) 
No 2014-2015 
IS Lebanon No 2014-2015, 2017 
Forces of the House of Representatives Libya No 2014-2015, 2017 
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DPR Ukraine Yes 2014-2018 
United Armed Forces of Novorossiya Ukraine Yes 2015 
IS Yemen (North 
Yemen) 
No ;2015 
FLM Mali No 2015 
IS Algeria No 2015 
IS Cameroon No 2015-2016 
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad Cameroon No 2015-2017 
IS Turkey No 2015-2017 
Al-Shabaab Kenya No 2015-2018 
IS Afghanistan No 2015-2018 
Forces of Hadi Yemen (North 
Yemen) 
No 2015-2018 
IS Russia (Soviet 
Union) 
No 2015-2018 
IS Niger No 2015-2018 
IS Nigeria No 2015-2018 
IS Egypt No 2015-2018 
UNLFW India Yes 2015-2018 
IS Libya No 2015-2018 
LPR Ukraine Yes 2015-2018 
IS Chad No 2015, 2017-2018 
TAK Turkey No 2016 
IS Jordan No 2016 
IS Tunisia No 2016 
IS Bangladesh No 2016-2017 
ARSA Myanmar (Burma) No 2016-2017 
IS Pakistan No 2016-2018 
Kamuina Nsapu DR Congo (Zaire) No 2016-2018 
IS Iran No 2017 
Harakit Sawa'id Misr Egypt No 2017-2018 
OPM Indonesia Yes 2018 
 
Discussion 
The table above includes a comprehensive list of rebel groups that appear in the data 
analyzed in Chapters 4-6. In addition to the names of combatants in each dyad, the table 
indicates the years those groups were active as well as whether or not the group was 
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separatist. Naturally and according to ACD coding rules described at length earlier in the 
dissertation, a group is considered active in a given year if 25 battle deaths resulted from their 
conflict with the government in that year.156 
The application of the separatism criterion is slightly less straightforward, but I again 
rely on previous scholarship to guide coding decisions. Specifically, I follow the coding scheme 
outlined in Cunningham et al.’s (2013) Nonstate Actor Data (NSA) to identify rebel groups that 
are engaged in separatist conflicts, as opposed to rebel groups that are seeking some change in 
policy or regime (what I refer to as center-seeking groups, following convention in the 
literature). Although adjudicating between separatist and non-separatist rebel groups was 
straightforward for me because of previous scholarship, the application of this criterion may be 
less straightforward for the reader. I therefore engage here in a discussion of a few of the cases 
in the data so that the reader might better understand how my coding decisions resulted in 
classification outcomes for the real-world cases in the list above. 
Some cases were quite easy to identify according to this criterion. The Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), for example, are so clearly 
separatist rebel groups that their status as such is evident even in their names.157 Fretilin, too, is 
easily identifiable as a separatist group, since their full name, the Revolutionary Front for an 
 
156 This of course does not mean that the group was not operating or that clashes between rebel and government 
troops did not occur in years when the conflict was not technically active; rather, it only means that said 
operations and clashes occurred at an extremely low level and did not rise to a point of analytically relevant 
severity. 
157 The two groups overlapped as rival factions during Eritrea’s decades-long struggle for independence from 
Ethiopia. Although both fought for Eritrean independence, the two fought amongst themselves on multiple 
occasions in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in the ELF’s expulsion into neighboring Sudan and the EPLF’s 
emergence as the only legitimate force for Eritrean independence prior to the establishment of Eritrea in 1991. 
Both groups now operate as rival (and not entirely peaceful) political parties, among many, within a politically 
messy and complicated independent Eritrea. 
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Independent East Timor, explicitly states the goal of independence and foreshadows the 
emergence of a state that now exists independently. Beyond these surface-level observations, 
it is clear that these groups operated with the explicit goal of independence in mind. Both the 
ELF and EPLF were committed to continuing the fight against Ethiopia until they were defeated 
(as with the ELF) or until they achieved victory (as with the EPLF). Fretilin, likewise, engaged in a 
long and committed struggle, and engaged in widespread diplomatic campaigns to win 
international support for an East Timor independent from, first, Colonial Portuguese, and 
subsequently, Indonesian control. 
Less obvious separatist groups are the ones that are named for a region but make no 
explicit calls for liberation or independence or claim to fight on behalf of an ethnic group in 
their name. More challenging still are the ones whose struggle has not resulted in a newly 
independent state as evidence of their intentions. Groups such as the Movement of Democratic 
Forces of Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) in 
Papua New Guinea fit into this category, and more digging was required to establish their 
separatist proclivities. Luckily, in both cases, leaders of the groups proclaimed early on that the 
goal was to be independence for their regions. In Casamance, the MFDC began peacefully 
petitioning for separatism in late 1982 but resorted to armed conflict in response to 
government crackdowns. In Bougainville, the BRA organized and rebelled against the 
government of Papua New Guinea in 1988 and 1989 in response broad social discontent with 
the lack of reinvestment in Bougainville of mining revenues procured there. The BRA’s goal was 
to establish a new state of Bougainville where Bougainvillians would have control over the 
region’s profitable copper mines. 
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A few cases did require some subjective adjudication as to whether a rebel group 
counted as separatist. This happened particularly in cases involving wars of irredentism – that 
is, wars where a group seeks to separate from one country and join another, rather than 
seeking outright independence. In these cases, I chose to consider these groups to be separatist 
since their explicit goals were to disrupt a state’s status quo territorial integrity and change 
their own statehood status. The prime example of such a conflict is that over the Republic of 
Artsakh, better known as Nagorno-Karabakh. Karabakhi separatists rebelled against Azerbaijan 
in 1992, perhaps with the goal of independence, but this quickly gave way to a popular interest 
in becoming incorporated into the existing state of Armenia, with whom they share many 
cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties. Armenia and Azerbaijan have been engaged in a protracted 
frozen interstate conflict over the region since the early stages of the Karabakhi rebellion, with 
the civil war between Karabakhi rebels and the government of Azerbaijan occupying a major 
theater. 
The wars of dissolution that resulted from the fall of first the Soviet Union and then 
Yugoslavia also presented difficult cases. In many of these, it is easy to determine intentional 
separatism on the part of rebels seeking to carve out a post-dissolution sovereign space, as was 
the case with Croatia’s separation from Serbia or Armenia’s resistance of Soviet domination. In 
others, however, it is less clear whether a group fought specifically to gain independence from 
an existing entity, or whether they simply got caught up in the chaos of the geopolitical 
situation around them. In each of these cases, however, since the opposite of separatism in my 
conceptualization is center-seeking, and since there is no center to which a group in these wars 
could turn their attention, I classified them as inherently separatist, even if they were only so by 
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circumstance. Still, most groups in these conflicts fought on behalf of an ethnic or social group 
that was not the dominant group in the country against which they were fighting (e.g., the 
Serbian Republic of Krajina vs. the government of Croatia, Croatian Irregulars vs. the 
government of Bosnia Herzegovina, etc.), so classifying all conflicts in these cases as separatist 
is a reasonable safe choice. 
Another difficult case to classify was the Zapista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in 
Mexico. The EZLN appears to pursue an outcome that includes significant autonomy and 
guarantee of indigenous rights within Mexico, but not outright independence. The EZLN 
espouses an ideology that has been referred to as “libertarian socialism”, wherein they favor 
government provision of many social services within a deeply federalized state system where 
most political power rests in the hands of local government (Godelmann 2014). It is therefore 
not a separatist movement, but perhaps as close as is possible otherwise. 
The final category of rebel groups in the data are those that are center-seeking. These 
are by far the most common groups in the data, as well as the most varied. In broad terms, 
these groups seek either to change some policy or to change the regime. Functionally, it is also 
a category that is meant to be highly inclusive, as it includes all rebel groups that do not count 
as separatist. The EZLN are one example of a center-seeking group, in that they seek to enhance 
indigenous rights in Mexico and fundamentally change Mexico’s style of governance, without 
seeking to separate from Mexico entirely. Group’s like the EZLN have limited goals aimed 
merely at policy change. Others seek more comprehensive change, usually involving full-blown 
regime change. The list of groups in this category is long and includes some of the most 
infamous rebel groups in the data, such as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, FARC and 
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ELN in Colombia, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, 
the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In addition, many 
small conflicts and all coups that rose to the level of full-blown war, such as those surrounding 
the Arab Spring, are included in this subset of the data. 
My goal in this discussion has been to elaborate on the structure and content of the 
data, as well as to shed light on empirical choices as it relates to adjudicating what counts as 
separatist and non-separatist conflicts. By this point, the reader should understand what 
qualities separatist groups generally possess, and what differentiates them from center-seeking 
groups. I refer the reader to consult the list above for more information on the status and 
categories of any rebel groups not discussed in more depth here. 
